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Abstract 
	  
This thesis offers a comparative historical analysis of sub-state violent 
contention in Quebec and Corsica. It focuses specifically on the Front de 
Libération du Québec (FLQ) and the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu 
(FLNC), in 1963 to 1971 and 1976 to 1990, respectively. The thesis argues that 
the FLQ and the FLNC sought to extend radical ideological space to promote 
independence in order to achieve revolutionary social and economic change 
through campaigns of violence and kidnappings.  
 
Theoretically, the thesis draws on the contentious politics and social 
movements literatures, which it notably combines with Radical Flank Effect 
(RFE). RFEs are interactive processes that aim to map the beneficial and/or 
detrimental impact of radical group action on moderate groups. Whilst 
commonly used to understand the political outcomes of social movements, 
RFE is used in this thesis in conjunction with social movement literature to 
compare the relationship between these violent movements and their more 
moderate opponents. To understand the internal dynamics of these 
movements, I have identified four key elements of contrast: membership, 
ideology, network structure and strategy. I draw on, for example, McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly’s (2001) mobilization method, which aids an understanding 
of membership and ideology by framing the interaction amongst challengers, 
their opponents and the media.  
 
This thesis seeks to understand FLQ and FLNC mobilization in light 
of the aim to shape and develop radical ideological space in the sub-states of 
Quebec and Corsica. It draws on an extensive study of archival data that 
includes police reports that have only recently been made available in 
Canada, transcripts of court cases, newspapers, and an interview with a 
former member of the FLNC, as well as secondary sources. The central 
orienting question is: what explains the contrasting patterns of sub-state 
violent contention in Quebec and Corsica? More specifically, why did the 
FLQ dissolve in 1971, yet the FLNC continued its violent trajectory, albeit 
less political and nationalist, until 2014? 
	   7	  
 
The FLQ and the FLNC differently subscribed to Marxism and post-
colonialism. The FLQ was committed to a Marxist program of revolutionary 
change, and this commitment was shared by the FLNC until the collapse of 
communism in central and Eastern Europe in 1989. FLQ members considered 
themselves ‘urban revolutionaries’ and employed Marxism to understand 
the economic disparity in industrial Montreal. Early Corsican violent 
contention, in contrast, included Maoist influences, in particular, through 
their demand for agrarian reform. The two groups viewed the relationship 
between their sub-states (Quebec and Corsica) and central states (Canada 
and France) through a colonial lens, and understood their mobilization 
against these states and elite minorities (the Anglophone elite in Quebec and 
the pieds noirs in Corsica) in this light. Both violent movements targeted this 
colonial relationship. Both the FLQ and FLNC manifestos were economically 
and politically focused, land and culture were additionally highlighted by 
the FLNC.  
 
This thesis found that sub-state violent contention in the very different 
contexts of Quebec and Corsica shared an overall pattern, an arc of violent 
mobilization. The initial mobilization developed from a frustration with 
moderate political groups; radicalization grew and new tactics were 
embraced; until turning points that included the assassination of Pierre 
Laporte by the FLQ and the division of the FLNC into competitive factions, 
and then a decline of activity, mobilization and recruitment. Although the 
FLQ and the FLNC contrasted greatly in terms of membership, ideology, 
organization and strategy, both groups attempted to extend radical space 
through the use of violent contention in these two very different nations. 
Ultimately, however, while the FLQ and the FLNC were able to extend or 
maintain radical space at times, yet they failed to sustain the extension of 
ideological radical space on the basis on their revolutionary manifestos. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
	  
	  
APC L’Associu di I Patrioti Corsu 
 
ARC L’Azzione pa a Rinascite di a Corsica 
(Corsican regionalist action) 
 
ARQ Armée Révolutionnaire du Quebec 
(Revolutionary army of Quebec) 
 
CBC Canadian Broadcasting Company 
 
CSC Cunsulta di I Studienti Corsu 







Confédération des syndicats 
nationaux  
(Confederation of National Trade 
Unions) 
CONSEO Conference of Nations without a 
State in Western Europe 
 
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 






Front de Libération des Femmes 
(Women’s Liberation Front) 
 
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale 
Corsu 
(The National Corsican Liberation 
Front) 
 
FLQ Front de Libération du Quebec 
(The Quebec Liberation Front) 
 
FPCL Fronte Paesanu di Liberazione di a 
Corsica 
(The National Front for the 
Liberation of Corsica) 
 







Irish Revolutionary Army 
 
Mouvement de Libération du Taxi 
(Taxi Liberation Movement) 
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MWLM Montreal Women’s Liberation 
Movement 
 
PQ Parti Quebecois 
 
RIN Rassemblement Indépendence 
Nationale 
 
RCMP Royal Canadian Mountain Police 
 
WMA	   War	  Measures	  Act	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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 “I have no more sympathy for Mrs. Cross1 than for the wives of thousands of men 
without jobs in Quebec at the present time”- Michel Chartrand  
 
Still considered today as one of the most contentious moments in 
Canadian history, the October Crisis of 1970 threatened law, order and 
democracy in Canada. Two cells of the Front de Liberation du Quebec, the 
violent nationalist network that was active since 1963, publicly kidnapped 
two political figures: labour minister Pierre Laporte and British Trade 
Commissioner James Cross. Further, the Canadian government responded 
with the implementation of the War Measures Act (WMA) and the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus, for the first time during peacetime, in order to 
allow for the presence of the army in Montreal and Ottawa, a curfew, and the 
arrest of several hundred citizens without evidence.  
 
Michel Chartrand, president of the Montreal central council of 
the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), compared the grief of Mrs. 
Cross for her husband’s kidnapping to the grief of the thousands of wives of 
unemployed husbands, drawing light to the disparity between Quebecois 
and the economic and political elites, unemployment, and poverty in 
Quebec. While the provincial government put forward a series of social and 
economic reforms, and society secularized during the early 1960s, a new 
specifically Quebecois consciousness developed that critiqued the existing 
division of labour in Quebec in which capital was predominantly 
Anglophone and labour predominantly francophone, which was in turn 
inspired by international ideologies that included post-colonialism, 
nationalism, and in some cases- Marxism.  
 
Similarly in Corsica, the local populace felt the pressures of poverty 
and unemployment as the traditional pastoral culture shifted to focus on 
tourism and agricultural export. Financially supported by the state through a 
series of programmes, the subsidies were perceived as being monopolized by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Wife	  of	  James	  Cross,	  who	  was	  kidnapped	  by	  the	  Liberation	  cell	  of	  the	  FLQ	  in	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a clan system, the French, and the repatriated Algerians on the island. The 
donation of renewed farming land to the Algerians and a series of failed 
economic and social programmes by the state, and the return of university 
students from the mainland with international ideologies and a new-found 
interest in preserving Corsican culture, developed an already existent culture 
of violence to form a new type of radical space that was nationally-focused.  
 
Born from these perceptions of inequality and sub-state frustrations, 
the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) and the Fronte de Liberazione 
Nazunale Corsu (FLNC) were active in the early 1960s and 1970s through the 
1990s, respectively.  This thesis offers a comparative historical analysis of the 
two networks in order to understand sub-state violent contention in Quebec 
and Corsica. This thesis looks at how the FLQ and the FLNC aimed to 
develop and extend radical ideological space through the use of violent 
contention, and uses Haines’ (1984) Radical Flank Effect to understand the 
effect of the violent groups on the moderate campaigns. In order to do so, the 
thesis is built around a central orienting question: what explains the 
contrasting patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica? 
More specifically, why did the FLQ dissolve in 1971, yet the FLNC continued 
its violent trajectory, albeit less political and nationalist, until 2014? And 
finally, by comparing these patterns and causal mechanisms of violence, did 
the FLQ and the FLNC succeed in extending radical space?  
 
Economic, political and demographic contexts in Quebec and 
Corsica 
 
As Tilly (2003) suggests, it is important to understand the historically-specific 
features in contentious politics and to place them within the appropriate time 
period. Comparing the changes and reforms in Quebec and Corsican society 
helps to identify the frustrations. By comparing the economic, political 
structures and demography, there will be overlap as the contextual processes 
affected each other.  
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‘The Sixties’, also known as the ‘cultural decade’ (Palmer 2008, 259), 
began to gain momentum in 1963 across westernized countries. The 
counterculture and revolution of the 1960s was certainly an influence on 
Quebecois; elements of culture and society were questioned and critiqued, 
and new social norms were developed. Just as rigid cultural boundaries were 
broken, new forms of politics and governance were considered and 
embraced.  The civil rights and anti-war movements proved that there was 
power to change society, and the decolonization of Africa proved that 
political governance was not absolute and could be changed through 
physical force and revolution (Palmer 2008). There was a ‘certain dose of 
radicalism amongst the youth, a militancy and an activism’ (Rocher 2013, 30). 
While the world changed dramatically during the 1960s, a new and modern 
media of television was able to ensure that the rest of the modern world 
knew about it, and was influenced by it: “Une image a ̀ la téle ́vision le ́gitime 
toutes les causes. L’adoubement me ́diatique se substitue au sacre 
de ́mocratique: de ́mocratie directe, sondage grandeur nature, vote a ̀ main 




During the 1960s, Quebec was focusing on the expansion and 
decentralization of industry through a series of economic reforms. While the 
Union Nationale promoted an economic policy in the 1950s that aimed at 
attracting foreign capital from outside of the province to invest in Quebec 
resources (Sara-Bournet 2009, 79), the Liberal Party, elected in 1962, took on 
an interventionist role and campaigned for the nationalization of the 
province’s private electrical companies (Bennett and Jaenen 1986, 503); 
thereby championing the slogan ‘Maitres chez nous’3. The Liberal party did 
not advocate a general policy of nationalism. The sole focus was to “build a 
broad and secure base for the expansion and decentralization of industry” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Translated	  as:	  ‘an	  image	  on	  the	  television	  legitimizes	  all	  causes.	  Media	  dubbing	  
substitutes	  for	  the	  democratic	  consecration:	  direct	  democracy,	  opinion	  polls,	  
voting	  by	  a	  hand	  raised,	  a	  drawn	  fist’.	  	  
3	  Masters	  at	  Home	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(Manifeste du parti liberal du Quebec 1962, 9); however, the success of the 
Liberal Party in the 1962 election proved a changing mindset in Quebec that 
valued economic freedom and reform from English- speaking companies.  
 
These economic reforms were made possible by sustainable economic 
growth between 1961 and 1967. According to Hébert (1989), this economic 
growth was due to the devaluation of the Canadian dollar (which fell to US 
$0.925 in 1962) and Canada’s reinstatement of a fixed exchange rate regime 
with OECD countries between 1962 and 1980, thereby allowing the 
provincial government to make contributions to a series of big projects such 
as: the Montreal metro, Expo 67, and the hydroelectric development on the 
Cote-Nord (53).  
 
The economic reforms provided the sub-state with further control of 
its economy, and gave Quebecers a confidence and assertiveness in its 
dealings nationally and internationally. Quebec’s Liberal government 
became more assertive in- and unhappy with- its place in Confederation and 
relationship with the federal government (Bothwell 1998). While parts of 
Quebec were experiencing modernization, secularization and economic 
expansion, East-Montreal, however, was going through a period of 
deindustrialization. While anglophone capitalist elites and Francophone 
political elites gained from these economic reforms and expansions, it 
widened the disparity between these groups and the working-class 
neighbourhoods4.  
 
In Corsica, the economy was traditionally agriculture and sheep 
breeding; Corsican artists refer back to ‘the culture of shepherds’. During the 
1970s, Corsica had yet to experience an industrial revolution or 
modernization. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Corsican society began 
to urbanize from the rural interior and small villages to the larger port cities 
of Ajaccio and Bastia (Poggioli 2012). As the state created a level of 
dependency through importing goods and a series of half-hearted economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  poverty	  in	  Montreal	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  Demography	  section	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policies and programmes, many of these traditional employments would 
struggle to continue due to economic pressures.  
 
La Société d'aménagement pour la mise en valeur de la Corse 
(SOMIVAC) was created in 1957 to create 30, 000 hectars of viable 
agricultural land out of the Maquis; the objective was to create an 
agricultural economy of vineyards, kiwis and citrus fruits. The land was 
divided into lots and were mostly awarded to repatriated Algerians. While 
most agricultural properties in Corsica were unable to grow past 20 hectars 
due to the mountainous nature of the island, the new land also had new 
modern features such as a hydraulic pipe system, operational buildings, and 
the creation of an agromonic station (Poggioli 2004, 35). As the repatriated 
Algerians were given priority in this program, it created discontent amongst 
Corsicans who felt as though they had been cheated of their own lands, 
which had been modernized to boot. Tourism was also a focus of growth on 
the island, and the growth along the coastline of the island was through 
French investment; therefore, there created an economic divide between the 
Corsicans, the repatriated Algerians and the French.  
 
In 1974, the government attempted to establish local opinion in order 
to fashion a more appropriate policy and/or programme. The state sent 
Libert Bou, a 65 year old experienced administrator and manager from 
Catalonia, to analyze the economic situation in Corsica (Ramsay 1986).  After 
years of poor experiences with state-imposed programmes, the Corsican 
populace had no interest in the project. The disappointment with the report, 
the naming of the report as a Charter, and the denouncement of the Charter 
by the ARC only added fuel to the fire that was building against the state.  
 
This feeling of unjust aid to the repatriated Algerians, combined with 
the economic dependency on the state (monopolized by the clans, as 
discussed in the next section on political structure) and the new agricultural 
competition, frustrations grew amongst the Corsican populace. While the 
Corsican sub-state was very economically reliant on France during this 
period, francophone Quebecers were becoming ‘masters of their own home’ 
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economically. The decentralization of economy allowed Quebec further 
confidence politically, while Corsicans became more frustrated by the 
economical allowances provided to other ethnicities on the island, as well as 
the state’s inability to provide an appropriate solution that was suitable to 
Corsica’s distinct culture and need for a better economic deal, transport links 
and special regional structures. In both Quebec and Corsica, however, there 
was a frustration with the repatriated Algerians in Corsica and the English 
bourgeoisie in Quebec due to ‘rising expectations’ (Tocqueville 1955) from 
the Quiet Revolution and the attempts at new socioeconomic programmes by 
the French government. In Quebec, the elites gained from the Quiet 
Revolution, and in Corsica, the French and repatriated Algerians gained 




As the largest populated province in Canada, Quebec held political 
clout against the other provinces in Canada during the 1960s. Situated 
geographically in central Canada, and surrounded by other provinces and 
territories, the preservation of identity, culture and political representation 
was important to the political class in the sub-state. As a province of Canada, 
the authority to make laws was divided between the federal parliament of 
Canada and the provincial legislature; however, the political reality is that 
‘Quebec is not a province like the others’ (Gagnon 2004, 127) and began to 
assert its national status.  
 
Before the Quiet Revolution, elections were dominated by two 
political parties: the Liberal Party and the Union Nationale. Urban and rural 
Quebecois were divided politically, which resulted in a focus on the interests 
of the Anglophone capitalist class (Cox 2009, 92). The rise of the nationalist 
movement in the 1960s allowed for the creation of the Parti Quebecois in 
1968, and supported its momentum to instigate two referendums for 
independence in 1980 and 1995. 
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 Corsicans similarly questioned their sub-state relationship with 
France.  France has three levels of territorial self-government: municipalities, 
departments/provinces and regions, and traditionally has had a very unified 
administrative system. During the 1970s, Corsica was a region of France5. 
Regions were created in 1972 and it was not until the 1980s that Paris 
elevated Corsica to a special status and began a “three-step process 
devolving authority to institutions on the isle well beyond the 
decentralization and regionalization process the Socialists inaugurated 
elsewhere in France during that decade” (Rudolph 2006, 51)6. Corsica was 
one of the French metropolitan regions with the lowest GDP per capita7, and 
had little real political power over its economy and society.  (Directorate-
general for internal policies European Parliament 2013, 29)  
 
Corsica did, however, have a Corsican Regional Council, granted in 
1970. The individuals running the Commission were not elected, but drawn 
from members elected to other posts, and was therefore viewed as symbolic 
until 1982 when a directly elected Assembly was given formal executive 
decision making authority on education, economic development, agriculture 
and housing. This assembly was elected through a proportional 
representation system based on an island-wide constituency instead of the 
electoral-districts in other regions. The aim of this was to give the Assembly 
island-wide legitimacy and to encourage the participation of both moderate 
and violent nationalists in elections. This system needed only 1.6 percept of 
the popular vote to win a seat, which encouraged nationalists to participate 
(Henders 2010, 100).  The role of the Assembly, however, was advisory and 
could suggest legislative or regulatory changes in Corsica’s development, 
except when it came to organizing Corsican language and cultural classes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Corsica	  would	  later	  become	  a	  collectivité	  territorial	  in	  1982,	  which	  would	  
allow	  it	  greater	  political	  and	  economic	  powers.	  
6	  In	  1982,	  the	  directly	  elected	  Assembly	  was	  given	  formal	  executive	  decision-­‐
making	  authority,	  and	  a	  university	  was	  created.	  	  As	  the	  third	  step,	  Corsicans	  
were	  officially	  recognized	  as	  a	  distinct	  ‘people’	  within	  France	  in	  April	  1991.	  In	  
1993,	  institutional	  reforms	  created	  a	  second	  Corsican	  executive	  that	  was	  elected	  
by	  the	  island’s	  councilors.	  
7	  In	  2010,	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  PPS	  reached	  the	  level	  of	  90%	  of	  the	  EU27	  
average	  due	  to	  tourism,	  construction	  and	  industry.	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which had to be optional so as not to breach the French state’s one-ness 
(Michalon 1985).  
 
TEST as a way to compare the limited political access as structural repression 
 
The obvious comparison of political structure between Quebec and Corsica 
looks at the access to political reform as sub-states. Quebec had the same 
electoral system and provincial institutions as the other provinces in Canada; 
however, due to a monopolization of an Anglo capitalist elite and a 
Francophone elite amongst the political parties, certain Quebecois actors felt 
economically and politically disadvantaged and many looked to 
radicalization through moderate and violent movements to achieve change.  
 
Corsica, on the other hand, was given very little political autonomy 
through a Corsican Regional Council. Even when the French state gave 
formal executive authority to the Corsican Assembly in 1982, the role was 
advisory.  The political structure in Corsica continued to pursue roots of a 
traditional clan system, which involved nepotism and patronage. As the 
island experienced modernization, it also endured high levels of poverty and 
half-hearted attempts by the government to impose economic programs that 
mostly benefitted the repatriated Algerians that became known as ‘les pieds 
noir’. This disparity on the island, a frustration with the neoclan system and 
an inability to achieve reform without backlash from the state and other 
agents (clan leaders, repatriated Algerians, and French) influenced a 
nationalist movement that was both moderate and violent, and much more 
intertwined.  
 
Cox (2009) created a Theory of Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism 
(TEST) that posits that there is a “dynamic relationship between the state and 
an ethnic group that determines the conditions under which ethnic groups 
will support terrorism to change the status quo” (22).  Experiencing 
structural repression and agent-driven repression, ethnonationalist groups 
turn to violence and threats as a way to strive for reform (53).  TEST helps to 
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compare the political networks in Corsica and Quebec, and understand why 
actors chose violence over peaceful and moderate action.  
 
Actors radicalized in Quebec (through violent and moderate means) 
in demand for reform and independence from a perceived colonial state. An 
economic disadvantage, particularly in Montreal, created disparity between 
Quebecois and the Anglo business elite in partnership with a Francophone 
elite. This economic disadvantage to the ethno-nationalist group in Quebec 
influenced individuals to participate in violent campaigns during the 1960s 
and early 1970s. In 1968, the Parti Quebecois (PQ) formed under the 
leadership of René Levesque. A merger of the Mouvement Souveraineté-
Association and the Ralliement National provided the moderate nationalists 
in Quebec a political party within the federally-imposed political system to 
carry out their demands for independence and further autonomy. PQ leader, 
René Levesque, deliberately avoided a merger with the RIN, the political 
organization and party that the FLQ developed from. As the PQ gained in 
popularity8 and became the vessel for the nationalist movement and 
Quebecois interest, and the institutional structures became facilitative 
through the Quiet Revolution, violence became unnecessary.  After the 
particularly violent October Crisis where James Cross and Pierre Laporte 
were kidnapped and Pierre Laporte was killed, many of the sympathetic 
individuals that once supported the FLQ turned against its violent campaign.  
As will be considered and supported with Radical Flank Effect in the 
following chapters, the violent tactics utilized during the October Crisis by 
the FLQ simply boosted the support for the moderate movement. Therefore, 
TEST proves that the political institutions initially seemed closed to the 
Quebecois, and forced some individuals to pursue violence as a way to rebel 
against the monopolization of the democratic electoral system by Anglo 
capitalist and French elites. Once the ability to change and reform Quebec 
society was possible through moderate means, the ethno-nationalist group as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  PQ	  had	  a	  strong	  and	  personable	  leader,	  a	  broad	  support	  for	  independence	  
and	  embrace	  a	  ‘populist	  style’	  that	  included	  demonstrations,	  house	  meetings	  
and	  an	  egalitarianism	  (Linteau	  et	  al	  1991,	  524).	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a majority ignored the opportunity for violence and ceased to mobilize and 
form other FLQ cells.  
 
As discussed in the economic section, the French government 
provided financial support to Corsica after World War II, but did not address 
the issue of the ever-present clan system. Funds that were transferred to the 
island were seized and controlled by clan leaders (Kofman 1982, 303). The 
clans competed for control of the funds through elections for office (mayors 
and municipal councils), for the General Councils or for the position of 
deputy (Cox 2009, 97).  Creating a pyramid structure of patronage, members 
of the villages were often clients to one of two local patrons- generally the 
mayor and the leader of the contrapartitu of the region- who were then 
clients to the leaders of the larger insular families that situated, respectively, 
south and north of the island and held considerable, and almost state-like 
power. Reciprocity generally included a vote for favours, and power for 
assistance (Lenclud 1986). Savigear (1983) argues that the Corsicans held the 
French government responsible for this corrupt governance (15). Just as the 
Anglo business elite and French elite dominated political parties in Quebec, 
clans also controlled political access through the domination of political 
parties, but with an extra emphasis on electoral manipulation (Cox 2009, 
101). The French state , therefore, did not intentionally discriminate against 
Corsicans any more than other regions in France, but they instead “failed to 
ensure broad and fair representative government….[and] tolerate unfair and 
discriminatory practices against substantial portions of the Corsican 
population” (Cox 2009, 101) 
 
The autonomists (demanded autonomy within the French state) and 
the Separatists (fought for independence) were two distinct factions of a 
larger movement for reform and change in Corsica, and the violent FLNC. 
Many actors subscribed to more than one group.  TEST posits that the 
participation in violent campaigns within the FLNC was due to the limited 
political institutions and political power on the local level. The FLNC 
emerged as a response to the French government’s response to previous 
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strike action (as will be discussed in chapter 4) and a radicalization of the 
nationalist movement and demands for reform.  
 
The Corsican case under TEST differs from the Quebec case. While 
Quebec had the framework for a democratic institution that should have 
allowed access to all ethnicities, it was monopolized by elites due to the dual 
party system that divided the province into urban and rural votes and, 
therefore, ignored the necessary representation of Quebecois and the 
disparity between classes. Corsica, comparatively, did not have similar 
institutions for local political power; and as they began to achieve them, the 
French government failed to challenge the clan system that evolved to the 
contemporary political system. 
 
Demography: a focus on language and violence 
 
 Quebec went from one of the highest demographic growth rates in 
Canada during the 1950s to a nearly stationary growth rate that was less than 
1 percent per year in 1970 (Langlois et al 1992, 13). In 1961, the average 
household in Quebec was 4.53 persons with a total population of 5,259,211, 
and by 1975 the number of persons per household was 3.5. This statistic 
represents a decrease in children and an increase in divorce as Quebec 
society experienced secularization (14).   
 
There was a steady decline in the English-speaking population in 
Quebec from 15 percent in 1931 and 13 percent in 1976 (Cox 2009, 65); 
however, the economic elite continued to be massively represented by 
Anglophones. Linteau et al (1991) states that French Canadians represented 
approximately 6.7 percent in the early 1950s to 8.3 percent in 1972 (413). 
Although there was some growth in French-Canadian representation in the 
economic elite over 20 years, it still remained minimal and disproportionate 
to the distribution of French Canadians versus Anglophones in Quebec at the 
same time. As late as 1977, Milner stated: ‘there is little evidence to suggest 
that there is at present a French-Canadian group, of social stratum, which 
wields any amount of effective economic power on a scale comparable to 
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that of the Anglo-Canadian or American business interests’ (49). While this 
statement could be considered harsh, the economic, political and social 
changes and reforms occurring during the Quiet Revolution spurred a new 
consciousness of the division of labour in Quebec.  
 
Due to Corsica’s geographical location in the Mediterranean basin, it 
was occupied by a succession of peoples including the Phoceceans, Romans, 
Vandals, Pisons, Genoans, British, and finally the French; and it had never 
been constitutionally absorbed into another state until France in 1768. While 
most countries invaded Corsica for the maritime advantage, they generally 
occupied the periphery of the island and allowed the Corsican populace to 
retain a large measure of their internal affairs and cultural identity. These 
invasions reinforced the defensive nature of the Corsicans; historically, they 
have had difficulty in forming satisfactory relations and alliances with 
outside people (Ramsay 1983, 2). Secondly, the mountainous terrain of the 
interior affected the ability for the sub-state to become materially or 
demographically strong enough to assert their independence militaristically.   
 
The interior also shaped Corsican communities. Communications and 
travel across the island were difficult, which meant that small villages 
through the valleys and mountains were divided; thus, creating deep local 
loyalties that are apparent in the kin-based clan system. An agro-pastoral 
culture shaped active, but modest and even impoverished, lives (Sanguinetti 
2012, 159).  
 
Prior to the Regional Action Plan of 1957, in which repatriated 
Algerians settled in Corsica, the population of the island was 180, 000, of 
whom 90 percent were Corsicans, 7 percent were Italian and less than 3 
percent were from the French mainland. Between 1950 and 1970, Corsica 
experienced ‘an exodus of violence’, in which actors who once participated in 
violent action in Corsica moved to the mainland, and the traditional banditry 
adapted to the violence of the ‘milieu’. It was in 1950, at the end of WWII, 
that Sanguinetti (2012) suggests that a new form of violence with political 
claims formed due to the political, cultural and economic frustrations 
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discussed previously, combined with the exposure to new ideologies and the 
global nationalist and decolonization movements from tourism and ‘les 
éxilés’, students that had moved to the mainland for university (162). Later in 
the 1980s, poverty and an increase in drug businesses and consumption also 
influenced a change in violence. Between 1980 and 2000, Sanguinetti argues 
that there was also an ‘explosion’ of homicides, suicides, transport accidents, 
cancer and AIDS in Corsica. The amount of ‘perils’ increased more rapidly 
than the governmental authorities could react (163).   
 
Although French was the national language, and the language used in 
schools and businesses, Corsican was very much used in the household. In 
the 1970s, there was a reinvigorated interest in the Corsican dialect as an 
instrument for Corsican culture, very much headed by Jacques Thiers who 
was kind enough to meet with me during my fieldwork. A survey carried 
out by l’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) 
in 1977 showed that in Ajaccio and Bastia, 79 percent of ‘heads of households 
claimed to speak Corsican, as did 69 percent of their spouses and 59 percent 
of their children’ (Ramsay 67).  
 
Notably, Quebec and Corsica were both experiencing socio-political 
and economic awakenings. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec placed an 
importance on becoming masters of their own homes, which included 
protection of the sub-state language and culture.  Similarly, many Corsicans 
in the 1970s subscribed to a socio-political programme to protect culture and 
language. There was a cultural movement to write the oral Corsican dialect 
and to preserve the stories, poetry and theatre. The traditional shepherd 
culture was romanticized within this literature.  
 
When comparing the demography of Quebec and Corsica, it is most 
important to note the contrasts of population size. While Quebec was a 
considerable size in comparison to other Canadian provinces at 5,259 000 in 
1961 (Stats Canada census 1961), and held considerable political weight, 
Corsica was a much smaller population, at 180 000 in 1957 (Sanguinetti 2012, 
62), with very little political and economic power.  
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What is ideological radical space? 
 
 
In order to understand ideological radical space, I refer to Kohn’s (2003) 
work on radical space: 
The	  social	  and	  symbolic	  properties	  of	  space	  can	  also	  be	  important	  
resources	  for	  transformative	  political	  projects.	  Political	  spaces	  facilitate	  
change	  by	  creating	  a	  distinctive	  place	  to	  develop	  new	  identities	  and	  
practices.	  The	  political	  power	  of	  place	  comes	  from	  its	  ability	  to	  link	  the	  
social,	  symbolic,	  and	  experiential	  dimensions	  of	  space.	  Transformative	  




Whilst Kohn (2003), like others, focuses on physical space, she 
indicated the need to capture less tangible dimensions of space. She argues 
that it is necessary that a mediated position “acknowledges that space is a 
product of social practices but one that has particular properties precisely 
because of its embodiment in specific types of places…. [this] position 
neither reduces space to a purely physical category nor evacuates its material 
dimension” (15). It is to this end that I introduce ideological radical space in 
this thesis.   
 
Tilly’s (1986) work on repertoires of contention demonstrates how 
social movements operates within the parameters of what each society 
perceives to be acceptable; these boundaries are shaped by cultural beliefs, 
values and attitudes. Radical ideological space is an extension of these 
parameters to conceive of a greater range of political possibilities. In 
agreement with Kohn, radical ideological space encompasses a material 
dimension of socio-political practices while also being rooted in the physical- 
in the case of this thesis, sub-states Quebec and Corsica.  
 
This thesis examines how individual actors in Quebec and Corsica 
justified radical tactics in support of the movements for social and political 
change and attempted to manipulate or extend radical ideological space 
through campaigns of violence. When ideological radical space is extended, 
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one finds a great acceptance of radical means and goals. Conversely, a turn 
towards conservatism, might see an erosion of support for independence 
movements9. 
Plan of Thesis and Research Scope 
 
The contentious politics paradigm has shifted from political to cultural 
approaches to utilize a combination of the two, and it has continued to place 
a focus on empirical research. This thesis analyzes new archival data, such as 
policing documentation, court transcripts, newspapers, primary accounts 
and secondary sources, within a social movement theoretical framework that 
is further explored in Chapter 2.  
 
While the sub-state violent contention occurred in the very different 
contexts of Quebec and Corsica, the FLQ and the FLNC shared an overall 
pattern: an arc of violent mobilization. This pattern helped formulate the 
empirical chapters. Chapter 3 examines the initial mobilization of the FLQ 
between 1963 and 1965 and the FLNC between 1975-1979 that developed 
from a series of socio-economic and political frustrations; Chapter 4 looks at 
the radicalization of the FLQ in 1965-1968 and the FLNC between 1980 and 
1989 in which new tactics were embraced; and Chapter 5 examines the peak 
of violence and then the decline of activity, mobilization and recruitment 
between 1969-1971 in Quebec and the early 1990s in Corsica.  
 
While the Corsican violence continued on and off until 2014, the 
network changed after the ‘scission de 1990’; violence did not comprise 
symbolic episodes, but was used instead to further competition between the 
newly-divided factions. I introduce this change in the last chapter, and then 
choose to end the comparison for research scope and to limit the contrast to 
nationalist-focused violence. Finally, Chapter 7 acts as the thesis conclusion 
and compares and analyzes the two cases in order to answer the research 
questions and draw conclusions about sub-state contention, and the 
extension of radical space, in Quebec and Corsica.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  examiners	  for	  their	  help	  in	  developing	  this	  concept.	  	  	  




This thesis compares and contrasts violent sub-state contention in the very 
different socio-political and economic contexts of Quebec and Corsica. The 
FLQ and the FLNC both groups sought to extend radical space. While both 
groups arguably were able to extend the space at moments by inspiring 
popular support, both ultimately failed at sustaining the extension of radical 
space on the basis of their revolutionary manifestoes. Both groups, however, 
acted as a ‘stepping stone’ for democratic moderate action. Many of the 
actors that once used violent means to achieve revolution, or members of the 
populace that once supported the violent contention, turned to moderate and 
democratic action through the forms of political referendums for 
independence.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Literature Review 
 
This chapter is a review of social movement literature and contentious 
politics, highlighting key scholars such as McCarthy and Zald, Gurr, Tilly, 
Tarrow, McAdam, Snow and Benford and Haines. This literature provides a 
theoretical framework for the following empirical chapters. First, I introduce 
Social Movement Theory that frames the analysis of the FLQ and the FLNC; 
in doing so, I outline the evolution of Social Movement Theory, the 
distinctions between the theories and the approaches, and how they have 
come together to develop a strong contemporary theory that is both political 
and cultural. Second, I focus particularly on my comparative ‘tool kit’ of 
Radical Flank Effect, Tilly’s mobilization model and repertoires.   
	  
Viewing the FLQ and the FLNC as social movements 
	  
Social movements are a modern form of protest (Tilly 1995; Johnston 2011). 
Modernization and industrialization gave a rise to commerce and 
manufacturing, new classes, and status groups (Mann 1993). The 18th and 19th 
centuries witnessed a new politicization of social life that would develop into 
the 1960s and 1970s when political parties would form to pursue the interest 
of these new groups (Tilly 1978); however, not all groups felt adequately 
represented by the democratic electoral systems embraced by the French and 
Canadian states. The FLQ and the FLNC, in particular, offered particularly 
loaded critiques that turned from nationalism to Marxism. The FLQ and the 
FLNC can be understood by social movement theory, as they were both a 
‘complex aggregation of peaceful and violent groups that encompassed a 
network against the state’ (Diani 1992). In this sense, the actors (or members 
of the FLQ and FLNC) were influenced by mobilizing processes and 
mechanisms, variables used to understand social movement dynamics, and 
participated in social movement repertoires, a set of various tools and actions 
available to a movement or organization.  Both the FLQ and the FLNC were 
comprised of cells and canals, as discussed in detail in the empirical chapters, 
and can be considered as Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) 
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McCarthy and Zald (1977) define SMOs in a broad sense as “a 
complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences 
of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those 
goals” (1218). Gaps in the social movement literature, as to the characteristics 
of SMOs, and their contributions to social movements, have been re-
examined in recent years with a push to bridge social movement and 
organization theories (Davis, McAdam, Scott and Zald 2005; Lounsbury and 
Ventresca 2002; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005).  
 
Currently, scholarship on SMOs focus on three critical areas: the 
organizational basis for mobilization; how resources are related to SMO 
strategy, and how these resources affect organizational mobilization; and a 
focus on SMO structure. A focus on the relationship between structure and 
internal SMO dynamics, similar to Balser (1997), Useem and Zald (1987), was 
influential to my empirical research. The three moments of the FLQ and the 
FLNC are analysed and investigated based on processes and mechanisms 
that are highlighted in social movement theoretical literature.  
 
The following sections highlight the contemporary developments of 
Social Movement theory, and introduce and compare the distinctions 
between Resource Mobilization Theory, Political Process Theory and 
Cultural Constructivist Theories. All three theories are used to frame my 
analysis.  
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) 
	  
Resource Mobilization Theory was developed in 1977 when McCarthy and 
Zald critiqued the early social psychological view of Gurr (1970) and 
Kornhauser (1959), and other deprivation theorists who suggested that 
protest was only used by marginalized members of society. Analysts 
criticized these theories by suggesting that the most marginalized people in 
society are less likely to engage in risky political actions as they are un-able 
to afford such risks, nor do they have the time or the political knowledge. 
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McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that social movement theory ought to be 
integrated with structural theories of social processes; they focused on social 
movements that are composed of formal organizations, and that collective 
response is a rational response that can occur when adequate resources are 
available.  RMT was groundbreaking scholarship as sociological variables 
replaced psychological predispositions to marginality and discontent 
(Klandermans 1984).   
 
Resource Mobilization Theory critiqued the previous assumptions 
that SMOs relied on informal, contentious activity; the RMT perspective 
considered that organizations with paid leadership and paper membership 
as central to the ‘mobility, stability and maturation of the movement’ 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977, 24). Staggenborg (1988) focused on the 
formalization of SMOs, and found that the movement organizations that 
were less professionalized, had few policies and concrete procedures, no 
decision structures, and were influenced by individual leaders who often 
tended to have ‘autonomous chapters’. The FLQ reflect Staggenborg’s 
observation; as will be noted in the following empirical chapters, the cells of 
the FLQ were mainly independent cells under the umbrella term of the FLQ 
with limited to no interaction between cells and moments.  In agreement 
with Gerlach and Hine (1970) and Piven and Cloward (1977), these less 
formal organizations, although less stable and influential to the maturity of 
the overall movement, are able to mobilize quickly. The cells in the FLQ were 
small, mobilized easily but were unable to last long after clandestine violence 
began. The FLNC held a more structured decision-making hierarchy, but 
allowed the regional networks to make their own decisions, thus allowing 
for a more stable movement that could survive long-term.  
 
Political Process Theory in Social Movements 
	  
Political process theory (PPT) grew from original resource mobilization 
scholarship; while scholars from both groups agree that SMO’s are critical for 
mobilization, recruitment and collecting and distributing critical information 
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about the movement, political process theory includes a sociopolitical context 
and a study of the relationship between SMOs and the institutions within 
their environments. Political process scholarship looks further than the 
organizations themselves to focus on success and failure of the larger 
movement. For example, Tarrow (1998) argues the cycles of mobilization are 
influenced by the opening and closing of groups’ access to the political 
process. Political process theory was initially associated with institutions and 
conditions, but has become open to cultural and social contexts as way to 
inform the dynamics of the movements; Beth Schaefer Caniglia and JoAnn 
Carmin cite Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Rucht (1996) as early examples 
that applied a cultural context to political process theory. Certain scholars 
(see Bennett 2004, 2005; Kriesi 1996; McCarthy 1996; Rucht 1996 as examples) 
look at the links between individuals and organizations as a network. 
Bennett (2004) looks at how three properties of transnational protest, 
inclusive organization models, social technologies, and political capacities of 
members, ‘communicate their issues and form effective political relationships 
with targets of protest’, and I similarly focus on a contrast of organization, 
the use of technologies and media, and the political capacities of the 
members to inform membership and recruitment. 
 
While much social movement literature focuses on interactions 
between social movements and authorities, certain academics (such as Diani 
1995; Gerlach and Hine 1970; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; McAdam 
1988; Snow, Zurcher and Eckland-Olson 1980; Marwell and Oliver 1993; and 
Passy 2003) argue that associations and ties between actors act as an 
organizing and mobilizing mechanism by establishing means for 
communication and knowledge-sharing (Caniglia and Carmen 2005), but 
also provides the service of recruitment.  Rucht (2004) argues that these links 
between actors “should become part and parcel of social movement studies. 
It is time to abandon the simplified image of a two-party struggle between a 
(unified) movement and its (unified) opponent acting in some kind of a 
social vacuum” (212-213). The empirical chapters of this thesis highlight the 
associations, ties and relationships between the members, the cells of the 
FLQ, and the canals and networks of the FLNC. In both cases, the 
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participation of the FLQ and the FLNC required affiliation with other 
members. Members, as noted in the empirical chapters, were recruited from 
other less-radical organizations or through relationships such as friends, 
family and/or neighbours. The FLNC published in their manifesto that all 
new members had to have relationships with at least one other member to 
avoid intelligence infiltration.  
 
The political process and mobilization theories created a foundation 
for recent SMO research; it placed an importance on the study of the 
relationship between SMOs and their external environments, and focused on 
a broader economic and political context. PPT combined macro-organization 
theories with social movement methods to encourage research into ‘field-
level dynamics’ (Edwards and Marullo 1995; Johnston and McCarthy 2005; 
Minkoff 1999, 1997, 1995). While critics found that PPT was originally overly 
structural, PPT theorists have turned to the processes and mechanisms of 
contentious politics. This thesis uses mechanisms as elements of contrast. The 
concept that SMOs are actors (Tilly 2003), or made up of actors, that respond 
to the sociopolitical environment is very much apparent in this thesis, and 
why a contextual element to my empirical chapters is so important.  
 
Although PPT has been critiqued, it continues to dominate the field of 
social movement research. Goodwin and Jasper (1999) suggest that non-
structural factors are often analysed as though they were structural factors, 
and are defined as factors that are relatively stable over time and outside the 
control of movement actors. Such factors include: agency, the active choice of 
movement actors, and cultural factors that deal with moral visions, cognitive 
understanding and emotions that exist prior to the movement. McCarthy, 
McAdam and Zald (1996) intended to establish these factors as frames rather 
than as ‘mobilizing structures, as suggested by political theorists’. While 
Goodwin and Jasper are quick to critique the conceptual consensus of this 
approach, they do not deliver a better solution; thus, the ideologies and 
strategy of the FLQ and FLNC, discussed in the empirical chapters, are 
introduced and analyzed as key elements, and as part of the context.  
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Cultural and Cognitive Theories 
	  
While social movement literature today has developed into a ‘synthesis’ of 
political and cultural approaches, it is important to highlight the two original 
approaches. Cultural theory developed as a critique of PPT and argued that 
movements develop and occur within social and cultural contexts. 
Participants are motivated to join movements because they hold the same 
values and beliefs as the movement due to primary frameworks (Goffman 
1974); identity affiliation is prevalent. Framing, influenced by Goffman 
(1974), is often used as a tool to identify alternatives (Snow and Benford 
2000), and develop a rationale for movement activity (Babb 1996; Snow and 
Benford 1988); it has been used by scholars such as Gamson et al (1982), 
Snow et al (1986), Snow and Benford (1988). Framing processes became 
popular during the mid 1980s when sociologists found that the mobilization 
of ideas and meanings were not discussed analytically, nor were they treated 
as relevant to the development of social movements (Snow and Benford 
1992: 135-36).  Movement actors are viewed as actors engaged in the 
production and maintenance of meaning, and are a part of the “politics of 
signification”, as discussed by Hall (1982).  
 
Although culture is considered a defining and shaping factor for 
protest, it was originally considered in the form of a ‘frame’ or ‘identity’ 
within the political process literature, rather than a cultural approach 
(Goodwin and Jasper 2004, Viii). Collective action frames simply highlight 
aspects of society in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents 
and constituents, to garner the bystander support, and to demobilize 
antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988: 198); in other words, Snow and 
Benford suggest that collective action frames are “sets of beliefs and 
meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social 
movement organization” (Snow and Benford 2000: 614). Collective action 
frames are distinguishable from schemas (as discussed in psychology) and 
cognitive constructs in that collective action frames are not “individual 
attitudes and perceptions, but also the outcome of negotiating shared 
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meaning” (Gamson. 1992b: 111). Building on Wilson’s (1973) three part 
ideology, Snow and Benford (1988) designate three core framing tasks: 
diagnostic framing includes problem identification and attributions; 
prognostic framing that articulates a solution, or plan of attack, and the 
strategies to the problem; and motivational framing, the agency component 
(Gamson 1992a), that provides rationale for engaging in collective action.  
SMOs use these ‘tasks’ to ‘diagnose situations, generate solutions and 
communicate views and positions’ (Snow and Benford 1988). Many 
sociologists including Cable and Shriver (1995), Capek (1993), Gamson 
(1992a, 1992b), Gamson et al (1982), Kubal (1998), Neuman (1998), 
Triandafyllidou and Fotiou (1998), White (1999), and Zdravomyslova (1996) 
have looked at the processes of frame development and innovation.  
Klandermans and Goslinga (1996) differ from the scholarship that focused on 
the functional aspect of frames with research that focuses on how frames 
shape the production and construction of meaning. As suggested by Caniglia 
and Carmen (2005), cognitive and normative attributions shape the choices of 
the SMOs just as culture shapes the structures and practices of the 
movement; social movements and SMOs have shared understandings, values 
and beliefs. As noted in the following empirical chapters, FLQ and FLNC 
members mobilize around shared values and beliefs.  
  
The constructivist approach not only provided insight into framing 
processes, but also placed an importance on the inclusion of culture when 
studying social movements and SMOs. Highlighting cultural theories in this 
literature review identifies trends in the emerging research on social 
movements; SMOs are no longer considered components of the movement, 
but active instruments. The internal dynamics of the SMOs, the movements, 
the ‘mechanisms’ and relationship with the state are all important factors to 
explore in order to answer the thesis question. While this thesis certainly 
affords culture quite a bit of emphasis, the focus on membership and 
mobilization/recruitment mechanisms follows a contemporary theory of 
social movements that combines both political and cultural approaches. As 
Tarrow rightly states, the political process approach deals with more than 
politics; “it helps us understand processes, such as mobilization and 
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demobilization, the framing of contentious political action, and how social 
movements mobilize resources on behalf of their claims” (Tarrow 2012: 8).  
 
Similar to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), my empirical research 
attempts to avoid ‘fitting’ my research into ‘invariable models’ , but to 
analyze the FLQ and the FLNC amongst processes, mechanisms, actors and 
culture outside of the “boxes and arrows of the classic social movement 
agenda” (McAdam et al 2001: 84). My research also places an importance on 
Tilly’s challenge of idea-based explanations of violence by insisting on the 
importance of social interaction (Tilly 2003). Strong emotions arise from 
social interaction and respond to changes in the social setting (Tilly 2003), 
thus placing an importance on the interactions and changes that occur in the 
social setting. 
	  
Studying Social Interactions: Repertoires and Radical Flank Effect 
	  
This second section explores contentious politics including Radical Flank 
Effect, Tilly’s mobilization model, Gurr’s study of political violence and 
repertoires. Leitner et al (2008) critique Tarrow’s definition of contentious 
politics10 by suggesting that it is overly state-centric and interest-oriented; it 
is ‘insufficient in acknowledging the differences within all collective action’. 
I, therefore, turn to the definition that I feel best represents my own research: 
‘contentious politics refers to concerted, counter-hegemonic social and 
political action, in which differently positioned participants come together to 
challenge dominant systems of authority, in order to promote and enact 
alternative imaginaries’ (158). 
 
Charles Tilly (2003) outlines four characteristics of productive social 
movements:  social movements must demonstrate (1) a worthiness of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Tarrow’s	  definition	  is:	  ‘public,	  collective	  and	  episodic	  interactions	  between	  
makers	  of	  claims	  when	  a)	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  interaction	  adops	  non-­‐
institutional	  forms,	  b)	  at	  least	  one	  government	  is	  a	  claimant,	  and	  object,	  or	  a	  
party	  to	  the	  claims,	  and	  c)	  the	  claims	  would,	  if	  realized,	  affect	  the	  interests	  of	  at	  
least	  one	  of	  the	  claimants’	  (Tarrow	  2001,	  7)	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cause and claim-making (2) a unity of purpose; to demonstrate that the 
claimants will not disappear over time (3) large numbers of supporters and 
(4) a strong commitment amongst the members to urge a response from the 
state. Johnston (2011) critiques Tilly by arguing that when the committed 
groups are unable to show or gain numbers, they sometimes choose violent 
acts to prove a dedication to the cause. In the case of the FLQ and the FLNC, 
both groups had limited numbers when they initially mobilized, and chose 
violence as a means to draw attention to their demands and motives. There 
was, however, less need for the violent networks as peaceful political 
movements gained strength. Violence also attracts the attention of the media, 
the populace and the policy makers; a phenomenon called the radical flank 
effect (RFE) shows that extremists can draw the attention of the populace and 
policy makers when moderate groups may not, but will also ‘bear the brunt’ 
of state repression (Haines 1984). RFE acts as an explanatory mechanism for 
my thesis argument that the FLQ and the FLNC shaped radical spaces. When 
social movements are comprised of radical and moderate SMOs that are 
aligned differently on the spectrum, radical flank effect may occur; the more 
extreme factions frame and shape the social movement demands and have 
either a positive or negative effect on the movement as a whole.  
 
 Haines (1984, 1988, 1996) led scholarship on Radical Flank Effect by 
first studying it systematically in reference to the black power movements 
and civil rights movements in the United States. Gupta defines the RFE as a 
‘mechanism triggered by the bifurcation of a social movement into radical 
and moderate factions’. In other words, RFE is not a tactic or strategy; it is a 
variable that ‘enters into the likelihood of success’ (Lofland 1996: 295) when 
studying the success of a movement. Lofland (1996) states that SMOs can 
often be arranged on a spectrum of moderate to radical “running from the 
more conservative SMOs who are closer to the mainstream, to the more 
militant and radical SMOs who are further to the extreme ‘left’, ‘right’, or 
merely ‘out’“ (294). When a movement contains both a radical and moderate 
group, the radical group’s actions are perceived by external actors (the state, 
populace, opposing radical groups) to be threatening because they advocate 
extreme and politically unpalatable goals and/or they pursue transgressive 
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(often violent) tactics.  In other words, the level of ‘radicalism’, or 
‘moderation’, of the actors is defined by ‘the degree of legitimacy that is 
imputed to their objective, rhetoric, and tactics by relevant external 
audiences’ (Haines 1984, 1). The state will either bolster the position of the 
moderates to make them more desirable and to isolate or undermine the 
extreme groups, or, they will provide concessions to the moderates in the 
form of policy changes or resource transfers to stave off costly radicalism (see 
Haines 1984; Marger 1984; Haines 1984; Gupta 2002).  The violence by 
clandestine actors can normalize and redefine moderate strategies and 
demands from peaceful groups, and can make them seem ‘reasonable’ 
(Haines 1984, 32). Or, the radicals can also ‘create crises which are resolved to 
the moderate’s advantage; (Haines 1984, 32). This dynamic, called the positive 
radical flank effect (RFE+) occurred during the final moment of the FLNC in 
chapter 6. The Corsican government found that repression of the violent 
network was not working; despite arrests, violence continued to occur. 
Authorities began to look at the region of Corsica as a distinct region in 
France that required its own attention, and therefore met with moderate, 
peaceful actors to attempt political negotiation towards policy change.  
 
In some instances, the presence of radicals in the same movement can 
have ‘deleterious effects on moderates’ ability to gain access to decision 
makers and achieve some measure of success’ (Gupta 2002: 6). The Negative 
Radical Flank Effect (RFE-) then affects the moderate program and discourages 
benefits from external actors (see Wall 1999; Shellengberger and Nordhaus 
2004).  The intense fear, provoked by the militants, creates a reactive 
repression of the entire movement, thus, setting back if not destroying the 
cause (Lofland 1996). As will be noted during the final empirical chapter, the 
Parti Quebecois, already distinct from the FLQ, made sure to publicly 
announce during the October Crisis that they worked separately from the 
FLQ;  leader René Levesque and the PQ were worried that the violence 
would hurt the nationalist movement. The Marxist focus of the FLQ, 
however, made it unlikely that the FLQ would ‘destroy’ the cause of the 
moderate nationalists.  
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Gupta (2002) argues that RFE is problematic by suggesting that one 
gains while the other loses; however, both groups can benefit or lose power 
at the same time. Rather than two outcomes, RFE theorists should consider 
four different possibilities: RFE+, RFE-, INCR (increase, when all groups 
advance) and DECR (decrease, when all groups retreat) (6). The radical flank 
effect is only appropriate when there is competition between two or more 
groups for the resources and attention. Relative and absolute gains that are 
studied under the RFE are not conducive to a single, monolithic movement 
organization that holds all of the influence.  
 
This RFE is useful as a comparison between the FLQ and the FLNC, 
and as a tool to understand the shaping of radical spaces in Corsica and 
Quebec. Gupta (2002) creates a list of assumptions of the mechanism that can 
point to environmental and strategic factors that are likely to influence 
power among movements and SMOs. First, the radical flank effect requires 
rival movement organizations, rather than a monolithic movement 
organization, that compete for the minimal resources and attention. If we 
look at the nationalist movements in Quebec and Corsica with a wider lens, 
the FLQ and the FLNC can certainly be studied using the RFE. Second, the 
RFE requires that the groups are distinct and differentiated in the eyes of the 
external actors: the populace, state and provincial governments. While the 
FLQ had different cells and groups that were not differentiated by the media 
or the state, the FLQ (violent faction) and PQ (moderate faction) 
distinguished themselves from one another very clearly. 
 
Harrison and March (1984), Schelling (1963) and Jervis (2002) argue 
that the RFE lacks an element of explanation, which can be rectified with 
insight into influential environmental and strategic factors, such as: distinct 
rival organizations, factors that distinguish a differentiation of actors, and the 
response of external actors. A final difficulty, Gupta argues, is that the RFE 
mechanism does not explicitly consider the levels of strategic interaction 
within the movement (Alimi et al. 2012). Internal dynamics and factors 
external to the movement also need to be studied and articulated. McCarthy 
and Zald equally suggest that groups can lose or gain power. While the RFE 
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lacks certain explanatory powers, it is useful when studying spaces in 
Quebec and Corsica. The spaces were partially shaped by the relevancy 
given to the FLQ and the FLNC by external audiences, their relationships 
with moderate factions, and the networks’ interactions with the authorities; 
therefore, a comparison of the RFE, supplemented with environmental and 
strategic factors, helps to answer the question of how radical spaces in 
Quebec and Corsica were shaped by the FLQ and the FLNC. 
 
While Gurr’s study of political violence is important to mention, his 
scale is rudimentary and less helpful to this study than RFE. Gurr’s study of 
political violence combined violence by both governmental actors and 
dissident groups; he looked at “nonstate communal groups that were 
politically salient” (Gurr in Tilly 1986, 64). In doing so, he used case reports 
to grade the activity over five-year periods with a scale of 1 through 5. The 
scale includes: (0) none reported; (1) political banditry, sporadic terrorism; (2) 
campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by or on behalf of the group; (3) 
small-scale guerrila activity or other forms of conflict; (4) guerilla activity 
involving more than 1,000 armed fighters carrying out frequent armed 
attacks over a substantial area, or group involvement in civil, revolutionary, 
or international warfare that is not specifically or mainly concerned with 
group issues; (5) civil war fought by military units with base areas (Gurr 2000 
in Tilly, 64). The scale is basic and can lead to error, however Tilly suggests 
that critics have encountered difficulty in creating their own. While it could 
be simple to place the FLQ and the FLNC on a numerical scale similar to 
Gurr’s, this thesis has the luxury of comparing and exploring the two cases 
in depth with the aid of mechanisms, repertoires, and RFE.  
 
Scholars such as Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Jenkins and Eckert 
(1986), Tarrow (1988), Olzak (1989), Kriesi et al (1995), McCarthy et al (1996) 
have studied strikes, riots, violent incidents and other contentious gatherings 
that have emerged as a way to assess the tactics of mobilization within social 
movements. Similarly to RFE, McAdam et al’s (2001) mobilization model 
expands on framing to involve the interaction amongst challengers (or 
actors), their opponents and the media. Unlike Gurr’s scale, this model adds 
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the elements of contrast in this thesis by calling attention to ‘active 
appropriation of sites for mobilization’ (44); the model looks at the 
mobilization process rather than the origins of an episode that affect 
mobilization. As will be noted in the empirical chapters, the mobilization of 
the FLQ and FLNC was dynamic and interactive. The FLQ and FLNC were 
‘continual and recursive’ (45) throughout their trajectories, and were both 
created from preexisting groups that worked as mobilization structures; 
thus, supporting the dynamic mobilization model that suggests that 
mobilization structures can be preexisting (McAdam et al. 2001, 45).  
 
RFE outlines the relationship between the extremists and their 
moderate factions, and the mobilization model looks at the interaction 
between extremists, opponents and the media.  The next section of the 
literature review looks at repertoires, and how the actors interact with 
audiences, public authority and one another.  
 
‘Trangressive Repertoires’ as Strategic Framing 
	  
Similar to RFE, Tilly and others suggest that actors interact strategically with 
significant audiences and representatives of public authorities. McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2001) compare the interactions, that proceed from prior 
encounters and experiences, to performances and scripted interactions ‘in an 
improvisatory manner of jazz or street theatre rather than the more 
repetitious routines of art songs or religious rituals’ (49). These performances 
are obvious during the empirical contrast of the FLQ and the FLNC, 
especially in the third moment when the networks attempted to manipulate 
the press to portray strength and patriotism by relying on acts and imagery.  
 
In this sense, members of the FLQ and FLNC, as challengers of the 
status quo, are considered actors. These actors used ritual and symbolism 
when committing violent acts as a performance; the performances innovated 
around inherited repertoires (McAdam et al. 2001, 49). Tarrow (2012) 
suggests that repertoires represent the culturally-encoded ways in which 
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people interact in contentious politics, and they evolve as a result of 
improvisation and struggle (16). Rarely was the ‘innovation’ within 
repertoires or the innovative acts completely new. All activity by the FLQ 
and the FLNC subscribed to a history or a movement of performance; some 
acts were simply creative forms of previous performances and routines. 
Bombings, hijackings and assassinations were part of the protest culture of 
the 1960s and 1970s, a culture in which the FLQ and the FLNC subscribed, 




McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) argue that actor constitution 
interacts with the mobilization process, and affects its course and outcomes. 
The actors, as in theatre, manipulate, modify and reinterpret their identity of 
contention (See Andrews and Biggs 2006; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; 
McCammon 2003; Myers 2000; Soule 1997). In both the cases of the FLQ and 
the FLNC, membership was open to many different social profiles; although 
identity was important, appropriation of identity was acceptable. As long as 
one considered themselves ‘Corsican’ or ‘Quebecois’ and made the same 
claims, he or she could be considered a member or actor. McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly also claim that the crucial arena for causal mechanisms lies in social 
interaction rather than in individual minds. Again, the importance of social 
interaction between movements and relevant audiences link contentious 
repertoires, actor manipulation, and the analysis of space using RFE.  
 
My focus on identity and actor formation throughout the three 
empirical chapters takes further inspiration from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
(2001) who assess that actors are ‘socially embedded and constituted beings 
who interact incessantly with other such beings and undergo modifications 
of their boundaries and attributes as they interact” (57); contentious politics 
attract actors to participate in a series of interactive performances that are 
partly improvisation within the constraints of a general script.  The relational 
approach of theatricality is excellent for the analysis of the FLQ and the 
FLNC; the interpretation of members as actors and activity as performances 
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within a larger script of contentious episodes provides a mechanism for 
analysis of social interaction. This focus of interaction between actors and 
relevant audiences, further supported by RFE, informs the development of 
radical spaces by the FLQ and the FLNC within the fluid boundaries of 




While the above section introduced and focused on the symbolism of 
repertoires as theatre and members as actors, this section conceptualizes 
literature of protest forms as tactical repertoires. Social, political and 
economic processes constrain the tactical options available to social 
movements and SMOs. The literature in this section places an importance on 
both internal dynamics and external sociopolitical factors to understand 
repertoires and the effective use of tactics as a way of shaping space, which 
supports my decision to place the comparison of the FLQ and the FLNC into 
a detailed historical context.  
 
Authors such as Tilly (1978, 1995), Traugott (1995) and Tarrow (1998) 
write about ‘tactical repertoires’ to discuss the predictable, limited and 
bounded tactics of protest that develop over time. Tarrow (1993) builds on 
Tilly’s (1986) idea that tactics are historically specific by suggesting that 
protest repertoires are also modular; tactics are borrowed by different groups 
and movements pursuing different targets. Activists take inspiration from 
other groups and movements so that they “do not have to reinvent the wheel 
at each place and in each conflict” (McAdam and Rucht 1993, 58 in Van Dyke 
et al. 2001, 266); however, because of this, “tactic innovations occur slowly” 
(Van Dyke et al 2001: 266). Social movements also appropriate cultural 
symbols and modify them to allow them to take on new meaning; this is 
another way that groups create new forms of protest. Taylor and Van Dyke 
convincingly state that cultural repertoires are central to movements across 
the political spectrum, and new technologies are always being incorporated 
into tactical repertoires. 
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The theme of tactical repertoires is discussed further in the empirical 
chapters, and especially during Chapter 6 when I place the FLQ’s tactics and 
actions in context of other nationalist movements. Hostage-taking and plane 
hijacking were popular tactics during the late 60s and early 1970s. The 
Montreal Gazette published an article by the United Press International on the 
6 October 1970 declaring 1970 as ‘the year of the terrorist kidnap’ and listed 
12 political victims kidnapped by leftist guerilla groups in Latin American 
countries since 4 September 1969. Plane hijackings peaked during 1968 to 
1973, in which 326 hijackings were attempted worldwide, or one every 5.6 
days; 137 hijacking attempts occurred in the US alone (Holden 1986). The 
FLQ was not only influenced by other groups using these tactics, but also 
specifically used them to become a part of the larger international movement, 
and to be known outside of Canada.  
 
Turner and Killian (1987) identify four basic tactics that are based on 
the types of interaction with the target (persuasion, facilitation, bargaining, 
and coercion) while recent academics such as Soule et al (1999) and Van 
Dyke et al (2001) focus on a differentiation between two modes of action: non 
confrontational or insider action and confrontational or outsider action. 
While insider action includes boycotts, lawsuits, lobbying, petitions and 
press conferences, outsider action uses demonstrations, vigils, strikes, 
symbolic actions, bombings and other illegal activity. Tarrow (1998) argues 
that violence incorporates a third category, and acknowledges that 
contentious politics often use tactics from all three elements. As will be noted 
in the empirical chapters, the FLQ and the FLNC did in fact use tactics that 
were both non-confrontational and confrontational; press conferences and 
newsletters were used as tactics throughout all three moments and chapters. 
Symbolic actions and bombings were the main tactics used to draw attention 
to the demands of both the FLQ and FLNC.  
 
Forms of collective action are determined by the degree of political 
opportunity, the form of organization adopted by the subordinate groups, 
and the cultural framing of the group’s grievances. My own research aligns 
with Taylor and Van Dyke’s (2004) exploratory research in how these macro 
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and micro factors influenced the FLQ and the FLNC’s tactics. The macro 
factors that are applied in this thesis include transnational tactical repertoires 
(including international influences), and a larger increase of radicalization 
and institutionalization, as described by Tarrow 1989, Koopmans 1993 and 
Kriesi et al 1995. Internal Movement processes involve three internal 
features: level of organization among actors, cultural frames of meaning used 
to justify collective action and the structural power of the participants.  
According to Darnovsky et al (1995), tactical repertoires are influenced by 
social movement culture. Not only are tactics adopted due to their efficiency, 
but also because they resonate with the beliefs, ideas and cultural frames of 
meaning (Snow and Benford, 1988) the actors use to legitimate their 
collective action (Van Dyke et al. 2001, 226). Gender specific ideology also 
serves as a basis for the choice of tactics by nationalist movements; Nagel 
(1998) found that this was the case when studying the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and Brown (1992) when he researched the Black Panthers. 
Gender-influences, specifically within the context of nationalism, influenced 
the choice of tactics by FLQ and FLNC. The first empirical chapter discusses 
the gendering of nationalism, not only as an influencing factor on tactics, but 
also in recruitment.  Taylor and Van Dyke (2004) conclude that actors choose 
among tactical repertoires for those that best conform to their ideologies and 
collective identities, and embody the cultural frames that best highlight the 
group’s motives for action (277). 
 
Scholars such as Schwartz (1976), Tilly (1978, 1986), Gamson (1989) 
and Taylor (1996) all argue that the structural power of protestors influences 
a group’s choice of tactical repertoires. Several studies of social movements 
have found that actors who lack access to institutionalized political and 
economic power are most likely to engage in protest (Scott 1985; Van Dyke et 
al. 2001). This theme is crucial to my own comparison where members of 
both the FLQ and FLNC felt as though they were not represented politically, 
but the movements would cease action when they felt as though they were or 
could be represented politically and return to violence when it became clear 
that their demands were not being considered.  As will be noted in the 
empirical chapters, many members of both organizations were students; 
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scholars agree that students have ‘fewer countervailing ties to the constraints 
of adulthood, and have limited access to politics through other means’ (Van 
Dyke, 277; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1988; White 
1999; Soule 1997; Zhao 1998; Van Dyke et al. 2001) 
 
Studies (see Tilly et al 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979; McAdam 1983) 
found that groups using disruptive tactics were more successful at policy 
change than those who were quieter and focused on institutional changes; 
however, this has been challenged by several authors who argue that there is 
no blueprint: Soule et al (1999) found that insider tactics were much more 
successful than disruptive tactics when studying women’s groups in the US, 
and McAdam and Yang (2002) argued that movements needed a 
combination of disruptive tactics and peaceful politics of persuasion. The 
October Crisis in 1970, in which the FLQ took two hostages, particularly 
proves that disruptive tactics were in no way successful in Canada in the 
1960s and 1970s. There was a worry by the moderate movement that the 
violent activity of the FLQ negatively impacted the completely separate and 
distinct democratic nationalist party, the Parti Quebecois. René Levesque, 
leader of the PQ, made many attempts to distance the PQ from the FLQ; as 
early as 1964 when he was Natural Resources Minister, Levesque denounced 
violence. (Peters 1964).  
 
As Mueller (1999) argues, repertoires and tactics are building blocks of 
all of the major social movement theories from the past three decades; 
therefore, it is important to highlight literature on repertoires in both this 
literature review and how it applies to the FLQ and the FLNC within the 
empirical chapters. Ferree et al (2002) suggest that identity and discourse 
take on an important role in repertoires by groups challenging cultural 
codes; this is linked to the nature of political authority in modern societies. A 
‘recognition struggle’ (Fraser 1993) developed a modern tactical repertoire in 
response to the lack of recognition for identities in law, politics, government 
politics and professional and social practices.  Thus, it is important to 
understand the democratic relationships between Quebec and Canada, and 
Corsica and France; the next few parargraphs looks at modern democracy in 
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countries Canada and France within a larger scope of social movement 
literature.  
 
Both France and Canada were modern democracies during the 
moments of sub-state violent contention studied in this thesis. Both systems 
had, and still do have, a clear division of political labour between elected 
politicians who govern and the populace who elect them (Allen and 
Mirwaldt 2010: 871). Political parties acted as ‘expressive instruments’ 
(Sartori 1976: 28) that performed vital democratic functions by connecting the 
voting citizens to the political and governmental process (Klingemann et al. 
1994:5), and shaping democracy and the division of labour. Alongside the 
checks and balances of democracy, there are also procedures that guarantee 
the freedom of expression, debate, and the liberty to form and join political 
groups and express views through lawful protests and campaigning 
(Giddens 2002, Heywood 2002); however, individuals have at times felt in 
Quebec and Corsica as though the electoral and legal processes were 
conceived in colonial terms. The assumption that violent ritual need not 
occur in democratic regimes due to the wide range of opportunity for claim-
making is certainly a reason in which democracies experience less violence 
(Tilly 2003), however both the FLQ and the FLNC felt as though they were 
not represented by the government and chose illegal actions as a form of 
claim-making. The contextual chapter will give further examples of the 
differences between the democratic governments in Canada and France, and 
the amount of claim-making allowed by both systems.  
 
According to Kischelt (1993) and Della Porta and Diani (2006), social 
movements can articulate a need for direct democracy, and more authority 
over politics than by simply electing representatives, to support the interests 
of the people further than a liberal democracy. The citizens involved in social 
movements assume direct responsibility for intervening in the decision-
making process and seek to switch the current decision-making process to 
include ‘more transparent and controllable sites’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 
240). While representative democracy is based on the creation of a 
specialized body of representatives, direct democracy is more participatory 
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by advocating a continuous turnover.  Direct democracy views the process of 
political delegation, through the electoral process, as an instrument of 
oligarchic power and asserts that the actors be subject to recall at all times. 
Issues with advanced democracy include: ‘the oligarchic functioning of 
political parties, the exclusionary implications of majority rule, the 
monopolization of public spheres of communication, and the exclusion of 
marginal groups and issues from their practice of democracy’ (Della Porta 
and Diani 2006, 241). While public decision-making has a low degree of 
transparency, movement organizations propose alternative and open public 
spheres. The following empirical chapters will show how the FLQ and the 
FLNC perceived the democratic electoral system as an institution that 
perpetuated colonialism, and chose violence to make socio-political, cultural 




This literature review explored social movement theory as the 
theoretical framework. In the first section, I give rationale for using social 
movement theory to contrast the FLQ and the FLNC. Second, I outlined the 
evolution of social movement theory and SMOs to conclude that most 
literature no longer separates cultural and political approaches. The focus on 
mechanisms and repertoires as a form of comparison, in this thesis, follows a 
contemporary theory of social movements that appropriately combines both 
political and cultural approaches.  SMOs are considered active instruments 
in the movement, which supports the comparison between the FLQ and the 
FLNC. 
 
The third section on repertoires and RFE outlined three elements of 
comparison between the FLQ and the FLNC: McAdam et al’s model of 
mobilization supports the empirical contrast between the mobilization 
processes of the FLQ and the FLNC throughout their timelines; Haines’ RFE 
informs the analysis of interaction between violent and moderate factions as 
a way to understand the changes in radical spaces; and repertoires provide 
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elements of comparison via tactics and actor constitution in order to 
understand and fully explore the two networks, thereby providing a context 
necessary to answer the question of why the FLQ and the FLNC chose 
violence over peaceful electoral methods.  
 
Although this literature review has been presented systematically by 
themes, the theory, models and approaches very much overlap to provide an 
informative review of literature that will be used and considered during the 
following chapters. These elements of comparison are important to study 
and understand the FLQ and the FLNC and how they shaped radical spaces 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
	  
In social science research on political violence, there is still a ‘lack of 
individual-level data-driven evidence to test hypotheses, build reliable case 
studies, and support the emergence of new theories’ (Horgan 2011: 195). 
There is a reluctance to either interview extremists or share the experiences 
of having done so; therefore, this chapter provides transparency of my 
research, both archival data and interviews.  Building on the discussion of 
social movements and contentious politics in the last chapter, this chapter 
describes the research design, methodology, data collection and how the data 
was analyzed.  
 
This research was a longitudinal study, which involved repeated 
analysis of the same variables over a period of time.  As a comparative 
historical analysis, this project utilized archival data and interview methods, 
including semi-structured and unstructured interviews. As Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) attest, qualitative approaches help elucidate and explain 
complexity. The purpose of the design was to map the networks with 
archives, secondary data and primary accounts by extremists themselves, 
and to use comparative analysis, a technique that compares and contrasts 
variables between cases, to understand this data.  
 
This thesis developed from an interest in, what is arguably, one of the 
most contentious moments in Canadian history, the October Crisis. Why did 
Quebecois choose to take great risks in order to challenge the social norms 
during the 1960s and 1970s when ‘social actors often resigned themselves to 
the existing social order’? (Lachmann 2013, 31) The case of the FLQ 
contributes to a growing literature on violent nationalism that places an 
importance on case studies, as it is argued that nationalism lacks a theoretical 
‘blueprint’. While violent nationalist networks, such as the IRA and ETA, 
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have been studied under many lens11 and has been compared to Corsica, the 
FLQ has not. Many of the earlier texts, and academic research, cited 
documentation and sources that have become contentious after it became 
clear that many left-wing individuals who had never participated in the FLQ 
were arrested under the WMA.  Although Crelinsten (1987) and Charters 
(1997) analyzed the activity and dynamics of the movement, the journal 
articles were still limited to the October Crisis and utilized basic data 
collections with an emphasis on newspaper articles.  
 
In 2013, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) released a 
declassified version of ‘The Intelligence Assessment, 2012 Domestic Threat 
Environment in Canada: Left-Wing/Right-Wing Extremism’, in which it stated 
that most of Canada’s politically motivated attacks were the work of 
domestic extremists. The report referred to a broadly left-wing group of 
extremists in Quebec, the Initiative de Résistance Internationaliste (IRI); since 
December 2004, the IRI has committed three politically motivated attacks in 
Canada. All three attacks were bombings that targeted symbolic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Key	  studies	  on	  ETA	  include	  Robert	  P.	  Clark,	  1980.	  The	  Basque	  Insurgents:	  
ETA,	  1952-­‐1980.	  Madison:	  The	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press;	  David	  Laitin.	  
1995.	  “National	  Revivals	  and	  Violence,”	  Archives	  Européennes	  de	  Sociologie	  36	  :	  
3–43;	  Goldie	  Shalabad	  and	  Franciso	  José	  Llera.	  1995.	  “Political	  violence	  in	  a	  
democratic	  
	  state:	  Basque	  terrorism	  in	  Spain”	  in	  Martha	  Crenshaw,	  ed.	  Terrorism	  in	  Context.	  
University	  Park:	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press.	  
Key	  studies	  on	  IRA	  include:	  Richard	  English.	  2003.	  Armed	  Struggle:	  A	  History	  of	  
the	  IRA.	  London:	  Macmillan;	  Brendan	  O’Brien.	  1999.	  The	  Long	  War:	  The	  IRA	  and	  
Sinn	  Fein.	  Syracuse:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press;	  Timothy	  Shanahan.	  2012.	  The	  
Provisional	  Irish	  Republican	  Army	  and	  the	  Morality	  of	  Terrorism.	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Henry	  Patterson.	  1997.	  The	  politics	  of	  Illusion:	  a	  
political	  history	  of	  the	  IRA.	  London:	  Serif.	  	  
Key	  comparisons	  of	  the	  IRA	  and	  ETA	  include:	  Hogan.	  2010.	  ETA	  and	  the	  IRA:	  a	  
comparative	  Study.	  Lambert	  Academic	  Publishing;	  Iganacio	  Snachez-­‐Cuenca.	  
2007.	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Nationalist	  Terrorism:	  ETA	  and	  IRA.	  Terrorism	  and	  
Political	  Violence	  19(3).	  Martin	  Dillon.	  1990.	  The	  Dirty	  War:	  Covert	  Strategies	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infrastructure12, similar to ‘urban guerilla’ tactics used by the Front de 
Libération du Quebec (FLQ) from 1963-1971. This CSIS report not only made 
this study topical, but it also proved that sub-state violent contention 
continues to use similar tactics to the FLQ.  
 
In order to better understand the FLQ, I chose to compare it with the 
FLNC in Corsica. After having studied French history, regionalism, and 
Corsica at the Sorbonne (Paris IV), I realized the FLNC would create an 
intriguing contrast in order to inform the FLQ case. Both the FLQ and the 
FLNC began with limited violence, targeted symbolic infrastructure, and 
advocated left-wing ideology, yet the mobilization mechanisms, state 
relationship and response, social structure, and culture were very distinct.  
 
The FLNC was well known on the mainland, had a constant presence 
in the media, and yet the academic literature was highly descriptive. 
Crettiez’s ‘La question corse’ and Robert Ramsay’s ‘Corsican Time Bomb’ are 
two typical examples; however, Ramsay’s account was narrative and ended 
in the 1970s, while Crettiez analyses the FLNC generally and with little detail 
to the internal dynamics. Transparency of research methods allows the 
reader to ‘adequately judge the validity of observations’ (Taylor 1993: 9-10), 
and the little Corsican literature was found to be less than forthcoming about 
data, often due to secrecy; this was especially evident with Poggioli’s  (2003, 
2006, 2011, 2013) several accounts about his participation with the FLNC. 
Even Charters and Crelinsten’s data shows a narrow data collection of media 
articles and secondary literature on the FLQ; neither cited the newly-released 
and extensive RCMP archival information in their short articles or book 
chapters.  
 
This research is concerned with contrasting the two movements in 
Quebec and Corsica, a contrast that has never been undertaken before. By 
understanding the different profiles of the individuals (the actors) that joined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  ‘Bomb	  Attack	  On	  a	  Hydro-­‐Quebec	  Tower,’	  6	  December	  2004,	  CBC;	  ‘Police	  confirm	  oil	  
exec’s	  car	  blast,’	  16	  August	  2006,	  CBC;	  Quebec	  anti-­‐terror	  squad	  probes	  oil	  exec’s	  car	  
blast,’	  8	  August	  2006,	  CBC.	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and organized the networks and the mechanisms and processes for 
mobilization, I was able to analyze how these movements affected radical, 
and thereby larger, ideological spaces. The strategy, ideology, network 
organization and recruitment of the FLQ and the FLNC are studied and 
compared systematically over three different time periods in three empirical 
chapters. The cases of the FLQ and the FLNC are very different, yet it is in 
these differences, or absences, that we are able to better understand violent 
nationalism in Quebec and Corsica.  
 
Lachmann (2013) argues that as researchers of contentious politics, 
our ultimate goal is to explain how these protests and periods of violent 
matter, and ‘to do that we need to construct theories of how structural 
change occurs. Protesters’ thoughts and actions are part of that protest, but 
they can’t be studied alone’ (47). In agreement with Lachmann, my data 
collection looked further than official organs and writings of the extremists 
themselves, as they were idealistic and did not accurately represent the 
views and actions of all the actors. I look further into causal mechanisms that 
explain ‘the process of popular mobilization and the effects of such 
mobilization upon social structure’ (Lachmann 2013, 47).  
 
Mahoney and Reuschemeyer (2003) suggest that comparative 
historical analysis is ‘oriented towards the explanation of substantively 
important outcomes. It is defined by…an emphasis on process over time and 
the use of systematic and contextualized comparison’ (6). Skocpol also finds 
that historical sociological studies highlight the varying features of social 
structures and patterns of change, while also looking at meaningful actions 
and structural contexts to ‘make sense of the unfolding of unintended as well 
as intended outcomes in individual lives and social transformations’ (4). My 
research focuses on a contrast of mechanisms that help to understand how 
the FLQ and the FLNC sought to create and extend radical ideological space 
in which their agendas would create factions. In doing so, this thesis employs 
a very large importance on socio-political and cultural context. By dividing 
the analysis into three chronological chapters, my thesis displays a 
development of the movements themselves and the ideological radical 
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spaces. My research had the further issue, however, of balancing two very 
different time periods. While there are huge contrasts between the FLQ and 
the FLNC anyway, I also had to balance the influences of the time periods on 
the ideological spaces; the international influences between the 1960s and the 
1980s, for example, are vastly different, and had to be taken into 
consideration. This thesis is written so that it balances a confidence in the 
intellectuality of the reader while not demanding too much of him or her by 
bouncing back and forth between time periods excessively.   
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
	  
This study mainly drew on archival research data from the National 
Archives of Canada in Ottawa and les Archives Nationales in Montreal for 
the Quebec component; the center of Corsican scholarship at Université de 
Corse in Corté and the archives départementales de Haut-Corse in Bastia and 
Corse du Sud in Ajaccio supplied the archival data for the Corsican 
component. Beyond the archival research, I was also able to access further 
text data through newspaper archives. The RCMP documents of the FLQ and 
newspaper articles are considered contentious due to the suspicion 
surrounding the clandestinity of the network, and the official organs of the 
network were accounts written by the members themselves, proving to be 
very idealistic; therefore, they were cross-referenced with primary data, such 
as newspapers, police documents, and transcripts of court cases, and 
secondary accounts by Laurendeau (1990), Fournier (1984), Vallières (1990).  
Equally, Crettiez (1999), Ramsay (1983) and Poggioli (2003, 2004, 2006, 2011, 
2013) provide important accounts of the FLNC and Corsica that aided the 
analysis of the manifestoes within this study. Further information of 
specificities is given within the sections detailing fieldwork in both Canada 
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Canada: Ottawa and Quebec 
 
My research involved two periods of fieldwork; a period of time spent in 
both Canada and France. I spent two months in Ottawa and Quebec 
researching at the National Archives of Canada and les Archives nationales 
in Montreal. In Ottawa, my fieldwork began with a workshop with the 
Research Network on Terrorism, Security, and Society, where academics and 
policy-makers met to present and discuss research on the above subjects in 
Canada. This research network workshop aimed to bridge the gap between 
academics and policy makers, and allowed me to place my own historical 
research into a larger network of contemporary issues of violence and 
security in Canada.  I then spent the rest of the time in Ottawa collecting data 
from the National Archives of Canada; I looked specifically at RCMP 
documents in collaboration with the Surêté du Québec, many of which were 
redacted, and newspaper articles about the FLQ and specifically the October 
Crisis. The collections of RCMP documents had been partially used in order 
to study Mario Bachand. 
 
In Quebec, I gained access to court records and copies of the organ of 
the FLQ, La Cognée, held at les archives nationales. These documents proved 
to be extremely informative for membership, ideology and activity, as long 
as they were read with bias constraints; RCMP documentation about 
individual arrests was contentious as they arrested many left-wing 
Quebecois who had no ties to the FLQ, and the La Cognée articles were 
obviously propagandist as they were written by the members themselves. 
Despite their idealism, La Cognée articles were informative to the analysis of 
what the different cells believed, and what they were striving for as a way in 
understanding the difference between the moments. Newly released RCMP 
documentation aided in supporting and critiquing secondary literature.  
 
Research at the Archives Nationales in Quebec proved to be more 
difficult than the simple system at the national archives in Ottawa. I went 
through a series of security checks that took up to a week and a half in order 
to gain access to the requested documentation on the FLQ and its members, 
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and it was soon discovered that the unexpected delay was due to the 
information that was accessible amidst the court transcripts: detailed 
information on how to build several kinds of basic bombs. Day to day 
fieldwork in Ottawa and Montreal consisted of full days of leafing through, 
reading, taking note of, and photographing archival documentation.  
 
France: Aix-en-Provence and Corsica 
 
I traveled to the south of France and Corsica for further research. I had 
obtained my level two ethics as I had planned to set up interviews in Corsica, 
but I first planned to conduct research at the Centres des Études Corses, the 
center for Corsican studies at the Université Aix Marseille.  Upon reaching 
Aix-en-Provence, I was informed that the Centres des Études Corses had 
recently shut down. Those who were around were unable to locate the 
documentation held there. Instead, I was able to access the PhD thesis of 
Pierre Poggioli, a former member of the FLNC who has since become a 
prominent politician in Corsica.   
 
In Corté, Corsica, the international office at the Universita di Corsica 
was very cooperative in organizing university privileges for me. The library 
held a small center of Corsican scholarship, which included the FLNC 
manifestos and secondary literature on the FLNC, independence and 
Corsican culture. At the university, I also met an art professor, of French 
nationality, who was very helpful in opening doors for my research and 
introducing me to Corsican culture. Interestingly enough, many individuals 
suggested over the course of my fieldwork that people were more open to 
my research because I was not French and writing in a different language; 
many individuals were excited about a foreign interest in the Corsican case.  
 
Besides these informal, conversational interviews, and in agreement 
with Nunkoosing (2005) who emphasized the importance of the interview by 
enabling the interviewee to think and talk about their experiences, 
understandings, predicaments and needs, I also conducted semi-structured 
interviews with Pierre Poggioli and Jacques Thiers in order to further 
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support the analysis of secondary information and archival work. Although 
there are certainly power relations between the interviewer and the 
interviewee (Anyan 2013), I attempted to ‘control the power imbalances’ by 
practicing reflexivity and supporting the interviews with other methods and 
theory. I give rationale for these interviews in the following paragraphs. 
 
Pierre Poggioli was a former member of the FLNC Direction, the small 
leadership cell of the network, between 1977 and 1989; he was also elected 
the Assemblé de Corse between 1984 and 1998. He received his doctorate at 
Université Aix Marseille by comparing the FLNC to the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) in Basque Country and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
and has authored several books about the FLNC and Corsican nationalism. 
The interview with M. Poggioli was very informative as he had a keen 
understanding of the clandestine network. My access to an interview with 
him was based on luck and small-town networks. The postgrad student that 
I happened to sit across from one of my first days in Corté happened to be 
long time family friends with Poggioli and his son; Poggioli himself 
contacted me the next day. I had spent quite a bit of time attempting to track 
him down before his chance meeting. I met Poggioli in Ajaccio at a café bar; 
he provided me with ample information about his own experiences within 
the FLNC and general information about membership but was hesitant to 
discuss details of specific attacks, actors or clandestine dynamics.  
 
Second, I met with Jacques Thiers, a connection that I made before my 
arrival to Corsica thanks to an organizer of the Jeunes Rechercheurs 
conference that I presented at in Berlin. Jacques Thiers, a professor of 
linguistics at the Université de Corté since 1983, has been a leader in the 
literary and cultural movement in Corsica promoting and preserving the 
Corsican language. Since 1994, Thiers has led the Service Commun du Centre 
Culturel Universitaire (CCU), which organizes cultural and artistic 
workshops, publications and a periodical journal entitled ‘À l’asgiu’, 
conferences, drama and literary competitions on campus, the continent, and 
across the Mediterranean.  I initially met with Thiers to understand the 
cultural component of my research, but his interview further informed my 
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contrast between the responses to the FLQ and FLNC activity; due to Thiers’ 
involvement with the cultural movement, he was named as an FLNC 
member in the media. Thiers suggested that he ‘woke up one morning to 
find [his] face on the front of a newspaper declaring that he was a leader of 
the FLNC’, which he was not; this situation is comparable to the many 
cultural activists in Quebec who were arrested under the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus as FLQ suspects. Many artists and left-wing Quebecois were 
targeted.  
 
In both cases, my data collection was mainly archival work and the 
use of texts. Texts were most accessible to me than interviews with past 
extremists, and they also balanced the ‘artificial process of interaction’ that 
occurs in interviews or focus groups (Hancké 2009, 62). In Corsica, I also 
spent time at the two regional archives in Ajaccio and Bastia where I 
accessed newspaper articles and ‘Le memorial des Corses’ between 1945-
1980 and 1980-1990s. These texts provided accounts of the FLNC activity and 
key moments, and were written by Corsican, rather than French, academics, 
which was very informative as most newspapers were supported by and 
supportive of the French state. The texts also included several photographs 
and propaganda that aided the contexualization and the comparison.  
 
Lastly, all research has been conducted in French. RCMP 
documentation was often in English, but all other sources and interviews 
were in french language, in which I am fluent.   
 
While interviews were certainly not enough to create a contrast 
between the FLQ and FLNC, they aided in informing the context of the 
movements, elements of the internal dynamics, and further supported the 
archival and secondary source analysis. Similarly, Andrew Silke (2001) 
conducted a survey of published work on political violence, and argues that 
very few researchers actually conducted interviews with extremists; those 
who did identify interviews as part of their methodology articulated that 
interviews ‘represented a very minor feature of the overall effort and 
contributed to no more than four per cent of the information contained in the 
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article’ (7).  Main data focus of researchers came from secondary data 
analysis. Much of the analysis resulted from the contrast of mechanisms and 
processes between the two movements. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) attest, 
that by comparing where the facts are different, ‘we can generate properties 
of categories that increase the categories’ generality and explanatory power’ 
(24).  
 
Due to access to court transcripts, I was able to cross-reference RCMP 
documents, primary accounts, secondary literature and newspaper articles to 
map members of the FLQ. Transcripts of court cases against FLNC militants 
were inaccessible to me in France, less militants were arrested and proven 
guilty, and the levels of secrecy and clandestinity made it much more 
difficult to map specific individuals. I was, however, able to gain accurate 
knowledge on membership through formal and informal interviews, primary 
accounts by militants, and introductions to militants by individuals who 
supported my research project. A combination of these primary sources 
informed my research on membership and specifically looks at who was 
forming the leadership, who was being recruited and who joined the FLNC 
in contrast to the FLQ, and who was absent; thus, studying why the FLQ and 
the FLNC were appealing to different profiles.  
 
I conducted qualitative research interviews (QRIs) that engaged in 
active listening in order to gather information and facts (Weiss 1998), and 
sought to ‘understand human behavior, elicit information and meaning, and 
learn from participants’ (Rosetto 2014). Semi-structured interviews collect 
data in a style that is somewhat conversational, and to gather detailed 
information on a topic (35). As Dolnik (2011) suggests, interviews with 
extremists very rarely yield ‘ground-breaking’ information. Very often the 
interview responses are idealized and do not provide new information. In 
the case of my interviews in Corsica, even the interviews that did not 
provide new data were still informative for supplementing potentially 
questionable research; others were helpful in my understanding of the role of 
culture and history within Corsican society.  Others were able to share 
information about membership profiles that would be difficult to publish 
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locally, as much of the information were about family and neighbours.  
Making contact, or contact attempts, were very different in Quebec and 
Corsica. While certain past FLQ members were present on social sites such as 
linkedin and were available by e-mail or through work offices, my attempts 
to contact for interviews were ignored. Social media was not even an option 
in Corsica, and interviewees were contacted through social connections. My 
interview with Gerard Bouchard, historian, sociologist, chaire de recherche 
du Canada sur les imaginaires collectifs, and brother to former premier 
Lucien Bouchard, was helpful for background information, but was also 
difficult to organize and was made possible by my aunt, a colleague and 
mentee of Bouchard.  
 
I traveled to Corsica with hopes of making connections to obtain 
interviews, especially one with Pierre Poggioli, whose thesis I read in Aix on 
the FLNC and had read several of his written accounts of his participation 
with the network. Interestingly, I had the luck of sitting down for lunch 
across from a postgrad student originally from Ajaccio; he coincidentally was 
best friends with Poggioli’s son and was able to put me in contact with 
Poggioli.  
 
My choice to spend most of my time in Corté was an obvious one. 
First, the two port cities, Ajaccio and Bastia, that were home to the archives 
were very touristy. Second, the only university on the island is located in 
Corté, therefore it was a good point of contact for fieldwork, and it was 
extremely culturally rich. (Many classes were offered in the Corsican dialect, 
and all signage was in Corsican rather than French.) Finally, Corté was the 
capital of the Corsican independent state during the period of Pasquale Paoli, 
and is known for being very nationalistic. The Corsicans that I met in Corté 
were enthusiastic about participating in research. One respondent suggested 
that it was because I was a native English speaker from abroad; I represented 
an international interest in the Corsican case, and the idea of my thesis being 
written in English meant that more people would be able to read and learn of 
Corsican nationalism. Because Corté was a small town in the interior of the 
island where tourists would move through and spend only a couple of days 
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at the most, my extended presence was noted. I became known, kindly, as ‘la 
Canadienne’ to those who did not know me.   
 
Ethics and Positionality 
	  
While it is often thought that data collection for research on violence could 
be highly dangerous, Silke (2004) argue that this is unfounded if the 
researcher is experienced and well-prepared (13). Many of the issues of 
researching in a conflict or post-conflict zone were not legitimate risks in 
Corsica and Quebec; kidnapping and murder were highly unlikely and 
landmines are nonexistent. Taylor (1993), however, identifies a triad of 
dangers faced by any fieldworker: legal, health and personal. For the 
purpose of potential risk to my own health and safety, and of the legal status 
of my data collected, it was recommended during my first year board review 
that I undertook a level two ethics clearance for the Corsican component of 
my research in case of any issues with policing and/or working with 
extremists.  
 
A level two ethics clearance is ‘required for research on sensitive 
topics or illegal practices, research involving vulnerable groups or children, 
research that could adversely affect participants or the researcher, or in cases 
where there are impediments to obtaining the informed consent of 
participants’ (Research Ethics, University of Edinburgh 2014).  In completing 
this level 2 ethics assessment, it allowed me to manage any potential risks of 
my research that could threaten the participants or myself as researcher. I 
attempted to avoid the possession of incriminating evidence of participants: 
background and informal interviews were kept anonymous; quoting 
verbatim was avoided so as to protect the identity of the participants; written 
consent was not obtained due to a higher risk of a paper trail, and a higher 
risk that confidentiality would be broken; and I attempted to formulate 
interviews without the discussion of specific violent acts and events. In order 
to protect participants from forced disclosure of information to police 
officials, I stored all interviews on a G drive separate from my computer. In 
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order to avoid the risk of self-incrimination on record, I stopped recording 
when incriminating activities were discussed.  Those who are named in this 
thesis are known publicly for their involvement with the FLQ and the FLNC. 
I also made it clear that contacts at the Universita di Corsica would be aware 
of my whereabouts when traveling for interviews with past members, and 
we met in public locations. Although meeting in cafés slightly affected the 
data collection and the discomfort of speaking about personal connections to 
the movement in a public place13, it was necessary for the sake of the 
researcher.  
 
Going into the research, I was unsure as to how my profile would 
affect my data collection with masculine subjects; I was told by another 
respondent, however, that being a young-looking, white female on her own 
also potentially aided my research as Corsica had a clan system historically 
that placed an importance on family values.  Further, my eagerness for my 
research and my polite attitude to elders was said to be respected within the 
community. While research has found that people form 60% to 80% of their 
opinions about the researcher in less than four minutes (Pease 2004), I 
suspect that the positive reputation aided the entire process, as it was 
particularly productive.  
 
Through my experience, there were several surprising factors that 
aided my research: first, my nationality was foreign but NOT French; second, 
being a young-looking female traveling and researching alone; third, my 
undiscriminatory enthusiasm for the culture and my research. I would argue 
that the second factor was due to the importance that Corsican culture placed 
on family and the clan; when it was discovered that I was alone for Easter, 
the local Corsicans were very open and friendly to me and invited me to 
their homes. I became a regular at the Cyrnea bar and café, where I would 
work when I wasn’t on campus, that people began to approach me. Some 
would invite me to their tables to discuss Corsican culture; this often took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  One	  experience	  noted	  was	  during	  my	  interview	  with	  Poggioli.	  I	  asked	  a	  
question	  about	  membership	  in	  the	  movement,	  in	  which	  the	  five	  other	  men	  in	  
the	  café	  went	  quiet	  and	  Poggioli	  became	  noticeably	  uncomfortable.	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several days of polite discussion, music, and generally the acceptance of a 
drink. The owner of the Cyrnea even expressed his allegiance to the FLNC 
one evening. While these discussions did not provide hard data for my 
analysis, it provided an understanding for the culture, the people, and the 
movement itself that I lacked before my fieldwork.  
 
I keep in mind that there are biases within their accounts, but the 
knowledge of the internal dynamics, and ideologies, are useful in comparing 
the FLQ and the FLNC and how the movements developed radical spaces.  I 
was able to gain experience with the process of a level 2 ethics clearance, and 
it was reassuring to have when I completed my research. Although violent 
acts occur in Corsica, I at no point felt that my research or I was threatened. If 
anything, my presence was embraced by Corsicans, French and FLNC 
members past and present, as my presence and my thesis proved an 




I am aware of the limitations of this data collection on such a subject, 
especially interviewing; however, an awareness of these limitations, I 
believe, has justified my method choices and allowed me to problematize my 
data accordingly. Due to the secrecy and contention surrounding both cases 
in this thesis, I have ensured an intensive cross-referencing of sources. 
Interviews, RCMP documents, primary accounts and secondary literature 
were thoroughly studied in order to create the contrasts in the following 
chapters.  
 
Data collection involved an extensive engagement with the archives, 
but this chapter does not fully make clear the many people that have molded 
my cultural and social understanding of the sub-states. Despite the many 
hours behind a desk with boxes of archives, human engagement was 
particularly important to my research. I was very lucky in Corsica especially 
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to have cultural mentors14, and although this engagement did not provide 
raw data, it manifests itself in other ways throughout the thesis.  
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  A	  professor	  at	  the	  university,	  and	  her	  friend	  ‘the	  baron’,	  were	  kind	  enough	  to	  
take	  me	  around	  Corsica	  to	  cultural	  fairs	  to	  help	  sell	  local	  bread	  made	  from	  
wheat	  grown	  in	  Corté.	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Chapter 4: Mobilization of the violent networks: a 




“Aio! Tutti! Fratelli chi he l’ora 
D’Arma Shjoppi e di cigne carchera […] 
Aio! Tutti! Fratelli chi he l’ora 
Di stirpa sta razza maladetta […] 
 
[…]A populu fattu 
Bisogna a marchja 
 
Tutti sottu a listessa bandera 
Bianca, ornate di la testa Mora, 
Aio Corsi Chi turnata he l’ora 
Di l’antica nostra liberta15 
 
Come! All of my brothers, it is time 
To arm the guns and attach the cartridges 
Come! All of my brothers, it is time 
To remove this cursed race…  
 
…The people united 
must march 
 
All under the same flag 
Black decorated with the Maure head 
Come on Corsicans, the hour has come 
Of our ancient liberty 
 
 
As the Sunata Lu Cornu song articulates, actors in Quebec and Corsica armed 
themselves with guns and dynamite to fight for nationalism against a 
perceived colonial relationship with the state. While this chapter avoids the 
emotional nature of the movements, cultural texts such as this song were 
highly popular during the 1960s in Quebec and 1970s in Corsica. These texts 
demonstrate the tensions in the sub-states that is important to consider during 
this politically and economically-focused comparison.  
 
This chapter looks at the development and mobilization of the FLQ 
and the FLNC, beginning in 1963 in Quebec and 1976 in Corsica, and 
compares structure, ideology and membership as mobilizing mechanisms to 
inform the shaping of radical spaces. Frame analysis is used in the conclusion 
as a way “to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences” (Snow et al. 
1986: 464) and “selectively punctuate and encode objects, situations, events, 
experiences and sequences of actions within one’s present and past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  ‘Sunata	  Lu	  Cornu’	  appeared	  in	  1976,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  FLNC.	  The	  
song	  was	  written	  by	  Canta	  u	  Populu	  Corsu,	  a	  group	  that	  strived	  for	  protection	  of	  
the	  Corsican	  culture,	  and	  was	  hugely	  popular	  by	  account.	  While	  elements	  of	  the	  
lyrics	  are	  radical	  indeed	  (“to	  remove	  this	  cursed	  race”	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  
Algerian	  population),	  it	  provides	  a	  context	  of	  the	  cultural	  propaganda	  occurring	  
in	  Corsica	  during	  the	  first	  moment.	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environment” (Snow and Benford 1992: 137).  Framing the actions of the 
individuals discussed in the following empirical chapters channel the 
individual behaviors into patterned social ones (Oliver and Johnston, 2000).  
 
The structures of the FLQ and the FLNC not only influence the 
movement of information and resources, but also help to explain the 
sustainability of the movements. The ideologies inform a contrast between 
the demands of the two networks, and the changing demands between FLQ 
cells and decades of the FLNC network map a development of the radical 
spaces over time. Finally, membership explains which profiles were choosing 
to mobilize. Concluding analysis of these mechanisms, within collective 
action frames, at the end of the chapter illuminate why actors chose violence 
in democratic sub-states Quebec and Corsica, and inform the larger question 





“Au Quebec prévaut également cette situation injuste et paradoxale qui se trouve un 
bon exemple dans la comparaison entre le quartier Saint-Henri et celui de 
Westmount. D’un côté nous trouvons une masse typiquement québécoise, pauvre et 
miserable, tandis que de l’autre une minorité anglaise étale le luxe le plus honteux”16 
(Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation, 1963). 
 
Neither the FLQ nor the FLNC developed out of thin air; both networks 
developed in response to social and political frustrations with the state due 
to a belief that the democratic electoral system, ‘instilled by the colonizers on 
the colonized’ (La Cognée, 1965), was not supporting their needs. Tarrow 
(2012) argues that cycles of mobilization are influenced by the opening and 
closing of groups’ access to the political process; while Corsicans and 
Quebecois were included in the democratic system by electoral vote, the 
individuals that formed the contentious political networks felt marginalized, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  “In	  Quebec	  we	  also	  have	  the	  unjust	  and	  paradoxical	  situation	  that	  is	  
exemplified	  in	  the	  comparison	  between	  St.	  Henri	  and	  Westmount.	  On	  one	  side,	  
we	  find	  a	  mass	  typically	  Quebecois,	  poor	  and	  miserable,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  side	  
an	  English	  minority	  shows	  off	  the	  most	  shameful	  of	  riches”.	  Translated	  by	  Mitch	  
Abidor	  
	   64	  
disempowered, and that they were becoming minorities on their own land. 
Violence provided an alternative strategy to make frustrations known and to 
put forward a new socio-political and economic agenda. In both cases, the 
originating members met through other existing political organizations, but 
found that the previous organizations were not inclusive of their ideologies, 
strategies and demands; therefore, they developed the FLQ and the FLNC. 
While the founders were of different socio-economic background, they were 
united in their left-wing and nationalist ideologies. Although both the FLQ 
and the FLNC looked to further political power or gain independence as the 
ultimate goals, neo-marxism and a frustration with other ethnic groups 
having control over capital were important factors for mobilization.  
 
  In Quebec, the Jean Lesage liberal government had been elected into 
provincial power during the 1960 election. As mentioned during the context 
section in the introduction, this election proved a changing mindset in the 
province. This shift had been developing since the 1940s and 1950s, and 
focused on modernization, the separation of church and state, and a need for 
taking on the role of ‘masters at home’ through social and economic reforms. 
While parts of Quebec were experiencing this economic expansion and 
secularization, East Montreal was going through deindustrialization. The 
bourgeoisie predominantly gained from the nationalization of private 
companies as the rate of people on social assistance in Pointe- Saint-Charles 
tripled between 1966 to 1974 (Mills 2010), which caused frustration and 
activism to grow in South-East and East Montreal. The student mobilization 
of the FLQ was associated with the strong union presence on university 
campuses through research funding and presenting papers at conferences 
and functions (Rouillard 1989). 
 
The FLQ developed from a ‘daisy chain’ of political organizations that 
composed a contemporary independence movement in Quebec. As early as 
1957, the Alliance Laurentienne (AL) began to promote Quebec 
independence with a vision of a free Catholic Quebec named ‘Laurentie’ 
(Manifeste de l’Alliance Laurentienne, 1962). Independence was promoted as 
the only way to ensure that the Quebec identity, including language, culture 
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and religion, would be preserved. Membership of the AL included Catholic 
nationalists, students, some professionals and right-wing intellectuals 
(Griffin 1985).  Rassemblément pour l’Indépendence Nationale (RIN) was 
created out of a frustration with, and in response to, the AL’s right-wing 
policies (“L’indépendence” 1962). The RIN was founded on 10 September 
1962 as a neutral organization to accommodate a wide range of political 
associations. In October 1962, the Réseau de résistance pour liberation 
nationale du Quebec was founded as a military wing of the RIN, but the 
members mainly participated in petty crimes of vandalism. Posters that 
declared a ‘Quebec libre!’, a liberated Quebec, were taped on bus stops and 
street lights. (Schneider 2002, 58) When the 1962 election presented an 
opportunity not only for discourse, but also to challenge the political system 
in the polls, the RIN needed to focus on a political agenda; it quickly 
cemented a left-wing and secular agenda (Griffin 1985), and dropped the 
Réseau de Resistance as it was considered too radical. On the 3 March 1963, 
the RIN officially became a political party and five days later, the FLQ 
committed its very first bombing. RIN members who felt that the RIN was 
not radical enough formed the first cell and incarnation of the FLQ. In order 
to develop an ideological radical space, the FLQ used bombs and violent 
activity to attract attention to their plight of left-wing nationalism. Similarly, 
former RIN members used the peacefully-political organization to recruit 
other discontented members, both workers and left wing students, for the 
FLQ cells (Fournier 1982).  
 
On March 8, the FLQ attacked three military barracks in Montreal and 
Westmount with bombs. In April, the FLQ committed another series of 
attacks before publishing and distributing the first FLQ manifesto, ‘Message 
du FLQ à la Nation’, on the 16 April: on the 1 April, a bomb exploded in the 
ventilating system of the Income Tax Building; on the 4 April, CNR tracks at 
Lemieux where Prime Minister Diefenbaker was traveling was blown away 
by dynamite; and two days later, a bomb of 23 sticks of undischarged 
dynamite was found at 2:30 a.m. the base of the CBC television tower on 
Mount Royal (Div file no: 63 HQ 1184-1).  
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Membership 
	  
“…it is suspected that the FLQ is composed of the young element of 
the separatist groups. They have expressed themselves in the 
beginning in the form of slogan writings and gradually gained 
momentum by expressing themselves in a more militant way which 
would tend to indicate that the element of adventure and excitement 
is playing an important part. However, judging from their most 
recent actions and their method of operations particularly concerning 
the handling of explosives, the possibility the movement has the 
availability of either professional saboteurs or highly qualified 
personnel in the handling of explosives and time mechanisms come to 




Scholars (such as Rapoport 1988; Hoffman 1998) assess that the careers 
and profiles of individual members reveal patterns that help to understand 
the rise and fall of the strategy and networks within the violent nationalist 
movements; researching who joined and participated informs the internal 
dynamics of the organization. In order to map out the membership 
comprehensively as a mechanism of violence that shaped the radical space, I 
introduce key members and look analytically at each cell through a lens of 
six precipitants: economic, political, cultural, ethnic or nationalist influences, 
geographical influences and gender. This serves as a way to study the 
internal dynamics of the organization as a whole. These precipitants are not 
distinct, and often overlap. It is also important to note that the members 
discussed within this chapter admitted or were convicted of their 
membership; this provides the contrast with an accurate analysis of the 
movement itself despite the contentious arrests of many Quebecois. Focusing 
on key membership, ideologies, and influences within a larger framework of 
collective action frames, informs not only the internal dynamics of the FLQ 
but the social elements that influenced the radicalization and mobilization of 
students and workers from East Montreal. 
 
In several accounts (Morf 1970; Palmer 2008; Levinson, 1963), Georges 
Schoeters is declared to be the ‘leader’ of the central node, yet was known 
amongst his peers as a much lesser advocate of violence than his co-
organizers Gabriel Hudon and Raymond Villeneuve.  Schoeters’ experience 
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and matured age, however, would certainly allow him to appear as leader 
and sole founder; he arrived in Quebec in 1950 from Belgium where he was a 
part of the resistance against the Nazi Occupation in World War II and was 
imprisoned by the Germans during the Bataille des Ardennes.  
 
Schoeters was well known for his Marxism, however Hudon, 
Villeneuve and Schoeters all created the FLQ with Marxist demands and 
believed that independence must involve a socialist component; readings of 
Marxist and revolutionary literature were organized on almost a weekly 
basis at a series of restaurants in Montreal (Div file no: 63 M 11-84-1). For 
Schoeters, this political ideology was personally cemented upon a trip to 
Cuba, during the summer of 1959, that he organized for students from the 
Université de Montreal after he obtained his masters degree in Economic 
Sciences. The group met Fidel Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos. In Autumn 
1959, he returned to Cuba to work in agrarian reform, and during this time, 
he met Che Guevara. Upon his return to Quebec in 1959, he married a 
Québécoise named Jeanne Pepin (Fournier 1982). Although he himself was 
not Quebecois, Schoeters’ relations with a Quebecoise would have assisted 
his ethnic position exponentially within the movement.  
 
Pierre Schneider published a book in 2002 about his experiences with 
the first wave of the FLQ. Originally a member of the RIN at the age of 16, he 
noted that he experienced the ‘rotten democracy’ at work in Quebec at age 17 
when assisting with Marcel Chaput’s campaign as independent candidate in 
the 1962 election (68). His nationalist perspective was inspired by his 
childhood in Outremont with his grandfather, who was a supporter of Lionel 
Groulx, and his poor relationship with his Anglophone father. Schneider 
placed bombs for both the Réseau de Resistance and the FLQ while he was 
working for Radio Canada.  
 
 Raymond Villeneuve and Gabriel Hudon, both Québécois, came from 
different socio-economic backgrounds. Villeneuve, the youngest at 19 years 
old, had graduated from école sécondaire at Saint-Stanislas where he was 
president of the student association. He went on to work at a boulangerie 
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after graduation. Hudon, at 21 years old, was the son of a ‘debardeur’, a 
worker on the shipping docks, and had been working since the age of 17 as a 
drafter at Jerry Hydraulique, a factory for airplane parts (Fournier 1982).  It is 
interesting that the initial ‘noyau de direction’, central node, involves 
‘representatives’ of the three backgrounds within the FLQ membership: 
students, workers, and older immigrants with international influences.  
 
Villeneuve was considered a very apt recruiter in enlisting friends as 
the first FLQ members, and then drawing from members of the RIN and 
l’Action Socialiste (Fournier 1982; Div file: 63 M 1184-1). Villeneuve also 
recruited a newly formed organization, le Réseau de libération nationale, to 
join the FLQ as a whole; it was comprised mainly of students from the 
Collège Saint-Denis. These students, in 1963, were influenced by the New 
Left, and were radicalized on University campuses; they were influenced by 
the French and British New Left ideas, which drew on Mao Tse-Tung’s 
theories of materialism and anarcho-surrealism. The students were also 
“overwhelmed by the American [New Left] example” (Kotash 1980: xiii), and 
they followed the young Marx of 1844 and read his Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts. The New Left differed from the Old Left by focusing less on 
class struggle than on the refusal to succumb to bureaucracy, and was 
inclusive to both students and workers; it wasn’t until 1964 that New Leftism 
attracted non-students off campus through student engagement with their 
community and society (Palmer 2008). Bachand was a felquiste from a lower 
middle-class background- his father was a draughtsman. He stated that he 
became influenced by the political left in Bohemian coffee houses on Clark 
Street across from the Beaux Arts. At these cafés, he rubbed shoulders with 
students, anarchists, socialists and Marxists: “I became an anarchist” 
(Bachand in Taaffe 1963). Bachand participated in Socialist Independence 
Party meetings where he met writers from Partis-Pris, a separatist-socialist 
magazine founded in early 1963; it was through this network that he was 
introduced to the concept of revolution that he would advocate until after his 
jail sentence, and would become involved with the RIN and the FLQ (Gerald 
Taafe 1963). This interesting mix of the student New Left and the working 
Marxist ideology attracted individuals to join the FLQ.  
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Violent activity of the first FLQ cell solely included a series of bombs 
placed around Montreal in April, including: a bomb in the ventilating system 
of the Income Tax Building on the 1st April; the CNR tracks at Lemieux, 
Quebec where Prime Minister Diefenbaker was traveling on the 6 April; a 
bomb consisting of 23 sticks of dynamite was found at the base of the CBC 
tower on the Mount Royal on the 20th April, as well as 10 sticks of dynamite 
behind the garage at the back of the RCMP building on the 20th April; a bomb 
was placed against the Black Watch building on the 9 May; two bombs 
exploded at the RCAP building; and a bomb was also place near the oil 
reservoir at the Golden Eagle Refinery (Div file: 63H! 1184-1). Ten mailbox 
bombs were placed in the richer area of Westmount on the 18th of May, and 
exploded in the early morning, seriously injuring Sgt Major Walter Leja, a 42 
year old non-commissioned officer (“Mario Bachand Pleads Guilty” 1963).   
 
Several men (18) were then arrested and charged for FLQ 
participation. Mario Bachand was found guilty of terrorist acts and charged 
for having placed the explosives in the mailboxes; he also admitted to having 
conspired to place dynamite at the bottom of the CBC television tower. Roger 
Tetreault, a 22 year old unemployed reporter, was charged for placing a 
bomb in the Place d’Armes on 3 May 1963. Gilles Pruneau, a 19 year old 
office clerk, was charged with having placed bombes in mailboxes and 
having broke his bail in September (“Mario Bachand Pleads Guilty” 1963).  In 
the end, only 7 of the 18 persons charged for FLQ activity were not able to 
secure bail.  
After their arrests, Pierre Schneider, Mario Bachand and Roger 
Tetreault attempted to flee to Cuba via les iles de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 
and the United States (Schneider 2002, 16). They were arrested, opted for 
voluntary return to Montreal, and were sentenced to three years in prison 
(Schneider 2002, 19-20). 
The five persons- Schoeters, Hudon, Villeneuve, LaBonté and Giroux- 
who were charged for non-capital murder of army civilian employee Wilfred 
O’Neil, and two others who refused to testify for the Crown. The cell 
disintegrated after the arrests of the key members. When Bachand was asked 
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why he left the FLQ, he responded: “Well, I was arrested. I was three year in 
jail and after that I go out and the FLQ was never a very formal group; it is 
people who started all over again you know so it has changed policy you 
know, it was not a political movement” (unmarked interview in CSIS records 
92-1-00134 part 1).  
 
During the trials of FLQ members, it was found that Jeanne Pepin, 
wife of Schoeters, assisted at various meetings but did not participate 
actively in the movement; she stated that the independence of Quebec was 
for her the ideal future, and that she was present in the house when her 
husband made the bomb for the Black Watch building on Bleury Street, but 
she had no interest in participation (RCMP document no: 63 M 1184-1). Pepin 
was given a suspended sentence (“Mario Bachand pleads guilty” 1963). 
When questioned about the lack of female involvement by Contributing 
Editor Gerald Taafe, Mario Bachand responded: “The women of Quebec 
don’t care much for revolutionary movements” (Gerald Taaffe 1963). 
Whether this was an accurate analysis, Bachand was correct in 
foreshadowing that female participation in the FLQ was to be limited over 
the course of the organization’s existence.  During the existence of this first 
cell, bombs were placed against symbolic infrastructure but most of the 
activity revolved around organized revolutionary readings and knowledge 
sharing. As members were not required to participate in violence, the 
movement was open to left-wing individuals of varying radicalism. The first 
cell was short-lived and did not yet have a high level of insurgency, but it 
was successful in shaping the radical space so that other cells might occupy 
and develop the space.  
 
While researching the membership of the FLQ and the FLNC, the lack 
of female involvement became blatantly apparent. In Quebec, the appearance 
of only a single female FLQ member, and a few others affiliated to the 
organization, seemed at first surprising due to the level of agency of 
Quebecois women during the 1960s; women at that time were involved in 
various facets of oppositional politics (Mills 2010). While the three empirical 
chapters will look at specific female individuals and their involvement with 
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the organizations, this section introduces an explanation as to why most 
women did not involve themselves with the violent clandestine movement of 
the FLQ. 
 
 During the early 1960s in Quebec, women were active in other 
political spheres; left-wing female activists focused on fitting feminism into 
Marxist frameworks. Margaret Benston (1969), for example, wrote the highly 
popular ‘Political Economy of Women’s Liberation’, in which she argued that 
the function of housework could be outlined within capitalism.  The Front de 
Libération des Femmes (FLF), although unsupportive of the violence created 
by the FLQ, was connected to the organization through their active 
demonstrations over the arrest of Lise Balcer during the hearing of Paul 
Rose, FLQ member of the Chenier Cell further discussed in Chapter 6. The 
FLF was created by a collaboration of Anglophone and Francophone 
Quebecoises, originating with Naomi Brickman, a McGill student, and Nicole 
Therien, an activist and employee of the CSN; they organized an informal 
group of women from the CSN and McGill who decided to create the FLF 
with the main goal of liberation through the creation of an independent and 
socialist Quebec (Mills 2010); it was a group of women from the FLF that 
occupied the jury boxes of a Montreal courthouse during the hearing of Lise 
Balcer, a witness in the trial of Chenier FLQ cell member Paul Rose. Balcer 
refused to testify as witness because women were not allowed to sit as jurors 
in Quebec; Balcer was found in contempt of court for her actions. When she 
was in the witness box, having explained the reasons for her refusal to attest, 
seven FLF members sitting in the audience took over the jury benches, 
screaming “discrimination!” and “la justice, c’est la merde!” (Paul Rose trial 
transcript; Mills 2010: 128). Each woman, including Lise Balcer, was charged 
with one to two months in prison for her actions.  
 
Although supportive of Balcer’s plight and female jurors, the FLF and 
Montreal Women’s Liberation Movement (MWLM) became wary, in the late 
1960s, of radical groups and began to question male theorists who did not 
consider female experiences. Inspired by radical feminism in the United 
States, The MWLM wrote of radical groups that fought for “the liberation of 
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all oppressed peoples, yet oppressed the women right among them” (Birth 
Control Handbook, 1968). Due to the “schizophrenia” of groups such as the 
FLQ, women formed and organized their own in order to develop their own 
terms of reference with a nationalist voice, and without the violent activity of 
the FLQ. Both Mills (2010) and Dumont (1992) suggest that radical women 
defended their rights from within the language of anti-colonalism; it was a 
combination of ideals from the Montreal Left and women’s liberation. The 
FLF adopted the slogan: “no liberation of Quebec without the liberation of 
women, no liberation of women without the liberation of Quebec’.  
 
 In 1971, in response to the manifeste du FLQ of 1970, the Manifeste 
des Femmes Quebecois was released; the manifesto denounced the 
discrimination of women in left-wing groups and rejected national liberation 
groups that did not include female liberation, such as the FLQ (Dumont 
1992). Interestingly, and despite the attempts to separate their goals for 
liberation from male-dominated radical groups, the FLF relied on Vallieres’ 
discussion of his mother in Nègres blancs d’Amerique (Mills 2010). As Mills 
(2010) rightly suggests, a contemporary perspective would view his 
portrayal of his mother as almost misogenous in the way that he denunciates 
his mother and her clerical repression on the family.   During the 1960s, 
however, the radical women movement cited Vallieres’ argument 
“capitalism and religion have mass-produced mothers like mine” (Vallieres 
1968) as a ‘damning indictment of the ways in which the combined forces of 
capitalism and colonialism stripped individuals of their humanity’ (Mills 
2010: 132). This citation was then used to enforce the argument that in order 
to achieve a women’s liberation, the individual must have control of her own 
body.  
 
Further analysis into Vallieres’s Les Nègres Blancs d’Amerique proves its 
popularity amongst the women’s liberationist movement to be even more 
surprising. As Vallières attempts to level ideological differences between 
supporters of politically motivated violence in Quebec in his text, he 
completely disregards female participation. He calls ‘les gars’, the boys, to 
action.  Hunsaker (1999) suggests that the only female character Françoise, 
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who enters Vallières’ narrative briefly in order to encourage him to return to 
Quebec, is only as an ‘erotic object in which to console himself’ (72); she is 
described in detail while cleaning the dishes half naked. This sexist 
presentation of women in Nègres Blancs highlights a masculine focus not only 
in Vallières’ writing, but among FLQ ideology; women were ignored during 
the recruiting process as Vallières and his followers focus on left-wing 
and/or working class men: “Hey Georges,  what are you waiting for to make 
up your mind? And the rest of you, Arthur, Louis, Jules, Ernest? On your 
feet, lads, and all together: to work!” (Vallieres 1968). 
 
As Mills and Sheila Rowbotham suggest, the mythological image of 
the solitary urban guerilla that gives up on the comforts of capitalism for the 
good of his people attracts predominantly males: ‘for if it attracts a minority 
among men, it fits even fewer women” (Rowbotham in Mills 2010: 185). 
While women, generally, were not involved with the violence of the FLQ, 
women were arrested for delivering communiqués and hiding and hosting 
the members. During the 1970s through to the 1990s, women were not 
arrested for involvement with the FLNC, with the exception of Louise 
Lanctot. While Schoeters suggested that he built bombs for the first wave of 
the FLQ in his house with his wife present and knowledgeable of his actions, 
most members of the FLNC suggested that they keep their violent activity 
clandestine and separate from their home life. 
 
In order to fully understand FLQ membership, it is important to 
understand who participated and who did not. While economic change 
during the Quiet Revolution problematized male identity and created 
alienation, female participation in the FLQ is noticeably absent, with the 
exceptions of partners and sisters that had ties to the felquistes. An 
understanding of the individuals that first mobilized as felquistes will 
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This section introduces the decreed ideology of the original FLQ cell 
through analyzing the first manifesto, Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation. The 
manifesto itself highlights the reality of differing ideologies within the 
original network. While actors of different profiles were united under a 
similar cause of fighting the current ‘colonialist system’, that was being 
profited by an anglosaxon bourgeoisie, they held different beliefs of how to 
do so. The range of ideologies in the network developed an inclusive radical 
space that allowed actors of political allegiance across the left of the spectrum 
to join and shape the space.  
 
The three founders of the FLQ were militants of the Réseau de 
Resistance, the resistance network of the RIN as mentioned in the previous 
section. The founders, Georges Schoeters, Gabriel Hudon and Raymond 
Villeneuve, met at a mutual friend’s apartment where they decided to 
organize the FLQ due to a consensus that the potential for radicalism had 
become limited under the RIN as the organization worked towards 
becoming a political party. Due to a sentiment amongst some of the younger 
RIN members that violence was necessary to achieve the end goal of 
independence, the original FLQ network was created separately from the 
RIN. Mario Bachand, an original felquiste, stated in an anonymous interview 
that he considered the RIN to have become a “petty bourgeois party” (‘A 
convicted member of the original FLQ is interviewed by Contributing Editor 
Gerald Taaffe’.  Translated for RCMP use). Therefore, the RIN, while 
attempting to recreate itself as a democratic political party, had effectively 
alienated radical left-wing actors. 
 
The first manifesto, ‘Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation’, was distributed 
on the 16 April 1963, and appeared two years later in La Cognée. In the 
manifesto, the FLQ states that Quebec is colonized by ‘imperialist’ English 
Canada, and supported by an elite that is more interested in serving its own 
political economic interest than serving the interest of the Quebec nation 
(Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation, 1963). The manifesto cites grievances such as: 
‘anglosaxon domination of the federal government’, in which ‘anglo saxon 
interests [are imposed] to the detriment of those of Quebec’; foreign control 
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of the economy; the domination of English language in Quebec; and 
assimilation. The FLQ also expressed their need for violence outside of the 
moderate factions; the writers argued that the ‘independantiste political 
parties would never have the power to defeat the colonial political and 
economic power’, and suggested that independence was not enough; the 
original FLQ cell demanded a ‘total’ revolution.  
 
While the original manifesto is particularly revolutionary in language, 
the ideologies of the actors were diverse across the left of the political 
spectrum. Bachand stated in the same interview: “there were nationalists 
among us, but certainly I was no nationalist. Let’s say that the political 
opinions of the FLQ ranged from liberalism to communism” (‘A convicted 
member of the original FLQ is interviewed by Contributing Editor Gerald 
Taaffe’.  Translated for RCMP use). When arrested for the death of Wilfred 
O’Neil, many of the 15 original felquistes at their trial demanded to swear on 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth as a ‘revolutionary bible’ (Morf 1970).  One 
individual, whose identity was redacted due to the Access to Information 
Act, stated that he was not interested in the independence of Quebec; he 
simply placed the bomb that killed O’Neil “for kicks” (Cpl JP leCocq 1968: 
10).  These contrasting articulations create a ‘hodge podge’ of ideals, 
ideologies and levels of radicalization. While some of the students seemed to 
have articulated an idealized battle against the English-speaking bourgeoisie, 
others embraced Fanon’s theory that preaches anti-colonial revolution 
through the strength of the working class, while the others admitted to an 
involvement in the violence ‘for kicks’. The original members of the FLQ 
were very different in socio-economic and political backgrounds, yet they 
united through a perspective that achieving independence through coercion 




Between 1963 and 1971, the FLQ encompassed seven cells. Often there 
was a single cell that disbanded and another was organized; twice were there 
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two cells at the same time. During the 1960s and early 1970s, cells continued 
to develop after police ‘shut down’ previous cells by arresting the members. 
The creation of cells, after the dissolution of previous ones, also created 
limitations for policing and thereby continued the lifespan of the movement. 
Whereas authorities can use specific tactics to dismantle larger, hierarchal 
and centrally organized extremist networks, police could only target FLQ 
cells one at a time as they surfaced. The resurgence of FLQ cells not only 
made it difficult to police, but also informs a response to social conditions, 
including the poverty in East Montreal, the widening of disparity in Quebec, 
and an increasing popularity of the Left. The social conditions in Quebec 
influenced actors of different profiles to mobilize and organize FLQ cells, 
creating a loose structure of small cells that generally developed and 
disintegrated one after the other. In doing so, these actors developed a 
radical space that was inclusive to left-wing individuals of different 
backgrounds.  
 
Thus, the network structure of the FLQ was influenced by the 
ideological space, and political and economic frustrations of the Quebecois. 
The inclusive- nature of the loose cell structure, open to many different 
profiles of actors, allowed for a range of ideologies in the network. 
	  
L’Armée de Libération du Québec (ALQ) 
	  
The second cell of the FLQ reorganized in the summer of 1963 into 
two branches:  L’Armée de Libération du Québec (ALQ), and the political 
branch that focused on the official organ, La Cognée (Gendron 1965); the 
‘goal’, as described in La Cognée, was to apply and teach the politics of the 
FLQ during its battle for liberation of the Quebec people, and to defend 
against the police regime that was developing in Quebec (La Cognée, 15 
August 1965).   The ALQ was comprised of students from Outremont and 
young workers from East Montreal, and the ages of the ALQ members 
ranged from 18-27 years of age. Two members of importance were Robert 
Hudon and Jean Gagnon, both of whom had brothers in jail at the time for 
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FLQ participation in the original cell.  Hudon was considered a charismatic 
individual and was described by many members of the press as the ‘Robin 
des Banques’17 (Fournier 1984). Both were sentenced to 8 years in prison for 
stealing $100 000 in goods and money between the 26 September and the 9 
April 1963. Hudon was released on parole in December 1967. Equally 
interesting is the involvement of Jules Duchastel, student of Philosophie at 
College Sainte-Marie, and son of baron Duchastel de Montrouge. Recruited 
as a student, he was the sole member of bourgeoisie background that joined 
the FLQ, and was the ‘lone wolf’, distinct from the working class or the 
students that felt isolated from the motivations of the politically elite. 
Duchastel was charged for armed theft and possession of dynamite after 
attempting to rob the Banque Royale de Canada in Notre-Dame-de-Graces 
and leaving a very elementary bomb: dynamite hooked up to a watch. 
Duchastel and Claude Soulière were caught and were sentenced to two years 
in prison (Fournier 1984), although Duchastel only spent one year behind 
bars.  
 
Members of the ‘comité central’ for La Cognée were in communication 
with the ALQ, but the individuals are unknown; all writers of La Cognée 
used pen names. Certain Québécois authors were printed in the journal, and 
it is unknown today as to whether they collaborated or were printed 
illegally. The list includes Paul Chamberland, Jacques Renaud, Jean-Marc 
Piotte, Robert Maheu, André Garand and Philippe Bernard (La Cognée, Aug 
1965 to February 1966). Between April 21 and May 1964, André Wattier, 
Pierre Nadon, Claude Peron, Georges LaPorte, Maurice Leduc, and Claude 
Soulère were all apprehended. Robert Hudon and Jean Gagnon were the last 
to be arrested on the 5 May 1964. La Cognée allowed for the authors to write 
and distribute political responses, demands and instructions to felquistes and 
left-wing Quebecois. Through La Cognée, the FLQ were able to expand the 
radical space.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	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  as	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  of	  the	  banks’	  by	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The FLQ shaped a space in which the perceived marginalized could 
choose, or support, minimal violence as a way to articulate frustration with 
the power and the false consciousness within Quebecois society. The FLQ 
became an umbrella term for such frustrated activists. This section 
introduced the development of the FLQ in 1963 and explored the network 
structure, ideology, and membership as mobilizing mechanisms. While 
analyzing the mobilization and disintegration of the first three cells, the 
reader can form an understanding of the broken network that developed in 
Quebec. As one cell disintegrated, another cell mobilized in its place and 
further shaped the radical space. Consistent amongst the cells was a feeling 
of frustration with capitalist exploitation and a perceived colonial 
relationship with the state that resulted in an Anglophone bourgeoisie.  
 
The following section will outline the original FLNC network of the 
1970s. The section will similarly look at membership, ideology and structure 





With their leader, Edmond Simeoini, serving time in prison due to the Aleria 
Affair, as discussed in the context section of the introduction, the l’Azzione 
pa a Rinascite di a Corsica (ARC) dissolved on the 28 August 1975, leaving 
the space for the struggle for autonomy without an organized political 
group; as a result, the L’Associu di I Patrioti Corsi (APC) was founded on the 
26 January 1976. With similar goals of regional autonomy within the larger 
Republic and legal recognition of the Corsican people to the ARC, the APC- 
under the leadership of Marcel Bartoli, Lucien Alfonsi and Max Simeoni- 
made certain to reinstate its positions on three different factors: the state, 
violence, and racism. Violence was rejected immediately; Edmond Simeoini 
wrote from prison: “I repudiate those who fight for my liberation, and those 
of my comrades, by murdering and taking hostages, and I refuse all 
negotiations by these methods” (Simeoini 1975: 189-190). Similarly, the APC 
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responded directly to the xenophobic actions of the ARC towards the ‘pied 
noir’ before Aleria; Max Simeoini issued a statement that was much more 
inclusive: “In Corsica only one community need exist, formed by Corsicans 
of birth and all who have come to Corsica by choice- either personal or by 
necessity to live- and who integrate or want to integrate amongst us; 
meaning that they share in our existence and our difficulties, our joys, our 
hardships, and respect our culture and traditions” (Fournier 1984: 37). The 
elected clans demanded the liberation of Edmond Simeoini (Poggioli 2013: 
22).  During the keynote speech, Bartoli made it very clear that the new APC 
were not ‘separatists’: “We are not separatists and, even less, are we 
irredentists. We do not wish to leave the framework of the French Republic. 
We demand only the right existence for the Corsican people and we demand 
that that existence be acknowledged in a legal statute” (Bartoli in Ramsay 
1983: 114). The APC’s wish to exist with further rights and freedoms within 
the French Republic in mid 1970s is an element of contrast with the moderate 
faction in Quebec during the early 1960s, the RIN, who strove for 
independence (Manifeste des Rinistes de 1960: “l’indépendence totale du 
Québec”, 1960).  
 
The ‘legal’ nationalist organizations (or moderate factions)- the ARC, 
UPC, and APC- attracted the petit bourgeoisie, such as members of liberal 
professions, hotel owners, and commercantes; the organizations were aware 
that their survival and success relied on this membership, and took their 
interests into account (Poggioli 2012: 278). The ARC, and succeeding 
movements, completely ignored the benefits of capitalism being reaped by 
the repatriated Algerians and the French. Frustrated that the interests of the 
bourgeoisie were being prioritized in the legal organizations, and feeling that 
the movement needed to radicalize as a united front, members of the ARC 
joined with the FPCL and the GP to create the Fronte de Liberazione 
Naziunale Corsu (FLNC) in the wake of the FPCL dissolution (Bernabéu-
Casanova 1997).  
 
In April 1976, the original eight members of La Direction met in Porto-
Vecchio and at a militant’s house in Folelli to plan the first nuit bleue on 5 
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May 1976. The FLNC presented itself to the world on the 5 of May after a 
series of 20 attacks in Corsica, Nice, Marseille and Paris. Between 21.30 and 
23.00 in Ajaccio, four attacks were committed against Cynreacolor, a bar 
owned by Camille Guerra, a repatriated North African. The bombs were so 
powerful that neighbouring buildings had to be evacuated. The car of the 
secretary general of the prefecture and the Direction Departementale de 
l’Equipement (DDE) were also attacked; 200 grammes destroyed the Citroen 
DS 19 owned by M Yves Mansillon. At midnight, a Volkswagen car that 
belonged to the society Ecotra, in which the manager was a repatried North 
African, exploded as the last attack in Ajaccio. In Sartene, a kilo of explosives 
were detonated at midnight against the wall of the sous-prefecture. The fact 
that the bomb was placed against the building rather than in it suggests that 
the militants could either not gain entrance to the building or it was meant to 
simply be symbolic.  
 
Two attacks occurred in Bastia against the DDE at its offices at the 
residence Betrand in the Toga quarter at 21, and at the perception de Bastia at 
12.15. The DDE was a new installation in Bastia, and the perception had only 
been open for approximately two months.  In Linguizetta, the nature camp of 
Corsicana was also attacked. A bungalow of approximately 100 square 
metres was completely destroyed due to Corsicana’s link to a German patriot 
entitled simply as M. Hoffman. A bomb that did not explode was found in 
Casatorra the next day on the 5 May. A bomb consisting of seven sticks of 
dynamite was placed against a mechanical engine inside the ‘Constructions 
Metallique’ establishment. This company was directed by Mme Aurelie 
Belmudes, a repatriated North African (Unite Naziunale; Poggioli interview).  
 
In Corte, at 22.30, two explosive charges were thrown from a vehicle 
against the Villa du colonel commandant and 20 meters further at an 
‘immeuble des PTT’, an old administration building in which a family was 
residing. Much damage occurred but no one was hurt. In Francardo, 2.5 kilos 
of explosives were discovered at the ‘Fermette Corse’ between Ponte Leccia 
and Francardo; this company was directed by a M. Bruneau.  Three 
explosions occurred in the region of Ghisunaccia: the first at 9.15 created 
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destruction of the ‘station total’, owned by M. Martinez; the second explosion 
occurred 20 minutes later at the building of SODIPEC, owned by M. Michel 
Mackiewickz, who was also involved in the Aleria wine fraud; the third 
exploded at 9.40 and destroyed the office of Mes Maniez et Grimaldi. All of 
the victims were repatriated North Africans. In Porto Vecchio, two villas 
were bombed at approximately 1.15 in the morning (Unite Naziunale; 
Poggioli interview). The FLNC released a pamphlet the next day claiming 
responsibility for the attacks, and defined a six-point manifesto, that will be 
discussed in the section on ideology.  
 
While violence was not new to Corsicans, the nuit bleue nonetheless 
was an impressive show of force during the early 1970s; yet, the FLNC still 
did not receive a seriously concerned response from the state and policing 
bodies. In the journal Arritti, the autonomists’ response to the FLNC are 
represented by Max Simeoni, who wrote sarcastically: “coucou, voila le FLN 
flambant neuf” (Arritti 1976). Whereas the authorities in Quebec during the 
1960s were alarmed by the influences of Marxism and the left, as well as the 
violence, the local authorities in Corsica during the 1970s initially felt that 
there was little cause for concern. In Quebec, when a bomb was found on the 
1 April 1963 on the CN railway before the train with the visiting Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker was to arrive, Diefenbaker stated: “Is this 
Ireland?”, comparing the FLQ to the much more violent IRA.  In contrast, 
prefect Jean-Etienne Riolacci stated after the first nuit bleue: ‘the FLNC is not 
a serious threat’18(Pomponi 1982: 462). The difference in reactions to the 
violent activity indicates the extent of the radical spaces prior to the 
organization of the FLQ and FLNC. While the FLNC followed in the 
footsteps of the FPCL and GP, both of whom had waged violent acts in 
Corsica, the FLNC initially did not seem to offer anything particularly new 
and shocking. The FLNC would begin to shape radical space with its 
strength in numbers, its nationalist focus and better articulated ideology with 
detailed demands in the later manifestoes. Quebec, on the other hand, had 
little experience with violence, and the FLQ began to shape a new radical 
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space that had originally been developed mainly by activists participating in 
strikes or graffiti.  
 
The difference in the initial radical spaces also affected the structure of 
the networks. Because the Corsicans were used to a history of violence and 
clandestine action that Quebec was not, more actors mobilized and a more 
rigid structure was possible; this becomes evident in the next sections that 




“Being a clandestine patriot is not running from responsibility; nor is it, as 
some argue, proof of cowardice. No, to be a clandestine nationalist is to use 
anonymity to escape the pursuits of the colonial ‘justice’ longer and to continue 
fighting… I am 25 years of age; I am originally from Venacu. I have a law 
degree and I have been working in law for four years to pay my studies.” – Leo 
Battesti, known member of the FLNC. March 1978 
 
Researching membership of the FLNC was very different to the membership of 
the FLQ.  Because the FLQ ceased to exist after the early 1970s, members were 
less open to speaking with me but documentation was much more accessible. 
The secrecy surrounding the FLNC, and even past members, to this day made 
it very difficult to write about membership; even Poggioli (2009) completely 
avoids the discussion of membership in his doctoral thesis. Jean-Michel Rossi 
and Francois Santoni both received death threats for their book ‘Pour solde de 
tout compte: les nationalistes corses parlent’ (“L'ex-nationaliste corse Jean-
Michel Rossi assassiné” 2000). I was, however, able to connect details from the 
media and the few literary sources that even attempt to discuss membership.  
This is partially due to the secrecy within the network; leaders of the Cunsigliu 
were masked during meetings and held code names. My interview with Pierre 
Poggioli was further proof of the secrecy that even past members abide by; 
when I asked him about the other members he became visibly uncomfortable, 
and told me in a whisper to read his books about the FLNC in the 70s and 80s- 
both of which are lacking in details about members. I was able to, however, get 
a general idea of membership from him and his publications. Details on certain 
key members were taken from cross-referencing several newspaper articles and 
Rossi and Santoni’s publication, and will be used to illustrate the participation 
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of the original members of the 1970s in both the clandestinely violent and 
moderate factions; many members contributed to both the radical and peaceful 
political spaces during their lifetimes, and often at the same time. This 
overlapping of radical and peaceful spaces differs from the very distinct violent 
and moderate factions in Quebec. This section will provide a general overview 
of membership, and will also focus on key members, as in the FLQ section.   
 
Both Crettiez (1999) and Poggioli (2006, 2011), in his books and during 
an interview with him for this thesis (2014), stated that the earliest FLNC 
members were mostly composed of agriculturalists, farmers, and small 
business employees, as it was the Corsicans who lived in rural areas that felt 
the economic problems of the 1970s the most. Of 32 militants arrested 
between 1978 and 1980, 11 were employees, 7 independent professionals, 6 
farmers, 4 students, 2 workers and 2 intellectual workers. The average age 
was 28 and a half years old, with ages ranging from 20 to 40 (Kyrn 1975); this 
is a contrast to the much younger ages of the majority of the felquistes in the 
first moment. The bulletin Unione published another study that looks at 
militants arrested between 1970 and 1980: of 119 arrests, 30 were employees, 
19 farmers/agriculturalists, 16 students, 15 of liberal professions, 10 workers, 
10 officials, 11 unemployed and 8 artists.  Crettiez (1999) argues that the 
study proves that members of the FLNC were not comprised of the 
marginalized, but were rather integrated into Corsican society. What he fails 
to appreciate is that although the militants represented a series of 
employments and pay grades, all militants were of ‘Corsican’ descent. There 
was no representation of the repatriated pieds noir and the French 
bourgeoisie. Although the militants were indeed integrated into Corsican 
society and not part of the marginalized population per se, they ‘felt’ 
marginalized due to the benefits awarded to the pieds noir by the French.  
 
Yves Stella’s participation as a founder of the FLNC was well known 
in Corsica and became known state-wide after his arrest, and was reiterated 
after his death on the 15 July 2012 (“Décès d'Yves Stella, l'un des membres 
fondateurs du FLNC” 2012). Stella was born in 1942 at Morsiglia Haute-
Corse where he became conseiller municipal and mayor for seventeen years. 
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Stella was the very first nationalist mayor in Corsica.  Stella held a 
humanities degree and became the director of U Ribombu before creating his 
own journal ‘Paese’. On the 1 June 1978, at 34 years of age, he was arrested 
with several other FLNC members as part of a ‘grand offensive’ before the 
visit of President Valerie Giscard d’Estaing; he was sentenced to 15 years of 
prison by the Cour de sureté de l’État, but received a general pardon after 
three years by Francois Mitterand. After the internal split amongst the FLNC, 
Stella founded the MPA and was elected to the Corsican assembly. The 
dichotomy of Stella’s peacefully political life and his active participation in 
the clandestine movement initially reveals a hint of irony:  Stella participated 
in an FLNC commando that placed an explosive charge on the television 
relay of Serra-di-Pigno, ridding the island of television for nearly a year and 
creating particular uproar as the UPC congress in Furiani was to be held the 
next day. Years later, Stella became president of the syndicat intercommunal 
des réémetteurs de télévision du Cap-Corse.  He also held the position of 
directeur du service departemental d’incendie and de secours de la Haute-
Corse, in which he implemented prevention programmes to save the maquis, 
where he had hid during his run from the authorities in May 1976. Corse 
matin wrote of Stella: a ‘man of reflection doubled as a man of action during 
a time of ‘nuits bleues’; ‘Yves Stella had two lives, one that destroyed and 
one that built’ (“Mort d'un des pères fondateurs du FLNC devenu un artisan 
de paix” 2012). The duality of Yves Stella’s life is very similar to other 
members of the FLNC. Those who fought for the nationalist movement often 
involved themselves in democratic politics during or after the clandestine 
struggle. “Politicians by day, terrorists by night”; although crudely 
articulated by a Niçois in Nice, France, it aptly articulates the duality of the 
nationalist movement in Corsica.  
 
Similarly to Stella, Léo Battesti was a key member in the creation of 
the FLNC, yet denounced the violence after becoming a politician and 
eventually the vice president of the fédération française des échecs. Battesti 
was 22 years of age when he participated in the Aleria Incident as a militant 
beside Edmond Simeoni, and Battesti still attests today that he was not the 
militant who shot and killed the two gendarmes during the Aleria Incident.  
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At 23, he helped form the FLNC and participated in the first ‘nuit bleue’ at 
the same time as he held the position of secretary general of the Corsican 
student population (SCC) until 1978. In 1978, he was arrested for organizing 
an FLNC attack against a tax department, la centre des impots mitoyen.  
Battesti parked his car in front of the école de Toga (Deloire 2005). Police 
were able to identify his license plate and he was sentenced to 9 years in 
prison by the Cours de Sureté de l’état. In 1981, like Stella, he was granted 
amnesty as a political prisoner by Mitterand.  
  
After Battesti’s release, he became a speaker and advocate of the 
Consulte des comités nationaliste (CCN), and an important member of the 
conculta in the FLNC. In 1986, he was elected to the territorial assembly and 
continued FLNC activity until the scission de 1990 (Deloire 2005). Since 1992, 
Battesti called for the dissolution of all clandestine organizations and factions 
and a stop to its mafia-like tendencies of the FLNC that developed since the 
scission of 1990, which will be further discussed in chapter 6. Battesti’s anti-
violence stance was reiterated when he ran for president of the fédération 
francaise des échecs against Diego Slazar, director of the club in Chalons-en 
Champagne, Marne. (Crozier 2013). Stella and Battesti are both comparable 
to Paul Rose of the final FLQ moment, in the sense that they founded violent 
networks, and then eventually denounced them and ran for election to 
continue the nationalist struggle within democratic institutions. Rose was 
less successful than Battesti and Stella, who were both elected into the 
territorial assembly.  
 
Jean-Michel Rossi was also a key member of the FLNC-canal 
historique at 20 years of age. Rossi was arrested four times for his 
involvement with nationalist activity outside of the FLNC in 1984, 1988, 1992 
and 1997; he was released from prison in 1998. After denouncing and 
criticizing the new ‘canal habituel’ of the FLNC in 1992, the network banned 
Rossi from returning to Corsica on threat of death. After the dissolution of 
the network, Rossi returned to the island (“L'ex-nationaliste corse Jean-
Michel Rossi assassin” 2000) and published a book with Francois Santoni in 
June 2000 entitled: Pour Solde de tous compte: les nationalists parlent. Rossi 
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and Santoni gave an unflattering description of Jean-Guy Talamoni, chief of 
Corsica Nazione, and suggested that he had business acquaintances of the 
extreme-right; this publication, of course, received a backlash and a number 
of hostile reactions that forced Rossi and Santoni to take on bodyguards. 
Rossi and his security guard Jean-Claude Fratacci, were murdered in August 
2000 at Ile-Rousse (Haute-Corse). Three men appeared at the bar ‘La Piscine’ 
and fired several shots, while a second group of two men blocked the exit; all 
five escaped by vehicle. The suspected connection between the publication 
and the assassination is easier to understand when placed in the violent 
framework of the early millennium. While there was certainly a history of 
violence prior to the mobilization of the FLNC, the FLNC developed the 
radical space from the 1970s to the 1990s as they adopted strategies that were 
increasingly violent. After the scission de 1990, as will be discussed in Chapter 
6, the movement divided into two factions, leaving behind its nationalist 
agenda and focus on social and political reforms for an arms race 
 
While women in Quebec were participating in many forms of activism 
and politics, Corsican women were slow to organize themselves into groups 
driven by gender issues. It wasn’t until the mid 1990s that certain women 
organized the ‘femmes corses contre la violence’ (‘female Corsicans against 
violence’), and published the Manifeste pour la vie in 1995 in response to 
FLNC factions.  
 
Women were not without agency, however. Women participated in 
violence. During the twentieth century, men constituted between 84 and 86% 
of individuals arrested for violent acts in Corsica; with women between 14 
and 16%. Most incarcerations were economic or financial. Looking solely at 
crimes against the person, women were involved in less homicide, and more 
so for ‘infractions against the family and children’, in which most cases 
involved children guardianship (Sanguinetti 2012).  Sanguinetti also states 
that the level of female violence is similar to the national average, and that 
Corsica does not distinguish itself in either economic crime or crimes against 
the person. This is not to suggest, however, that women were not involved, 
historically or contemporarily, in the act of the vendetta: “certain women 
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convicted the vendetta themselves: it is not of the ordinary, nor is it rare, and 
is socially acceptable under certain circumstances, especially if the men are 
unable to avenge the family themselves’ (Wilson in Sanguinetti 2012: 28)19.  
 
According to the Global Terrorism Database by the University of 
Maryland, women were not allowed to join the FLNC. Members interviewed 
for this thesis did not suggest that women were banned altogether from the 
organization but rather that recruitment was focused on men, especially in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The absence of women during press releases supports 
this; even during those that all members were present and masked to form a 
show of force.  
 
 Although women were not encouraged to join the FLNC, the 
organization interestingly proposed a popular democracy with a focus on 
gender in the livre vert of 1977, to be discussed further in Chapter 5. The 
popular democracy that they would impose if national liberation was 
achieved, would ‘favor the cultural and professional development of women’ 
and ‘educate the female members of a nationalist lifestyle’ (Livre vert 1977). 
While the FLQ avoided the topic of gender altogether, the FLNC of the first 
moment demanded more opportunities for women. While the FLNC did not 
invite women to partake in the violent activity, they wanted women to be 
educated about nationalism. In both Quebec and Corsica, it was assumed 
that women should or would not participate in violent activity, even though 
it is evident that women were already active in the radical spaces of both 
societies. While the FLQ and the FLNC were fighting against economic and 
cultural exploitation, they were subsequently reinforcing the oppression of 




In Corsica, the ARC, nationalist advocates of the electoral system, 
developed an ideology that critiqued the left-leaning Front Regionale Corse 
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  Translated	  by	  author.	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(FRC). Inspired by the Marxist ideology, young Corsicans on the continent in 
the FRC demanded change and control of the Corsican identity and an 
endogenous socialism’. The ARC opposed the economic model of the FRC 
and focused on institutionally modernizing the island. Inspired by 
decolonization and radical movements of the 1970s, the nationalists 
radicalized and conducted events such as the Aleria Affair and the Boues-
Rouge; Crettiez rightly argues that this radicalization of the nationalists, with 
an affirmation of the ‘Corsican people’ and the glorification of the Paoli 
period, allowed the FLNC to ‘impose a thematic identity in Corsica’ (Crettiez 
1999). The FLNC would further radicalize the nationalist discourse by 
focusing on two points: contesting the state and sub-state relationship by 
demanding independence; and using violence to achieve it. The early FLNC 
attempted to unify ‘Corsicans’ against the state as a common ‘colonialist’ 
adversary; often the pieds noir were considered privileged recipients of a 
beneficiary state. The FLNC believed that independence would ensure that 
the repatriated Algerians were no longer given privileges by the state, and 
the Corsican populace would have control of their own economy and 
politics: ‘One single solution is possible: national independence’ (A liberta o 
a morte 1977: 22).   
 
In 1976, the FLNC published a pamphlet with demands that included: 
the recognition of the ‘national rights’ of the Corsican people; the removal of 
all instruments of colonialism- the army, the French administration and the 
colons; a popular democratic government which would express the will and 
needs of all Corsican patriots; the confiscation of colonial estates and 
property of tourist industry trusts; agrarian reform to fulfill the aspirations of 
farmers, workers and intellectuals, and to rid the country of all forms of 
exploitation; and the right to self-determination for the Corsican people. The 
document called for a united front against a hopeless French Republic.  
While this early declaration for independence distinguished the FLNC from 
the regionalists of the 60s and early 70s, the FLNC published the petit livre 
vert in 1977 with certain similarities to their regionalist counterparts. The 
document was left-wing, but also engaged with the socio-economic and 
cultural realities of the island. The document described a ‘common land 
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revolution’ with Marxist-Lenist and Maoist influences. Although it did not 
ascribe Mao’s agrarian revolution, it did suggest that land should be 
redistributed to Corsican farmers (Liberta O More 1977). The FLNC of the 
late 1970s share a Marxist perspective to independence with the FLQ during 
the early 1960s.  
 
In relation to the clans, the FLNC took a similar stance to the ARC and 
the UPC. The clan system was blamed for the economic and civic decline of 
Corsica. In a press conference, they hailed themselves as the representatives 
of a patriotic force for a better Corsica. For the FLNC, the political solution 
for the Corsican problem was a reform of the political system, currently 
monopolized by the clans. The FLNC considered militaristic action as an 
alternative to the corrupt political system (Kyrn 1979, 23).  
 
While the FLNC agreed with the peaceful nationalist groups about the 
clans, the network took a very different stance to the UPC about Europe. 
While the UPC sporadically cited a Europeanist rhetoric, in which European 
integration could facilitate Cosican self-determination, the FLNC was very 
disinterested in European affairs. During discussions of European 
parliament, and the elections, the FLNC made it clear from the beginning 
that they very much opposed European integration. Although the FLNC did 
participate in CONSEO alongside radical nationalist parties in the 1980s, a 
coalition was never produced due to differing ideology and 
‘conceptualizations of the liberation struggle’ (Elias 2008) amongst all parties 
despite an obvious opposition to their states (Lefebvre 1992; Crettiez 1999; 
Elias 2008).  Participation in CONSEO was mostly a show of force in the 
nationalist political sphere; it was important for the FLNC and the FLQ to 
affirm their places in the global movement, and these contacts assisted with 
domestic propaganda (Crettiez 1999). The FLQ attempted this during the 
third moment by plane hijacking, hostage-taking, and assassination, but that 
will be discussed further in Chapter 6. The FLNC continued its activity, but 
also organized an annual Journées Internationale de Corte where they 
displayed the strength of their network to representatives of other radical 
nationalist movements in Europe (Elias 2008).  
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Very little changed the FLNC’s opinion about Europe from the 1970s 
to the 1990s. Elias suggests that the only change was a ‘moderation of tone in 
which the Euro-rejectionism was articulated’ (Elias 2008). Similarly to the 
FLQ, the FLNC was influenced by global movements and events. While the 
initial FLNC network held radical ideology that was inspired by the global 
Marxist-Leninist movement of the 1970s, the collapse of communism in 
central and Eastern Europe in 1989 affected a change from the ‘romanticism’ 
and the ‘utopianism’ of young Corsicans in the early 90s (chapter 6) (Poggioli 
1996). The leaders of the ‘new’ network in the 1980s (and chapter 5) realized 
that Marxism did not fit the economic and cultural underdevelopment in 
Corsica; the sub-state needed to customize their own program. After the 
1980s, the FLNC continued to talk of independence from the French state and 
continued to define its struggle as the ‘national liberation of Corsica’, 
however there was very little published of a substantial political program. 
The FLNC published ‘Projet de Société’ in 1989, which committed the 
network simply to a model of society that would be determined by the 
liberation struggle itself (U Ribombu, 1990). Elias, therefore, argues that the 
FLNC held a ‘principled disinterest’ of articulating political details in 
response to a relationship with Europe; ideological goals also were 
articulated in a less radical tone throughout the 1980s (Elias 2008).  
 
The FLNC could have been uninterested in Europe during the 1970s 
due to a focus on the global decolonization movement; instead of focusing on 
Europe, the FLNC looked beyond with a much wider scope. Similarly to the 
FLQ, the FLNC was particularly influenced by Algeria and alternative views 
that young Corsican students returned to Corsica with from the mainland. 
Rightly suggested by Elias (2008), the FLNC’s uninterest in Europe in the 
1980s was largely due to the internal problems throughout the decade. 
Disagreements on tactics and militaristic activity influenced ruptures and the 
creation of different factions while successful policing raids were able to 
restructure the FLNC (Crettiez 1999) as they did the FLQ. While the FLQ 
attempted to place themselves within the international movement and gain 
global attention through, especially in the mid 1960s to 1971, the FLNC used 
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connections, contacts and strategy to reaffirm domestic strength and 
predominance not only within the radical space, but in the larger nationalist 
political sphere in Corsica.   
 
During the 1970s and early 1960s, there was very much a contrast of 
demands between the FLQ and the FLNC that help to understand the 
movements themselves, and how they began to shape radical spaces in 
Quebec and Corsica. Both the FLQ and the FLNC cited groups that 
benefitted from the sub-state relationship with the state. While the FLNC 
complained of the repatriated Algerians gaining preferential treatment from 
France, the FLQ argued that the Anglophone bourgeoisie controlled the 
economy and gained from the social and economic reforms of the Quiet 
Revolution. Similarly, while the FLNC demanded to end clan corruption in 




In the 1970s, the FLNC formed a network structure that included eight 
regions that functioned separately. A representative of each region sat within 
La Direction, a cell that met periodically to discuss the network as a whole. 
Each representative in La Direction was masked for meetings and adopted a 
code name, always the name of the present élu claniste, elected clan member, 
of the region. The eight regions included: Ajaccio, Bastia, Fjumorbu, Casinca, 
Porto-Veccho, Corte Niolo, Cap Balagne and ‘Zone France’ (Poggioli 2011: 
470). Each region had two to seven sectors that accumulated to 25 sectors.  
The Region Cap would become a part of the region Bastia and the Region 
Casinca would become the Region Cervione-Camploru. Youth were also 
placed in contact with ‘l’équipe des vieux’, composed of ten ‘pères 
tranquilles’, older men who were involved in the cause but not the violence; 
these men were ideological mentors (Poggioli 2006).  In May 1978, 27 
suspected members were arrested in both Corsica and France, which forced 
the network to reconfigure and replace the members; the success in doing so 
without dissolving or disbanding proves a much stronger network than the 
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FLQ in the first moment. While changes amongst the actors in the FLNC 
were fluid due to the hierarchal nature of the network, individual ‘nodes’ 
(actors) could change, generally due to arrest or leaving the network for 
different reasons, without dismantling the entire network. The FLQ cells 
were so small that the arrest of only a few felquistes meant that the cell 
would disintegrate or disband. 
 
The structure of the networks informs the shaping of radical spaces in 
the first moment. Both networks organized based on the radical spaces that 
were already present; while Quebec was enduring social and political 
changes with the Quiet Revolution, but had yet to experience any political 
violence, the first FLQ cells were loosely organized into cells and were 
‘relatively amateur’ in comparison to other violent networks (Charters 1997). 
The early cells of the FLQ shaped the radical space further as it became more 
violent and attempted to become more revolutionary. Corsica had a history 
of violence and had experienced activism and violence previously to the 
formation of the FLNC, therefore the network was able to organize for a 
higher insurgency and further shape an already radical space. Similarly to 
the FLQ, the FLNC shows a radicalization of activity throughout the 1970s 
and an attempt to push the boundaries of the radical space.  
 
As was noted in the previous section, the rigid structure allowed the 
network to articulate a strong and comprehensive ideology and list of 
demands. While the regions had a certain level of autonomy for funding and 
activity, le direction was able to mold the ideology and lead the network in a 
direction that they believed would be best to achieve their demands. 
Therefore, the network structure influenced the ideologies of both the FLQ 
and the FLNC; the looser cell structure of the FLQ allowed for an inclusivity 
of left-wing Quebecois of different profiles, whereas the rigid structure of the 
FLNC influenced a strict ideology that was followed by all actors willing to 
mobilize.  
	   93	  
Chapter conclusion: a comparative analysis of framing processes 
and mechanisms 
 
Framing processes have been used as a form of analysis on subjects of 
activism against subjects ranging as far as neo-liberal globalization (Ayres 
2004), collective action (Tarrow; Benford and Snow, 1986, 1988.) and 
terrorism (Crouch 2010; Della Porta 1995). Based on Goffman’s (1974) work, 
framing is a process where the actors interpret, and provide reasoning, to 
challenge and mobilize against socio-political conditions (Bedford and Snow 
2000; Ayres 2004).  From this perspective, social movements are given 
agency; recruitment and mobilization can no longer be viewed as ideas that 
grow from unanticipated events or existing ideologies (Benford and Snow 
2000). These frames provide “legitimizing accounts” (McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald 1988; Kane 1997; Williams 1995; McAdam et al 1996), in which the 
actors may “shape and sustain their mobilizing campaign” (Ayres 2004: 14) 
as a form of recruitment. Not only do these mechanisms shape their own 
networks, but they also shape the radical spaces in sub-states Quebec and 
Corsica 
 
I am using the three characteristic components of the collective action 
frame to formulate an analysis of the recruitment of the FLQ and the FLNC. 
First, the recruitment process must offer the identification and diagnosis of 
an event, antagonist or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of 
alteration (Crouch 2010). Both the FLQ and the FLNC framed the state as the 
antagonists. Beyond that, there was not always consensus over who or what 
was to blame after suggesting the nature of the problem (Benford and Snow 
2000). The FLNC of the 1970s also blamed the pieds noir as benefactors of the 
state who threatened their culture, while the FLNC of the 1980s focused on 
the clan system and pursuing democracy without clan ties. In May 1977, 
nationalists felt that they had gained a supporter when Alex Alessandri was 
elected as mayor of Antisanti, despite his opponent flying in non-residents 
from Paris on the day of voting. Alessandri, however, “forgot his origins” 
and became strongly opposed to nationalist ideals. This change of ideology, 
and his use of clan-system nepotism when he gave up his position to his son, 
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created much more skepticism, and distrust for politicians, amongst the 
autonomists and nationalists who had participated in the electoral system 
(Poggioli 2006). The FLQ noted that poverty in East Montreal was 
problematic, and criticized both the English and French bourgeoisie. Gamson 
(1995) suggests that there is ‘adversial framing’ in which actors delineate 
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ to construct protagonists and antagonists. This is 
very evident with the FLQ; workers and the labour movement were 
glorified, while the provincial and federal politicians and ‘les big bosses’ 
were shaped as antagonists (Manifest de 1970).  
 
Second, the ‘prognostic dimension’ is a collective action frame that 
outlines what needed to be done after identifying the socio-political issues 
and the antagonists (Crouch 2012). Simply, both the FLQ and the FLNC 
outlined a nationalist program in order to break ties with the state and 
‘rectify’ the economic struggle, however specific ideology changed as new 
members replaced the former disbanded members. The final characteristic is 
‘motivational framing’: a call for arms or a rational for engaging in the action 
suggested (Benford and Snow 2000: 615).  The official call for arms with the 
FLQ and the FLNC was to gain independence through militaristic struggle. 
In theory, both the FLQ and the FLNC were to inspire their collective 
communities to take up arms with an independent nation as end result. In 
reality, members were recruited for many different reasons. During the first 
wave of the FLQ, members attempted to recreate the mindset of the Cuban 
agrarian revolution, yet William McNeil’s single death, that occurred due to 
a bomb placed by the FLQ, was declared as ‘accidental’; the FLQ cell even 
apologized for it. Palmer (2009) suggests that New Leftists did not want the 
program of revolution as much as the adventure, and the response to the 
death of O’Neil is a good example of how the FLQ were emotionally 
unprepared for the revolutionary program; many of the working members 
articulated only a basic knowledge of the ideology that their comrades cited, 
and the students held a New Leftist idealistic view of the program (Court 
cases of Labonté and Williams). Unlike Laurendeau (1990), who suggests 
that the FLQ had a strict ideological orientation from the beginning, due to 
its first communiqué on the 8 March 1963, I argue that although the FLQ 
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articulated a need for revolution as a means to achieve an independent 
Quebec (Laurendeau 1990), the first three cells in this chapter reflect the FLQ 
as a whole in the sense that they lacked focus, direction and a specific end-
goal as a result of appeasing the different ideologies and levels of radicalism. 
 
The FLNC was comprised of students who had studied on the 
continent and were influenced by Marxist-Leninism, and islanders who had 
not had the same experiences and level of education, as there was no 
university in Corsica until 1981. In contrast to the FLQ, the members of the 
FLNC were able to mobilize around the history of violence, and the use of 
clandestine violence to pursue a nationalist struggle. The movement 
developed a much more intricate manifesto and livre vert that outlined the 
demands of the movement, and the tighter organization with levels of 
leadership diminished the ideological factions during the 1970s.   
 
This chapter highlighted and analysed three main mechanisms of the 
original networks of the FLQ and the FLNC: membership, ideology and 
structure. These mechanisms, supplemented by the framing processes, 
sought to answer why these networks developed in Quebec and Corsica, and 
how they inform the original mobilization of the FLQ and FLNC; thereby 
analyzing how the original cells of the FLQ and the FLNC network of the 
1970s sought to extend radical spaces.  
 
While the FLQ and the FLNC are two very different cases, the early 
networks discussed in this chapter were comparable as they were comprised 
of actors of different profiles who mobilized and chose to use violence as a 
way to articulate frustrations with the state and the ruling minority that 
benefitted from the relationship between sub-state and state. While the 
FLNC was frustrated with clan corruption, so was the FLQ with capitalist 
exploitation. Similarly, the FLNC blamed the pieds noir for receiving benefits 
from the state just as the FLQ blamed the Anglophone bourgeoisie.  
 
Both the early FLQ and the FLNC networks attempted to extend 
radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica as they radicalized, experimented with 
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tactics, and developed and shared their ideologies through the distribution 
of written texts. Since Corsica had a history of violence, the radical space was 
easily adopted from former violent groups, GP and FPCL, while the violent 
tactics of the FLQ were considered ground-breaking in Quebec. Never before 
had families in Westmount been scared to check their mailboxes for mailbox 
bombs that became synonymous with the early FLQ cells. Because of this 
violence prior to the FLNC, actors were able to mobilize and develop a 
stronger network structure with greater secrecy and group centrality. While 
the GP and FPCL were not very organized by ideology, the FLNC pushed 
the boundaries of the radical space, not only by radicalizing tactics, but also 
by forming and publishing a set ideology with distinct demands.  
 
This first empirical chapter explored the initial mobilization of the 
FLQ and the FLNC, the structure and the strategy that best fit their nations. 
The next chapter will analyse and compare the subsequent cells between 
1964 and 1968 and the FLNC network of the 1980s, and a further 
radicalization of the movements. While the original networks were open to 
different profiles and ideologies, the following chapter investigates the 
internal conflicts that occurred as a result.  
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Chapter 5: A radicalization of the FLQ and the FLNC 
resulting in internal tensions 
	  
	  
This second empirical chapter examines the next time periods of the 
FLQ and the FLNC; between 1964 and 1968 in Quebec and during the 1980s 
in Corsica.  While the last chapter looked at the foundation of the two 
networks, this chapter studies the radicalization of the subsequent cells and 
highlights the tensions that developed and influenced the internal conflicts 
that occurred. This chapter focuses on mechanisms, such as innovative 
action, polarization, ideology and actor constitution, in order to compare and 
to understand the FLQ and the FLNC during their subsequent time periods. 
In doing so, this chapter will inform the larger question of how the networks 
shaped the radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica.   
 
In Quebec, 1964 was a highly political year. The Lesage government 
had demanded a review of federal policy and had succeeded in withdrawing 
Quebec from cost-sharing programs such as pensions, health care and tax-
sharing in exchange for fiscal compensation. In 1965, the Caisse de depot et 
placement du Quebec was created to administer the assets of the Quebec 
Pension Plan to continue the nationalization of companies in Quebec. The 
Parent Report of 1964 argued for a public school system away from the 
control of the church, which meant further secularization of the social spaces 
in Quebec. While Quebec was coming into its own, and gaining strength and 
confidence as a sub-state, France in the 1980s was experiencing unrest due to 
a slow recognition that France was no longer a major player in global 
politics. An oil crisis in 1979 made matters worse by triggering a decline in 
living standards and worsened unemployment.  In the 1985 election, 
Mitterand introduced proportional representation for parliamentary 
elections; Chirac won a small majority, thus forcing Mitterand to appoint 
Chirac as prime minister in which France underwent a period of cohabitation 
between left and right.  
 
As was evident in Chapter 4, the socio-political and economic 
environment and the extent of the radical spaces, prior to FLQ and FLNC 
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mobilization, affected the organization of the networks; the history of 
violence and activism in the sub-states influenced network structure. In this 
chapter, the radical spaces were shaped by the cycles of violence and activity 
that occurred in both sub-states. While the FLNC responded to moderate 
political organizations and state responses with phases of violence and 
peace, the FLQ radicalized with a different program from the first chapter, 
which failed and then left the radical space to be developed by labour 
movements and ideological revolutionary leaders for two years; Quebecois 
chose peaceful activism over clandestine violence until the FLQ reorganized 
in 1968.  
FLQ 
	  
Unlike	  chapters	  4	  and	  6,	  the	  strategy	  and	  ideology	  of	  the	  FLQ	  are	  
discussed	  prior	  to	  membership	  so	  as	  to	  analyze	  the	  ARQ	  and	  the	  Vallieres-­‐
Gagnon	  cells	  as	  the	  separate	  entities	  that	  they	  were.	  It	  also	  allows	  the	  thesis	  to	  
introduce	  Vallieres	  and	  Gagnon,	  and	  their	  literature,	  so	  as	  best	  to	  understand	  
their	  role	  and	  theoretical	  influence	  of	  the	  Vallieres-­‐Gagnon	  cell	  before	  exploring	  
the	  FLQ	  actors	  themselves.	  	  
	  
Innovative Action: new strategic program did not fit urban mobilization  
	  
‘Oui,	  mais	  me	  battre	  contre	  qui?	  Contra	  la	  Police	  de	  Montreal,	  alors	  que	  c’était	  
l’armée	  Canadienne	  qu’on	  avait	  voulu	  se	  mesurer…	  Et	  a	  l’instant	  meme,	  je	  compris	  
toute	  la	  complexité	  de	  cette	  guerre	  de	  liberation	  qu’on	  venait	  de	  commencer.	  Cette	  
guerre-­‐là,	  me	  suis-­‐je	  dit,	  serait	  une	  guerre	  entre	  nous	  autres,	  Québécois	  contre	  
Québécois,	  tandis	  que	  les	  Anglais,	  eux,	  regarderaient	  le	  spectacle	  à	  la	  television’	  
(Schirm	  1982,	  32).	  	  
	  
Action is considered innovative by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) 
when it ‘incorporate claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-
representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or 
forbidden within the regime in question’ (8). The two FLQ cells between 1964 
and 1968 were both very different from the previous cells. The tactics 
adopted by the ARQ were more militarist and innovative, yet did not fit the 
urban environment in Quebec. Due to this, the ARQ was very short lived.  
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The Armée Revolutionaire du Quebec (ARQ) organized the third cell 
in June 1964. The ARQ presented itself as a militarist wing of the FLQ. It was 
founded by three ex-military, all of whom stated that they had experienced 
discrimination in the Anglophone-focused military towards Francophones. 
Although bilingualism began to be acknowledged in the mid 1960s, 
discrimination and unilingualism was still rampant, and it is no surprise that 
Francois Schirm, Marcel Tardif and Cyriaque Delisle cite their experiences in 
the military as a frustration. The year 1964 marked only the beginning of a 
focus on bilingualism in the military.  From 1964-1970, Chief of the Defence 
Staff, General Jean Allard, created more French-language units and the 
colonial ‘royal’ designation was removed from most branches in an attempt 
to create inclusiveness to all Canadians- including ethnic minorities (Decoste 
2013).  On the 1 May 1964, the Service d’édition des manuels de l’Armée 
canadienne (the publication section of the Canadian Army training manuals) 
was formed in order to translate and offer army training manuals in French 
(Pariseau and Bernier 1986). Arguably, this focus on bilingualism in the 
military was in response to the conflict in Congo in which Canada was able 
to lead internationally due to the knowledge of French within the military; it 
became evident that the unilingual policy of the military no longer 
corresponded with the accepted concept of Canadian duality (Decoste 2013). 
Although this was very much a rallying factor for the three cell organizers, 
there was still very much a shared left-wing ideology amongst the members. 
While the earlier FLQ cells had mobilized around left-wing ideals, this cell 
proves that the openness of the FLQ appealed to Quebecois with any 
language or sub-state frustration and felt disempowered by the system.  
 
Francois Schirm differentiated himself from most members by age and 
ethnicity; he organized the ARQ at the age of 32 years, which was much 
older than his fellow members. Similarly to Schoeters in the first wave, 
Schirm brought his international experiences to the FLQ.  Schirm was born in 
Budapest, becoming a political refugee in France. At the age of 18 years, he 
enlisted with the Legion étrangères francais, and fought the Vietnamese in 
Indochina with the French Army; he interestingly fought against the FLN in 
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Algeria, but quit the Legion in 1956 (Fournier 1986). Schirm stated that the 
colonial wars clashed with his political views; subsequently, he immigrated 
to Montreal, worked as a builder and night security guard, and joined the 
RIN (Transcript of Schirm trial).  His comrades were also ex-military: Pierre 
Toursignant was in the Royal 22 Regiment; Gilles Brunet was in the Black 
Watch Regiment; and Marcel Tardif was in the Royal Canadian Army, all 
unilingual regiments prior to the focus on bilingualism. Cyriaque Delisle was 
an electronic technician with the Royal Canadian Aviation. Brunet and 
Schirm became friends when they worked together in Steinberg and Miracle 
Mart. At 27 years of age, Brunet was a father of five (Schirm 1982, 27), and 
Fournier suggests that Tardif, Schirm and Delisle met at Le Cochon Borgne, a 
café on Saint-Catherine Street near St. Denis; it was considered a rendezvous 
for indépendantistes (Fournier 1986). These left-wing cafés were regularly 
cited as physical spaces for socialist discussion, recruitment and 
mobilization; Mario Bachand stated in an interview that it was in a similar 
café that he was recruited for the RIN, and then the FLQ (Transcript of 
Schirm trial). The ARQ was founded in a motel East of Montreal after the 
arrests of the ALQ, according to Schirm (1982, 16).  
 
During the summer of 1964, Schirm began a training camp for the 
members of the ARQ near the village of Saint-Boniface-de-Shawinigan. 
Schirm had limited knowledge of urban revolutionary tactics, drawing 
mostly upon his experiences in Algeria, and was unaware that he should 
have been targeting unemployed youth and workers from the cities. FLQ 
membership was urban rather than rural, and Quebec farmers were unlikely 
to join a revolution or participate in violent repertoires as they did in Corsica. 
The ARQ was not uniformly supported amongst the felquistes, and writers 
of La Cognée criticized its tactics in the journal. The director of the organ, 
under the pseudonym of Paul Lemoyne, wrote that certain militants were 
being impatient with ‘our refusal to skip steps’. ‘They want us to put 
uniforms on their backs, and rifles in their hands’ (La Cognée 1964)20. 
Lemoyne suggested that the endeavors of the ARQ were unrealistic and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Translated	  by	  author.	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members were overcome by a sense of adventure. Whatever his motive for 
skepticism of the ARQ, Lemoyne was correct in assuming that most 
Québécois would not follow such revolutionary tactics in 1964.  
 
The tactics that Schirm adopted were inappropriate for an urban 
Quebec, and his decisions created a schism between the ARQ and La Cognée. 
Unsurprisngly, the ARQ was short-lived, as Schirm, Delisle, Brunet, Tardif, 
and Edmond Guenette, a 20 year old worker at Northern Electric from East 
Montreal, were all apprehended on the 29 August 1964 during a daytime 
robbery at a gun store, International Firearms, in Montreal; shop owner Leslie 
MacWilliams and employee Alfred Pinisch were killed. Schirm (1982) 
describes in his autobiography how after a ‘dozen beer’ in a local tavern, 
(Schirm 1982, 28) Guenette had shot the Vice-President of Northern Electric 
McWilliams after being asked to lower his gun during the robbery. 
McWilliams was shot through the abdomen and died of internal hemorrhage 
(Morf 1970). After an attempted escape, Schirm was shot in the leg by police, 
and was arrested with Brunet and Delisle. Guenette managed to escape back 
to camp where he was then arrested (Schirm 1982). Schirm and Guenette (20 
years of age) were sentenced to death. At the age of 28 and 26, Gilles Brunet 
and Cyrique Delisle were sentenced to life imprisonment; and Marcel Tardit 
was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.  While on death row, Schirm and 
Guenette received life-long sentences after their cases were heard in the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Schirm Trial). Schirm spent 14 years behind bars, 
and was released on the 24 July 1978 as the Felquiste to spend the most time 
in jail for his actions, and Guenette spent 11 years in prison (Fournier 1982). 
A group arrest and release of seven other members at the training camp 
resulted in the end of the ARQ.  
 
During the arrests of ARQ members, Jacques Desormeaux, a writer for 
La Cognée, was arrested and charged as an accomplice to murder after the 
event for his knowledge of the activity (Fournier 1982). Desormeaux was 
eventually sentenced to four and a half months imprisonment on the 13 
January 1965. Desormeaux’s sentencing proved to the moderate members 
involved with La Cognée that they needed to be even more prudent; their 
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participation with the organ- but no violent activity themselves- was still an 
offence, and they could still be sentenced to jail-time. The heavy sentencing 
of the ARQ members also became a cautionary tale to those felquistes that 
considered rebuilding a more militarist and adventurous cell. Due to this 
very public reprimand, the skepticism of La Cognée members to affiliate 
themselves with another militarist network, and the increased activity of 
unions and the RIN, dissuaded the reorganization of an felquiste network 
until 1966.  
 
 While the ARQ attempted to be innovative with a different militarist 
program, the cell instead distanced itself from the moderate writers at La 
Cognée and became more violent than Quebec society was prepared for, 
which will be further discussed in the following section on polarization. 
 
Ideology and polarization: radical space is encompassed by ideological 
activism rather than violent episodes 
	  
Tilly (2003) defines polarization as the ‘widening of political and social space 
between claimants in a contentious episode, and the gravitation of 
previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward one, the other, or both 
extremes’ (22). Polarization is considered in this section as a widening 
between violent and moderate factions. Although the FLQ was always 
distinct from the peaceful nationalist movement, polarization took place 
when the moderates took control of the nationalist movement between 1964 
and 1968 in the absence of an FLQ cell, and gained a larger following of 
moderate actors. Further polarization occurred between la Cognée and the 
new Vallieres-Gagnon cell in 1968 that mobilized separate from the official 
organ of the FLQ.  
 
While the FLNC experienced a period of repression in 1978 and found 
it difficult for the Cunculta to meet and strategize, the ALQ dissolved 
completely after the arrests of many felquistes. Nationalist mobilization and 
popular frustration were rife in Quebec, yet the complete failure of the ALQ, 
and its increased insurgency, dissuaded other Quebecois to take up arms.  
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On the 10 October 1964, Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip visited Quebec 
and met with Jean Lesage. Three hundred and fifty police officers and 
approximately 500 members of the army were deployed around Quebec City 
to ensure the safety of the Queen. An article in La Cognée described the 
monarch as a symbol of colonialism and asked felquistes to join the RIN in 
greeting her majesty (La Cognée, 1964); there was no call for violence. The 
Queen was greeted by almost a thousand nationalist demonstrators who 
shouted: “Elizabeth, stay at home” (‘1964 Quebec Riots over royal visit’ 1964) 
and sang songs from Old France (Pepin in Gratton 2013). Although the 
crowds were unrelated to FLQ or union activity, the officials responded 
harshly by beating the demonstrators, tourists and journalists alike with 
truncheons, which resulted in a retrospective naming of the event as ‘Samedi 
de la matraque’21. Most police officers had contentiously removed their 
numbers from their helmets so as to be unidentifiable by the victims (‘1964 
Quebec Riots over royal visit 1964).  
 
This event highlights the fear in Quebec, and the attempts by the 
Sûreté du Quebec, the provincial police, to repress potential violence with 
force, rather than attempting to focus on the socio-economic and political 
factors that spurred the FLQ and labour violence. Although the moderate 
nationalists had no intention for violence, the movement was gaining 
momentum, and the authorities attempted to crack down on the movement 
even though the FLQ was inactive. This brings us back to Haines’ RFE, in 
which the FLQ affected the response to the movement, event though it was 
distinct and separate from the moderate factions.  
 
 ‘La Samedi de la Matraque’ was cited as a cause for more violence in 
La Cognée when the FLQ reorganized in 1966 (La Cognée 1964). As Bachand 
mentioned in an English-language interview in 1966, after his release from 
prison, “[The police] started [the violence] you know and people answered 
them but they always say that we use violence… They use more violence 
before and after that they get the result. …If they use violence then we will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Translated	  as	  ‘Saturday	  of	  the	  Truncheon’.	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use violence against them..” (Interview on ‘Seven on Six’, Sept. 1966). 
Bachand, while glorifying his cause, informs this study by suggesting that 
escalation tactics and the radicalization of members can occur when 
members feel as though there was an aggressive response by the state or the 
police force22; this is also evident in Corsica in the 1980s when the FLNC 
experienced a wave of recruitment to the network after the arrests and harsh 
convictions of university students and Corsicans alike.   
 
In 1965, Quebec and France signed a co-operative cultural agreement 
under the watchful eye of the federal state. Throughout the early 1960s, Jean 
Lesage and President DeGaulle regularly exchanged political 
representatives; Lesage met DeGaulle three times between 1961 and 1965, 
and found that Quebec’s attempts to avoid an “invasion of American 
culture” (“Canadianism says Lesage” 1961). 23 were aligned with the 
Gaullists’ views of preserving French culture. This cultural agreement 
allowed Quebec and France to cooperate directly, but only in the case of 
provincial legislation; this suggests that the federal government was aware of 
Quebec’s international initiatives and was attempting to maintain a single 
Canadian ‘voice’ in international affairs (Linteau et al 1991, 553). The 
cooperation agreement would not spur the re-organization of felquiste 
violence, but it would open the door for DeGaulle’s visit in 1967 that would 
provide a very public statement supporting the nationalist movement.  
 
Intellectual contributions and Ideology 
	  
“Pour les masses, le contraire de l’exploitation, c’est l’indépendence”24 
(La Cognée, 3ieme année no. 48, 1 December 1965) 
 
On 1 June 1965, Pierre Vallières, who was convicted for his political writings 
for and about the FLQ, was fired as a journalist at La Presse after he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Ronald	  D.	  Crelinsten	  suggests	  that	  repressive	  response	  by	  the	  state	  can	  serve	  
as	  a	  reason	  for	  escalation	  tactics	  among	  terrorist	  groups	  in	  “The	  Internal	  
Dynamics	  of	  the	  FLQ	  During	  the	  October	  Crisis	  of	  1970,”	  Inside	  Terrorist	  
Organizations.	  D.	  Rappoport,	  ed.	  Routledge:	  2001.	  
23	  Lesage	  in	  Quebec	  National	  Assembly.	  	  
24	  Translated	  as:	  ‘For	  the	  masses,	  the	  opposite	  of	  exploitation	  is	  independence.	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interrogated by the police for his role as director of the Révolution québécoise; 
in October 1965, he contributed to La Cognée for the first time under the 
pseudonym of Mathieu Hébert. After his termination of employment, 
Vallières formed the Mouvement de libération populaire (MLP) and came 
into contact with the FLQ (Vallieres 1968). Vallières was born in East 
Montreal where his father was a worker for the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
and he spent his childhood in the impoverished neighbourhood of Ville 
Jacques-Cartier.  Amongst many other experiences, Vallières spent six 
months in France where he became discontented with the French Left; he 
was instead much more interested in the French Algerians living in France 
(Vallières 1968).  Vallières’ interactions with the French Algerians in Paris 
influenced his writing by focusing on revolution and guerilla tactics as a way 
to achieve a socialist and liberated Quebec.  
 
In October 1965, Pierre Vallières wrote an article, ‘Le FLQ existe-t-il?’: 
Does the FLQ exist, that was published in La Cognée under his psyeudonym 
Mathieu Hébert. The author of the article became known to the wider public 
when Vallières published ‘FLQ: un projet révolutionnaire’, a series of texts 
assembled by R. Comeau, D. Cooper, and P. Vallières in 1990. The editor’s 
note for the article is also included in the book, in which Comeau, Cooper 
and Vallières suggest that Hébert (or Vallières) was hesitant to join the FLQ 
as a militant due to the weaknesses discussed in the article (Vallières in 
Comeau et al. 1990). It is important, however, to note that 1965 marked the 
beginning of Vallières’ intellectual contribution to the FLQ and a return to a 
Marxist focus since the first cell in 1964; it was also published at a time when 
there was no active violence being committed under the name of the FLQ. 
Carel (2013) attests that Vallières and Gagnon actively participated in other 
publications in La Cognée, where they produced separate editions for unions 
and students25 (63).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  There	  were	  certainly	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  separate	  version	  of	  La	  Cognée	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  students,	  unions	  
and	  Felquistes	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 The Vallieres-Gagnon cell mobilized in 1966, and Vallières and 
Gagnon were in New York when they heard of the arrest of several FLQ 
members. In response, they protested at the UN in demand for the freedom 
of their comrades, and freedom for the sub-state in general. Both Vallières 
and Gagnon were arrested by agents of the US immigration and imprisoned 
in New York City Jail for three months while awaiting extradition to 
Montreal (Hunsaker 1999). During this sentence, Vallières wrote Les Nègres 
Blancs d’Amerique, the White Niggers of America, in which he compares the 
Québécois in Quebec to the Black minority in the United States of America. 
Vallières states in the introduction that the book was written after a 29-day 
hunger strike and “within the framework of an absurd discipline (called 
prison rules), invented and applied for the purpose of brutalizing the 
inmates as much as possible” (Vallières 1968, 9). 
 
 The text offers Vallières’ criticism of Québécois society, nationalism, 
and the clergy. Through the Quiet Revolution, Vallières advocated a 
separation between historical myth and religion by symbolically murdering a 
key cultural figure: “Let us kill Saint John the Baptist! Let us burn the papier-
mâché traditions with which they have tried to build a myth around our 
slavery” (Vallieres 1968: 20). Hunsaker (1999) correctly states that Vallières 
not only dismisses the Catholic religion, but he also mocks French Canadian 
nationalism, which is constructed around a mythic sense of a heroic past, 
which interestingly clashes with the rituals and scripts of contentious politics 
and FLQ. Vallières struggles with how the Québécois defined themselves 
through this historical past rather than aligning themselves with the 
‘material realities’- the domination by English-speaking American 
corporations- that was shared by exploited people around the world 
(Hunsaker 1999). The answer to the social problems in Quebec, Vallières 
argues, could be found in ‘total’ revolution: “the heart of the problem is 
neither metaphysical nor moral. It is material; it is at the same time economic, 
historical, and military. Consequently its solution must be of the same 
nature…there is no theoretical solution to the problems it raises. There are 
only practical solutions” (Vallieres 1968, 56). Although les Nègres Blancs 
influenced certain FLQ cells, the Chenier and Liberation cells were 
	   107	  
influenced by the mythological past of les Patriotes of 1837 of the Lower 
Canada Rebellion. The comparison of the felquistes to the Patriotes in the 
manifesto is used as a way to justify the cause of the FLQ; thus embodying 
the exact idealism that Vallières argues against.  
  
While the FLQ was inactive in the late 1960s, labour occupied the 
radical space. Labour bargaining opened up a movement for a “second 
front”, in which workers and citizens of impoverished East Montreal could 
organize outside of the workplace. The confédération des syndicats 
nationaux (CSN) became a leftist movement that organized around housing 
and living conditions, as well as imperialism in Quebec (Mills 2010); this 
mobilization of workers brought labour conditions to the foreground of left-
wing radicalism.  
 
By January 1966, La Cognée was being represented by only a few 
felquistes.  The group Vallières-Gagnon was formed and organized itself 
separate from La Cognée. While the old wave continued to publish a national 
version of the organ, the new Vallières-Gagnon group began to publish 
editions that were targeted at specific groups with a socialist perspective.  
Édition nationale was written for the felquistes, as well as the “patriots who 
affect[ed] the movement with their financial and intellectual contributions” 
(La Cognée no.50 1966). The other three editions were distributed publicly in 
order to achieve maximum distribution:  l’édition syndicale was focused for 
workers, and the édition universitaire et édition des écoles sécondaire were 
written for university and high school students. L’Avant-Garde was a separate 
edition published five times during 1966; it was presented as ‘the official 
organ of the comité central du FLQ’, and had a very distinctively Marxist 
view. 
 
In February 1966, a writer at La Cognée with the pseudonym ‘P.L.’, for 
Paul Lemoyne, answered an open letter asking why he was one of two 
current authors writing for the organ. He suggested that the 15 previous 
authors had left La Cognee for one of three reasons: writers, such as Pierre 
Gagnon and Mathieu Hebert, had become militants and were now 
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participating in clandestine action; others, such as Marcel Martel and Francis 
Choquette, had abandoned the movement due to ‘fear, cowardice or 
laziness’; and others, such as Paul-André Gauthier, Hudon Lamarche and 
George Simard, had quit the movement because they no longer believed in 
the program and ‘were fighting elsewhere so that they could have a drink 
more often’; in other words, they were now participating in the moderate 
faction of the nationalist movement. (La Cognée no. 53 1966). Lemoyne then 
called for more writers; however, the official organ seemed at its end. No 
publications occurred during June to August until it reappeared in 
September 1966 under the direction of Pierre Gagnon, psyeudonym Jacques 
Désormeaux. Gagnon gave himself the title of ‘officier de l’armée de 
liberation du Québec’, an officer of the liberation army of Quebec.  
 
In March 1966, ‘Paul Lemoyne’ called for a halt of FLQ activity so that 
rearguard areas, such as houses, liaisons, reserve funds, security agents, and 
hideouts could be organized. He suggested in La Cognée that liaison, security 
and finance were important so as not to commit the same errors of 1963 and 
1964 (La Cognée no. 55 1966). This article proves that there was a knowledge 
of tactics, and differentiation between the urban struggle and the rural 
guerilla by the individuals writing the articles in La Cognée; however, the 
following militants of this moment either chose not to follow the instructions 
of Lemoyne or failed to do so.  
 
On the 5 June 1966, Quebec held its last election for the legislative 
assembly of Quebec. The bicameral system was replaced with a single 
Assemblé Nationale du Quebec on the 31 December 1968. After a campaign 
of ‘Quebec d’Abord’, ‘Quebec first’, Daniel Johnson and the Union Nationale 
defeated the Lesage Liberal government. Although this came as a surprise to 
many, the reforms in Quebec had been costly throughout the Lesage regime, 
and the public debt had doubled. Lesage was even nicknamed ‘Ti-Jean la 
tax’, ‘Little-John the taxman’. Despite having won 6.5% less votes than the 
Liberals, the UN won 56 seats to 5026. This electoral outcome showed that the 
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majority of Quebecois were also frustrated with the high taxes and expenses 
of the Quiet Revolution. 
 
This section examined the polarization of violent and moderate 
factions. Unlike the FLNC, the FLQ was distinct from the moderate factions 
since the beginning. During 1964 to 1966, however, there was no violent 
activity under the name of the FLQ particularly due to the harsh response to 
the previous FLQ cell, the skepticism of the La Cognée writers to affiliate 
themselves with another militarist network, and the increased activity of 
unions. Even though Quebecois considered less violent tactics in 1964, the 
government continued to pursue a violent response to demonstrators during 
Queen Elizabeth’s visit. Activism, instead, took the form of strikes and 
intellectual writings, particularly by Pierre Vallières, and other cultural texts, 
thus shaping the radical space to Marxist-Leninist influences.  
	  
Membership: a new Marxist-Leninist actor constitution 
	  
“Well, I don’t think that the new FLQ see the society as a global thing. 
They just…they are… they are not a movement for the masses. They are 
out of it, and this is the point where they are wrong” (Bachand on ‘Seven 
on Six’ on CBC channel 6 with Pierre Desbarats, held in September 
1966 and transcribed by RCMP). 
 
Actor constitution is defined as the ‘emergence of a new or transformed 
political actor- a recognizable set of people who carry on collective action, 
making and/or receiving contentious claims’ (McAdam et al. 2001, 216). This 
section examines the emergence of a new FLQ cell after a period without a 
felquiste presence. In the absence of FLQ violence, unions occupied the radical 
space and took to strikes and activism, and the moderates continued to publish 
ideological and cultural texts. While the previous chapter explored the 
openness and inclusivity of the previous cells that resulted in a loose ideology, 
the Vallieres-Gagnon cell differed by embracing a distinct and concrete 
ideology, which they published and distributed in several editions. This, of 
course, created conflict between the new FLQ cell and the ongoing La Cognée 
organ. Therefore, the FLQ shaped the radical space by tightening the ideology 
to focus on Marxist-Leninism.  
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The Vallières-Gagnon network mobilized in January 1966, and was 
composed of workers and students within a young adult demographic; this 
collaboration of members from two difference social groups fits the larger 
general analysis of FLQ cells. On the 5th of May 1966, however, an FLQ bomb 
killed Mlle Thérèse Morin, a secretary at Grenade Shoe Co. where the 
workers of CSN had been striking for almost a year. The bomb was placed by 
Gaetan Desrosiers, a 17-year-old high school student from East Montreal. 
When arrested by the police, he was entrusted to the care of his uncle, a 
lieutenant police officer in Montreal, instead of a trial (Fournier 1982). Of the 
compiled list of felquistes in the Vallieres-Gagnon cell, seven were sentenced 
for bombing incidents between 1966 and 1968: Rhéal Mathieu, a 19 year old 
laboratory assistant, was arrested on the 17 August 1966 and sentenced to 
nine and a half years for the two bombing deaths of Morin and Corbo (see 
below); Gerard Laquère, a 24 year old student of social sciences at 
L’Université de Montréal, was sentenced to six years and eight months for 
participating in two bombings; Serge Demers, who was a construction 
worker for Expo 67, was sentenced to 8 years, 10 months for his participation 
in the death of Mlle Morin; André Lavoie, a 22 year old student in 
journalism, hid in Mattawin in Haut-Maurivie before his arrest and was 
sentenced to three and a half years for involvement with the FLQ. Richard 
Bouchoux, a 27-year-old mechanic originally from France, spent 17 months 
in prison before being acquitted of murder. Interestingly, Réjean Biggs, a 23-
year-old hairstylist, was accused of stealing arms and materials from the sale 
d’armes du Mont Saint-Louis. Briggs was acquitted and Vallières was 
instead sentenced to seven years in November, 1968 for this theft (Fournier 
1982; transcript of Vallières court case). The acquittal and transfer of sentence 
from Briggs to Vallières is interesting, especially when Vallieres’ 
involvement with activity and violence is contentious. I have, therefore, 
included Briggs in my analysis of membership.  
 
Fournier (1982) suggests that the group structured itself into three 
networks: propaganda, action and the ‘Comités populaires de liberation’. 
Representatives of each network held a seat in the comité central, which gave 
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orders to the subsequent cell.  There is no evidence, however, that the 
network was as organized. This network was the first to publically advocate 
socialism by suggesting that they worked for ‘the construction of a socialist 
Quebec’ (La Cognée vol. 1 1966), and converted the battle between 
indépendantistes and federalists to proletariat and bourgeoisie. This network 
comprised of at least ten known members between the ages of 16 and 27.  
 
On the 14th of July, FLQ member Jean Corbo died at the age of 16 
while placing a bomb at Dominion Textile in Saint-Henri, Montreal, during a 
strike. It was meant to be an act of support for the striking workers. Serge 
Demers testified under the protection of the court that Corbo met with 
members of the FLQ central committee- including Pierre Vallières, Rhéal 
Mathieu, Gerard Lacquerre, Charles Gagnon, Marcel Faulkner and Claude 
Simard- none of which had participated in placing the bomb. It was Demers 
who met with Corbo and gave him the bomb built with a ‘clockwork 
mechanism’. The bomb was not to go off for 55 minutes, but Demers said 
that he saw fire trucks heading towards the textile plant from the restaurant 
that he and Corbo had decided on as a rendez-vous after the bomb was 
placed in its appropriate location (“Young FLQ Suspect Describes Bomb Raid 
that Killed Corbo’, 1966).  The bomb had detonated prematurely and killed 
Corbo in the process27. This was the first time that a felquiste had died for the 
cause.  
 
The arrested FLQ members were represented in court by M. Robert 
Lemieux, a 25-year-old lawyer who had just recently finished his law degree 
at McGill University and been admitted to the bar. Lemieux became known 
as the lawful representative of the FLQ, representing Vallières, Gagnon and 
the Rose brothers among many other felquistes over the years. Lemieux was 
fired from his position at an Anglophone law firm, O’Brien & Smyth, in 
January 1968; his mother, Jacqueline Lemieux, suggested to the Montreal 
Gazette on the 14 October 1970 that Robert Lemieux’s termination of 
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employment was due to certain “legal aid cases that did not fit the 
company’s image” (Allan 1970, no page number). Me. Lemieux was given 
half the bonus of the other partners and was told to leave or be fired.  
Lemieux was not proven to have engaged in the violence himself, but was 
very sympathetic to the felquiste political prisoners; his friend, lawyer 
Bernard Mergler, named him a “judicial guerilla” after his death in 2008 
(“Robert Lemiex- a man of his time”, 2008). In an interview with Peter 
Gzowski, he stated: “I felt that the government was lying and giving an 
impression that was not good…  the government must recognize that there 
has been a great amount of irregularity in the case of political prisoners” 
(CBC archives, 1970). Although Lemieux was not an FLQ member, he was an 
important individual to the nationalist movement in Quebec and the 
development of a radical space in Quebec; Lemieux ensured fair and 
sympathetic representation for Felquistes on trial in Quebec.  
 
The involvement of Vallières and Gagnon within the cell is unclear, 
but it is clear that they were, at the very least, ideological leaders of the FLQ 
during this period (Fournier 1982; Rapoport 1988; the Cossette-Trudels in 
Laurendeau 1990); Vallieres was sentenced in court for his political writings 
rather than his participation28.  Vallières described the FLQ in 1966 as the 
‘revolutionary vanguard’, whose mission was to organize the armed 
struggle. This statement was inspired by Che Guevara’s foco model of 
revolutionary organization and action, in which a guerilla organization could 
mobilize support for a revolution (Che Guevara in Charters 1999).  It is 
evident, suggests Charters, that Vallières and Gagnon overlooked the 
conditions particular to Cuba that attributed to Guevara’s success, but were 
not present in the Canadian socio-economic and political environment: “the 
fact that the Batista regime had managed to alienate almost every sector of 
Cuban society, including the middle class, and had been abandoned by its 
ally, the US” (Charters 1997, 144). The foco method was not an appropriate 
model for Quebec, and Vallieres’ attempt to instill Che Guevara’s model of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Robert	  LeMieux	  stated:	  “you	  get	  the	  court	  of	  appeal	  in	  the	  Vallières	  case	  that	  
he	  was	  sentenced	  for,	  he	  was	  found	  for	  his	  political	  writings	  rather	  than	  his	  
participation”	  (“Peter	  Gzowaski	  interviews	  FLQ	  lawyer”,	  1970)	  
	   113	  
revolutionary action amongst the FLQ proves a hastiness to jump in without 
consideration of the social spaces in Quebec and Cuba. Although the 
Vallieres-Gagnon cell attempted to shape radical space without 
consideration of Quebecois society, it did succeed in creating a stronger 
ideology based on a particular model.   
 
 Actor constitution of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell differed from the 
previous cells of the FLQ in the sense that members were mobilized with a 
distinct ideology. The first three cells were inclusive and open to left-wing 
actors along the left of the political spectrum. The perception of the state as 
the colonizer is still reflected in the ideology of this cell, however the tactics 
and action (including the distribution of an organ separate from La Cognée) 




During the summer of 1979 in Corsica, the FLNC’s near dissolution would 
herald a new network. Twenty-one militants had been arrested and the 
FLNC was declared dissolved by the French state. On the 4 June, the 
militants were to be judged in court, therefore a nuit bleue in Paris was 
organized. Although the court dates were changed to the 14 June, the attacks 
occurred anyway (Poggioli 2011). The 25 attacks around Paris focused on 
national banks and tourist agencies, proving not only that the FLNC still had 
an active faction in Paris and on the mainland, but that ‘colonial control’ over 
Corsican tourism and the economy was still a perceived frustration amongst 
the actors. This chapter shows a development of the radical spaces in Corsica 
and Quebec: the ARQ cell attempted to radicalize differently than the 
previous cells of the FLQ, which proved unsuccessful with limited popular 
support; and the FLNC in the 1980s responded to an appearance of 
instability by radicalizing further.  
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Innovative Action and Membership: strategic adaptation to political 
repression, new technology and tensions amongst the factions 
	  
	  
Just as the ARQ and Pierre Vallieres cells increased in activity and attempted 
innovative action, so did the FLNC during the 1980s. The FLNC not only 
attempted new action, such as breaking into prisons in order to kill 
offenders, but the actors also became more responsive perceived social issues 
in Corsica. As will be discussed later during this chapter, the activity 
included interference into the drug trafficking on the island and issues of 
censorship in the media. The increased activity throughout the 1980s also 
created a build up of internal tensions, which would result in the scission de 
1990, to be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the new strategy adopted by 
the ARQ cell proved unsuccessful on several fronts; death during a robbery 
to finance the cell limited popular support and dissuaded mobilization and 
recruitment for another cell for two years. The FLNC also introduced new 
innovative action during the late 1970s and early 1980s; one tactic was to use 
the media for recruitment purposes, to respond to political repression, and to 
gain international interest. On the 26 March 1978, the FLNC organized a 
press conference in the Aleria cave in which Leo Battesti, a militant in the 
Bastia network, removed his cagoule29 to show his face and identity. After the 
Solenzaro attack, there were rumours that the FLNC were being 
‘manipulated by international powers’ (Poggioli 2006) or even ‘mercenaries 
from abroad’. This media stunt of producing Battesti, a young and well-
known militant, was to prove to the islanders that the FLNC was comprised 
of local Corsicans and gain support and recruitment for the movement.  
 
With Battesti as a known militant, the police were able to link many of 
the other militants to their participation in the FLNC. In May of 1978, with 
the imminent arrival of President Giscard d’Estaing on June 6 (Ramsay 1983), 
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the police invoked a wide-spread investigation, and 21 suspected members 
of the FLNC were arrested; several of them were caught red-handed moving 
arms and explosives (Ramsay 1983). Of the 21 arrested, there were 9 
employees, 4 students, 3 agriculturalists, 2 artisans, 1 police officer, 1 worker, 
and 1 academic (Crettiez 1999, 73). The networks in the North of the island- 
Bastia, Casinca, Cap, and the cote orientale- were seriously affected by the 
investigations, and were practically cut off from the rest of the larger FLNC 
network. Leo Battesti was also found in a hideout in Aleria, and Pierre 
Poggioli ‘took to the maquis’ until 1981. Further, the members that avoided 
arrest no longer held the authentication code that was agreed upon with the 
journalists; the FLNC, therefore, no longer had legitimate contact with the 
media (Poggioli 2006). 
 
 On the 7 June, existing members of the FLNC fired at a police car in 
Ghisonacci, and an officer was injured. The members gave an interview with 
the journal “Liberation” in which they articulated to the rest of Corsica that 
the FLNC had not been dismantled. In reality, the network had been severely 
destabilized, and this was the closest the FLNC would come to dismantling 
until they laid down their arms for good in June 2014. In order to continue to 
influence and shape the radical space in Corsica, the network had to adapt to 
the increased security on the island.  
 
 The network, over time, was successful in replacing the ‘lost’ leaders; 
two coordinators used a system with a letter box in order to make contact 
with all of the regions; however one individual, known only as LC, was 
arrested in April 1979, and ‘J.S’ took to the maquis in May (Poggioli 2006).  
Poggioli, from hiding in the Maquis, made contact with the media about a 
new code (Interview with Poggioli, 2014).  
 
 On 17 June 1979, Michel-Ange Filippi, a student of the Cunsulta di i 
Studienti Corsi (CSC) in Nice, was jailed for radical activity. Furthering this 
arrest, a dozen university and high school students- including minors- were 
arrested, and six were also jailed: Jean-André Orsoni, Stephane Predali, 
Pierre Pagani, Jean-Charles Pellegrini, Christian Perès, and Francis Luciani 
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(Poggioli 2006: 125); they were released on the 11 June 1981. Responsible for 
a series of bombings in response to the arrests of the university students, 
Oliva, Christofari and Leoni were sentenced to a further two years on their 
original sentences for FLNC graffiti. Shortly after, the individuals responsible 
for the attack against the Fort LaCroix in 1978- Matthieu Filidori, Etienne 
Graziani, Hean-Pierre Darnaud, Francis Lorenzi, Antoine and Dominiqur 
Mattei- were further sentenced with five to ten years in prison.  Sauveur 
Costa, incarcerated for firing shots at Maitre Biaggi’s vehicle, avoided his 
sentences due to a masked complice that helped him escape from the Bastia 
prison. Despite two broken legs from a leap over the jail wall, he succeeded 
in escaping. When he was arrested in November, he was sentenced to death.  
 
Although none of the cases had resulted in loss of life or injury, the 
sentences were much more severe than with the Aleria case. As the State 
Security Court was, and is, highly political, the stricter sentences proved that 
the state responded harshly to violence in Corsica during the second 
moment; it also proved that the government considered the threat of violence 
more important than the threat of public backlash. Due to the series of arrests 
and repression felt by the state, however, the FLNC experienced a wave of 
recruitment to the organization, especially young militants eager to be a part 
of the movement. While the ARQ cell of the FLQ did dissolve due to a series 
of arrests and did not influence the development of a second cell, the FLNC 
developed new tactics for recruitment to replace lost members and were able 
to avoid dissolution.  
 
The	  introduction	  of	  a	  ‘double	  direction’:	  further	  security	  resulted	  in	  further	  
organizational	  changes	  to	  the	  network	  
	  
The repression by the state, military and police forces in 1978 made it 
difficult for the Direction to meet; however, the leaders of each region were 
finally able to do so in the summer of 1979 (Poggioli 2006).  During this 
meeting, the members of the Direction formulated a new organization to the 
leadership. Each region would be represented by a ‘double direction’ entitled 
the ‘Ghjunta’.  The Ajaccio network was also re-distributed into three sectors: 
Ajaccio-Porticcio, Vico-Sagone and Propriano-Sartene (Poggioli 2011). 
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Besides the representatives of the Gjunta, each region would nominate a 
representative for the Cunsigliu, the executive of the Front movement.  Two 
members of the Cunsigliu (Poggioli was one of the two) would then meet 
with the Ghjunta; these meetings would serve as a space for political 
formation and allow the members of the Cunsigliu to replace those who have 
‘fallen’ (Poggioli interview, 2014).  Creating so many positions of leadership, 
of course, inspired a debate over strategy and tactics, and resulted in little 
activity over the summer. The reorganization of leadership was an attempt to 
combat the pressure and limitations of the state response; in order to 
continue to encompass the social space that the FLNC of the 1970s had 
created, the FLNC of the 1980s had to reorganize, recruit and adapt strategy. 
Not only were the FLNC responding to the increased security in Corsica, but 
they were also attempting to fill a political vacuum during the 1980s. The 
elections of 18 and 25 March 1979 reflected a ‘static nature’ (Ramsay 1983) 
with little change; 17 of 24 members in the General Councils were re-elected 
and the autonomists boycotted the elections. The strategy of a united ‘Front’, 
proposed by the FLNC, attempted to represent the Corsicans striving for 
independence even further within the political sphere.  
 
On the 23 January 1980, over 40 FLNC militants held a conference on 
the eve of the Collectif des 44. At this press conference, the FLNC articulated 
the raison d’etre for their violence (Poggioli 2006, 56). The militants stressed 
the importance of the political element to their struggle: the ‘Corsican 
situation was (and is) political, and so must be the battle’. While the press 
conferences of the 1970s portrayed hunting guns, basic pistols, a couple of 
revolvers, Sten and Schmeiser guns that were used during World War II by 
the Germans, this conference highlighted the presence of impressive and up-
to-date arms. The possession of high quality arms shows a shift between the 
first and second moment; it proved a new professionalism surrounding 
funding, procuring the arms, and theft, as well as a new relationship with the 
peaceful political sphere. Although the FLNC owned an impressively large 
amount of arms that were displayed at press conferences, the members very 
rarely used them. Unlike the FLQ cells, of whom the members remained 
clandestine, the FLNC invoked a level of theatre ritual as tactics.   
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The ritual of the conferences- especially while collecting the 
journalists- further informs a shift towards a more radical network: the 
journalists were asked to collect information from the toilets in a local bar, 
which instructed the journalists to meet at a location outside of town. One 
motorcycle followed the journalists while another kept watch on the meeting 
area; both extremists communicated via walkie-talkies. At the meeting point, 
two masked and armed militants loaded both journalists into a vehicle and 
placed bags over the journalists’ heads, while the first motorcyclist returned 
to make sure that they were not being pursued. Finally, the journalists were 
forced to walk a kilometer continuously blindfolded before reaching the 
venue (Poggioli interview 2014).  
 
Poggioli stated that this press conference of the 23 January 1980 was 
meant to be a ‘pied de nez’ at the police force. The FLNC used a set of 
repertoires and scripts (McAdam et al 2001) to display an increased level of 
strength and advancement from the network of the 1970s. The use of 
technology, walkie-talkies and modern arms, and secrecy added a level of 
mysticism to the clandestinity of the movement. Unfortunately, both 
journalists were censored by the editors of their newspapers, invoking a 
state-directed crack down on nationalist propaganda; Corse-Matin published 
nothing and Provencal published a very short article without photographs 
that displayed the participation of 40 actors (Poggioli 2006).  
 
In September 1980, the Cunsigliu were meeting once a month in 
different locations; frequent meetings meant further organization around 
strategy and activity. The 1980s saw a much more competitive relationship 
between the police forces, the state and the FLNC; a show of strength from 
one side resulted in a show of strength from the other, creating a vicious 
cycle. When the Police announced that the FLNC had been dismantled in 
Aix-en-Provence and Marseille, nuits bleu were organized in both locations 
to prove the announcement wrong (Poggioli 2011).  
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One of the most famous attacks in Corsica occurred in 1984 in 
response to the kidnapping and murder of FLNC member Guy Orsoni. On 
the 17th June 1983, FLNC member Guy Orsoni was kidnapped by the 
Corsican mob, directed by Jean Alfonsi, beat and left in his uncle’s car trunk 
to die (Historique de la LLN et du FLNC film).  On the 25 June 1983, more 
than 2000 people held a demonstration on the cours Napoleon in response to 
Guy Orsoni’s disappearance, which shows an avid public response to the 
violence and a frustration with attacks against individuals. On the 10 July 
1983, several masked and armed men placed a plaque in memory of Jean 
Orsoni, followed by a long procession of sympathizers. On the 7 June 1984, 
three FLNC militants broke into the prison in Ajaccio where the kidnappers 
of Guy Orsoni were being held; they neutralized the officers and killed the 
two men responsible for the assassination of Orsoni. The three FLNC 
members, Petru Albertini, Noel Pantalacci and Pantaleone Alessandri, were 
captured and deported to France (“Le FLNC s’oppose au milieu et tue deux 
de ses membres” 2015). This planned attack displays a very evident change 
in strategy, organization and a higher level of insurgency than the FLNC of 
the 1970s; while the early FLNC attacked symbols of colonialism and 
avoided the loss of human life, the FLNC of the mid to late 1980s were 
becoming more radical. As tensions rose between nationalists and anti-
nationalists throughout the 1980s, both networks became more violent. The 
attack on the murderers of Orsoni by FLNC members, and other activity 
between the FLNC and anti-nationalists, can be informed by the traditional 
Corsican vendetta, in which ‘an eye for an eye’ is invoked. The radicalization 
during the 1980s, therefore, was not only an increase in insurgency, but also 
a return to cultural violent traditions. In Corsica, culture and tradition cannot 
be extracted from the analysis of the activity of the movement, which is why 
the contextualization of the causal mechanisms is so important throughout 
this thesis. 
 
This attack suggests a very distinct contrast with the two FLQ cells 
discussed of this moment. First, neither of the FLQ cells were experienced or 
trained enough to be able to complete an attack such as this, and second, the 
loss of human life during the ALQ’s robbery very much influenced the state 
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response, the negative popular response and, therefore, the dissuasion of 
another FLQ cell and mobilization of political guerilla warfare.  
 
On 2 January 1986, the FLNC assassinated Mohamed Sara Sgatni and 
Hassan Saari on rue Trois-Marie in Ajaccio, who they accused to be 
trafficking drugs. In the Mémorial de Corse, the author attests that the FLNC 
were incorrect and that it was in reality a case of racism towards the 
Maghrebians (Pomponi 1982). Either way, this assassination kick started a 
program against drug trafficking in Corsica. Slogans “a droga basta” and “a 
droga fora” were painted on walls across the island, while nationalist groups 
printed and wore t-shirts with the same slogans (“FLNC: cinq assassinats 
assumés en 35 ans” 2011). Whether or not Sgatni and Saari played a role in 
the drug trafficking movement in Corsica, this assassination and program 
proved a further development of radical space in Corsica into the social and 
political spheres; the FLNC began radically targeting individuals that played 
into or spurred social issues on the island, and proved that the FLNC could 
influence moderate activism, which will be further discussed as polarization.  
 
The increased action in the 1980s was not constant; it was used as a 
political instrument in between elections. Arms were often lowered when 
there was a possibility of an election outcome that pleased the Corsican 
populace. This raising and lowering of arms created a cycle of polarization in 
Corsica, and the increased violence influenced the publication of a new 
manifesto, updating the ideology of the 1970s. Both of these elements will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Ideology and Polarization 
	  
Just as the FLQ experienced a widening of ideological space between 
moderate and violent factions, the FLNC partook in cycles of violence in 
which the network would lower arms if they felt that a political party 
represented their ideology.  
 
On the 1 April 1981, the FLNC published the ‘livre blanc’ in a special 
edition of the journal Ribellu. While the ARQ and Vallieres-Gagnon cells of 
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the FLQ did not publish manifestoes, the FLNC’s livre blanc outlined the 
network’s new programme. The Livre Blanc articulated a new strategy that 
the network, and specifically the Cunsigliu, had developed in order to 
survive the increased security measures of local police and state. The ‘Lutte 
de Liberation Nationale’ (LLN) defined the new strategy in which a 
‘direction politique’ would be in charge of structuring and organizing the 
network around three types of ‘struggle’ that would act autonomously but 
compliment and support the others: armed struggle, institutional struggle 
and mass struggle. The focus of a popular ‘front’ as an entity was to ‘defend 
the Corsican identity’ and their national rights through reappropriation of 
production, import and export. The FLNC’s role was to ‘designate enemies’, 
articulate a political perspective for the front and ensure that the front was 
working towards national independence, and finally target and hit symbols 
of colonialism militaristically. The livre blanc highlighted that the front was 
not to make war against France, as it would be inefficient and unable to 
succeed in such an end-goal; liberation had to be achieved politically, but 
only the struggle for national liberation would resolve the Corsican problem 
(livre blanc, 1981). This new strategy articulated a need for moderate and 
violent factions within a unified movement; this was different from the FLQ, 
which mobilized separately and distinctly from the peaceful political 
movement.   
 
The FLNC had already put the new tactics of the front into action with 
the creation of the first public organization in December 1980; the Cunsulta 
di I Cimitati Naziunalisti (CCN) politically challenged the UPC and the 
autonomists, and further expanded the radical space into the moderate non-
violent political sphere.  Further, the FLNC kept to their claim that their 
struggle was political following the publication of the livre blanc. In April and 
May, the FLNC suspended their militaristic activity, for the first time since its 
inauguration, for the presidential election in hopes that the Left would be 
successful.  With the election of Francois Mitterrand, the first Socialist 
president of the Fifth Republic, the FLNC stated that they would abstain the 
violence indefinitely to ‘see what happens’.  
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In July 1981, the FLNC further expanded its propaganda to include 
not only print but also radio and television. Until this point, television was 
considered the voice of France, therefore the inclusion of an interview with 
the FLNC on television proves further development and expansion of the 
radical space; it also suggests that the French citizens on the mainland were 
intrigued by the plight of the FLNC and the ‘Corsican problem’.  The two 
hour interview was shown during the ‘Nouveau Vendredi’ show in 
September where a masked Pierre Poggioli explained the livre blanc and the 
strategy of the FLNC. For the first time, the FLNC was able to freely express 
their views, demands and ideals. By including modern media, the FLNC 
succeeded in gaining more interest in their plight and allowed the FLNC to 
situate itself within a larger movement. The interview with FR3 by Judith 
Radiguet proved so contentious amongst the barbouzes and supporters of 
the French state, that Radiguet was physically threatened and had to be 
placed under police protection after her apartment in Corsica was ransacked 
(Poggioli 2011).  
 
Similar to the development of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell in the wake of 
the election, the FLNC took up arms again on the 11 February 1983; despite 
the re-opening of a University in Corté on the 26 October as well as the 
liberation and amnesty of several political prisons, the FLNC continued to 
pursue violence tactics against a perceived colonial problem (U Ribombu 
1984). This pattern, of lowering arms when the organization was in a period 
of negotiation and then picking them up again when negotiations have not 
been met, would cycle throughout the 1980s, but also proved that violence 
was used as a political instrument by the militants to weigh in on public 
political debate. 
  
While violence was being used as a political instrument, it particularly 
began to increase between 1987 and 1988. The increased violence, however, 
resulted in tensions within the network itself. Poggioli stated that some 
members wanted to radicalize even further and organize all networks with a 
militarist focus rather than a political one; this was in part due to further 
repression by the state during the summer of 1987.  A congress was 
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organized in 1988 in order to attempt to discuss the internal conflicts. The 
late 1980s also saw a further participation in Corsican activism and society. 
Activity no longer solely included bombing symbolic infrastructure; the 
FLNC responded to local injustices with innovative action. For example, 
three major journalists working at the regional television center were 
censored by the state after investigating nationalism and violence in Corsica 
and the rédacteur en chef of the station was called ‘back’ to France by the 
interior minister. When his replacement, Michel Satti arrived in Corsica, a 
commando of FLNC kidnapped him; they released him when he promised to 
leave the island and withdraw as rédacteur en chef (Poggioli 2011).   
 
On the 31 January 1988, the FLNC organized its very first clandestine 
congress. This space allowed the militants of the FLNC to explain the 
political motivations of their clandestine actions and respond to questions 
and interrogations. As the two ideologies of propaganda and warfare 
continued to conflict, this congress was meant to find a compromise, but the 
need for this congress only foreshadowed the ‘scission de 1990’. Minutes of 
the congress show frustration over a centralized direction, especially when it 
came to finances. In 1983, the FLNC instigated the ‘impot revolutionnaire’, 
revolutionary tax. According to Crettiez, a member of the Cunsigliu stated 
that the leaders of the sector made the decision to invoke the tax as they did 
not believe it fair that the members had to pay from their own pockets. 
Money raised was distributed evenly to the sectors; however, some militants 
and sectors autonomously collected the racketeering money for themselves 
without referral to the direction (Crettiez 1999). In 1983, a hairstylist was 
assassinated for refusing to pay the revolutionary tax. The event became 
known as ‘l’affaire Schock’. Poggioli argues that the murder was without 
knowledge and referral of the direction (interview 2014), which informs the 
structure of the network; the movement had no way of penalizing and thus 
controlling the nearly autonomous sectors. This lack of ‘punishing’ 
mechanism will allow for the scission de 1990.    
 
L’affair Schock marked the beginning of rising conflict between the 
sectors and the direction over coordination of the network and a central 
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direction; these problems surrounding command and progressive autonomy 
is evident in the notes of the congress of 1988 that brought together 
participatory FLNC members from all regions  (FLNC congress notes 1988). 
By accepting to decentralize the economic logistics of the tax, the leaders of 
the direction began to lose some control of the sectors. Due to this, in part, 
the hierarchal organization of the FLNC during the 1970s slowly began to 
disintegrate until 1990.  By 1989, however, the nationalism movement in 
Corsica was in crisis. With a return to the Left, there seemed to be more 
representation within the electoral political sphere, and the structure of the 
FLNC weakened as sectors became stronger and less unified. While other 
clandestine groups began to disappear, the FLNC continued to be innovative 
with their action and activism that targeted local injustices beyond the scope 
of their official demands. The polarization between moderates and 
clandestine actors, however, began to expand by 1988 and the radical space 
began to shrink and contract.  
Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter is ultimately characterized by a struggle by both movements to 
maintain their networks against a state response. Several arrests happened in 
both sub-states during this moment, and both movements responded 
differently; while the ARQ cell of the FLQ completely dissolved, and 
influenced a two-year calm, the FLNC was forced to reorganize and adapt in 
order to replace ‘fallen’ members. The inappropriate program of the ARQ, 
and the unnecessary death and violence, left a bad taste in the mouths of the 
Quebecois. Yet, in the absence of active clandestine violence, the union 
movement and an ideological movement of Vallieres, Gagnon and the organ 
La Cognée occupied and developed the radical space in Quebec so that the 
actors of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell could mobilize the FLQ movement once 
again. During this chapter, there was evidence of polarization and RFE 
between moderate and violent factions with both the FLQ and the FLNC, yet 
polarization will be even more prominent in the following chapter, which 
discusses the emergence of the political party, the Parti Quebecois (PQ). 
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The FLNC of the 1980s distinguished themselves with cycles of 
violence, in which they used violent episodes as a political instrument to 
weigh in on public political debate.  Violence increased during tense political 
situations with the central power, but also responded to local injustices on 
the island. During periods of minimal activity, specifically from 1981 and 
1988-1990, the FLNC were in negotiation with the state, specifically over the 
release of political prisoners. The lowering of arms during periods of 1 April 
1981 to the 25 February 1982; 1 July 1985 to the 2 January 1986; 31 May 1988 
to the 30 September 1988 (Crettiez 1999: 106) represented short terms of faith 
in the government and the electoral democratic system. The use of violence 
also allowed the FLNC a ‘political visibility’ to Corsican nationalism that the 
moderate regionalists were not able to achieve. As the movement evolved 
from the first moment, violence became the method for negotiation with the 
state. The members of the FLNC viewed themselves as the voice of the public 
over the elected clansmen that had monopolized the electoral system 
(Crettiez 1999).  
 
The shaping of radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica was further 
influenced by another causal mechanism of innovative action. Beyond the 
cycles of violence, both the FLQ and the FLNC adopted new techniques and 
strategy in this second moment. While the ARQ adopted a program that was 
less than effective within Quebec, the FLNC invoked theatricality so as to 
display strength amongst the media and gain interest in the ‘Corsican 
problem’. While repression resulted in dissolution of the ARQ, it forced the 
FLQ to consider other innovative action for both activity and recruitment, 
and influenced a re-structuring of the network.  
 
Beside the FLQ, and the single homicide during a robbery-gone-
wrong by the ARQ cell, the FLNC of the 1980s could seem to be particularly 
violent. Although violent episodes were particularly constant and regular in 
Corsica, the FLNC of the 1980s had relatively low death rates in comparison 
to other clandestine movements in Europe, such as the Basques (ETA) or the 
Irish (IRA). Three people outside of the ‘nationalist conflict’, of the FLNC or 
anti-nationalist clandestine networks, were killed by FLNC activity: two 
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business owners that refused to pay revolutionary taxes, known as the impôt 
révolutionnaire, and the owner of a camping site who tried to deactivate the 
bomb in his establishment. When the FLNC is placed in a European context- 
especially in Corsica with its history of violence and vendetta- the level of 
insurgency could be considered low. The level of violence can especially be 
explained by the organization of the network; as the extremists attacked the 
regions in which they resided, they were more likely to target symbolic 
infrastructure and less likely to facilitate activity that would produce high 
death rates amongst family and neighbors. While the organization of the 
network influenced a lower insurgency and level of violence, it instead 
allowed for infiltration into the population and an excellent knowledge of the 
environment and terrain. This organization would change within the third 
moment as the movement divided into two factions.  
 
While the FLNC created a cycle of violence as a tool for negotiation 
with the state, the FLQ cells were never able to achieve that discourse with 
the Canadian federal government.  First, the FLQ was not active enough to 
be a threat. Second, the police were able to aptly shut down the cells of the 
first two moments. Finally, the state government had no interest in 
negotiation. The moments of inactivity were due to arrests and repression, 
while the FLNC actively chose to lower arms in hopes that the political 
system would favor their demands, and the state and moderate nationalists 
responded positively to the action by participating in negotiations.  
 
A final mechanism that is explored in this chapter is membership (or 
actor constitution). As discussed during this chapter, members are ultimately 
male and masculine in this moment. While Pierre Vallieres masculinizes the 
entire nationalist program, women are not included in FLNC membership. 
Membership continues to involve left-wing individuals of 16-32 years old in 
Quebec, and in their 20s and 30s in Corsica. The opening of the university in 
Corté during this moment resulted in a larger population of young students 
on the island who no longer had to leave the island for university; while 
students were part of the FLNC in the first moment on the mainland, they 
were now able to participate in activity on the island.  
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The radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica were shaped by the cycles of 
activity that responded to the moderate political spaces and state repression. 
During the 1980s in Corsica, the radical space still included both clandestine 
and moderate nationalists particularly when the FLNC chose to negotiate 
with the French government, but even when the FLNC used violence against 
social injustices; for example, the safe removal of the new French editor was 
supported publicly. In Quebec, the radical space was developed by union 
movements and ideological leaders in the absence of the FLQ after the 
homicide by the ARQ left the Quebecois choosing activism over clandestine 
violent episodes for a period of two years.  
 
This chapter can be characterized as ‘the beginning of the end’. The 
tensions around financing and organization that lead to the downfall of a 
cohesive FLNC network begin to become apparent in this section, and will 
only become more volatile in the following chapter; the differing views on 
how the movement should respond and interact with the government will be 
the ‘final straw’ and result in a splitting of the network into two canals. The 
empirical chapters highlight a general increase in felquiste radical activity 
from the original cell in 1963 to the Chenier and Liberation cells in 1970, 
when they come head to head with Prime Minister Trudeau and the federal 
and provincial governments during the October Crisis 
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Chapter 6: ‘The government is using a sledgehammer to 
crack a peanut’: a comparison of the FLQ during the 
October Crisis (the ‘peanut’) and the FLNC in the late 
1980s and early 1990s 
	  
	  
The previous chapter highlighted the rising tensions in both Quebec and 
Corsica, as well as amongst the militants themselves. This chapter explores 
the height of violence of the FLQ and the FLNC, which resulted in the 
dissolution of the FLQ and the traditional FLNC. The FLNC of the early 
1990s divided into two competing factions without the cultural and language 
demands of the FLNC of the 1970s and the 1980s.  
 
The radical spaces during the periods of this chapter are very different 
than in Chapter 5: Quebec society was radicalizing in the late 1960s; general 
and trade unions and workers movements were becoming popular and 
stronger; and the Parti Quebecois was developing momentum as a peaceful 
political party committed to democracy, while an insular nationalism was 
also gaining popularity in Corsica and the FLNC struggled with the 
limitations of the original nationalist discourse. Because the socialist 
government chose to negotiate with the FLNC after 1987, and considered the 
‘Corsican problem’ a distinct issue to be handled separately from the rest of 
the Republic, the government was able to avoid further violence amongst the 
canal in Ajaccio. This negotiation, and the demand for further violence by 
many younger members, influenced older FLNC leaders, such as Pierre 
Poggioli and Alain Orsoni, to quit the movement and pursue nationalism 
through the insular democratic political system.  
 
While Corsicans were becoming uneasy with violence- groups such as 
les femmes contre la violence (women against violence) developed in the late 
1980s- Quebec society was radicalizing and looking to the protest 
movements of the 1960s in the United States and nationalist movements 
abroad. The FLQ embraced new tactics such as plane hijackings and 
kidnappings. In response, the English-speaking judicial system responded 
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with harsh sentences; Pierre-Paul Geoffroy, leader of the Geoffroy cell, 
received 24 life sentences in jail. The use of the new tactics, and the stronger 
responses by Canadian institutions, publicized the plight of the FLQ as they 
attempted to settle within an international movement.  
 
Thus, the further the FLQ and the FLNC radicalized, the further they 
distanced themselves from the peaceful political space. Many members chose 
to pursue the peaceful nationalist movement, thereby re-shaping the radical 
space. This final empirical chapter explores how the October Crisis and the 
dissolution of the FLQ, and the ‘scission de 1990’ and changed violence of the 




 “I think that the prevalent view is that the FLQ is not someone who is sitting in 
their home or a bar; it is a membership through action. My view is that people of St. 
Laurent, Winsor… these are workers involved who adopt radical solutions to their 
problems which are always Quebec type problems. The youth are the more 
revolutionaries with a global view and want to do more action. It is membership 
through action… if you speak to them, they consider themselves as such. –Robert 
Lemieux, 1970 CBC Archives  
 
	  
The Geoffroy cell and La Victoire: heavy-handed state and provincial 
responses to protest  
	  
April 1968 marked the organization of the Geoffroy network and the new 
official organ for the FLQ, La Victoire. La Cognée had dissolved almost six 
months earlier (La Victoire 1967). La Victoire was short-lived and lasted only 
until the end of the summer of 1968; however, the new organ was important 
to the fifth wave by allowing the Geoffroy cell to articulate and distribute its 
personal agenda.  
 
The Geoffroy network was founded amongst RIN members and 
participants of the ‘7-up strike’, a strike by 7-up factory workers, which had 
begun on the 15 June 1967. All members, therefore, were politically involved 
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with the left-wing workers movement before joining the FLQ; the felquistes 
demonstrated this solidarity by bombing the 7-up factory in May 1968 as the 
cell’s inauguration (Fournier 1984). Once again, the RIN served as a platform 
for frustrated left-wing indépendantistes to create cells of violence under the 
umbrella term of the FLQ. On the 27 February 1968, thousands of supporters 
joined the ‘7-up strike’ in solidarity of the factory workers. Pierre-Paul 
Geoffroy was amongst them, and was arrested for assault. Charges were 
originally dropped, but the arrest resulted in a lengthier sentence when he 
was arrested and tried for FLQ participation on the 4 March 1969 (Fournier 
1984; Lebel 1969: Lepine 1969; Whitaker 2011). The actors that mobilized for 
the Geoffroy network, the group defined the constitution of membership as 
left-wing Quebecois who were frustrated with international involvement in 
the market, the federal and provincial relationship, and the perceived 
‘English rule’; the Geoffroy cell is interesting as it was mainly comprised of 
workers who had attempted the traditional form of striking but had found it 
ineffective. Further violence was sought when the members perceived an 
inefficacy in the slower, peaceful system of strike action.    
 
The sociopolitical environment in Quebec was certainly radicalizing 
during this time period; many Quebecois were actively participating in 
demonstrations and strikes, and the Sureté du Quebec responded heavily. 
Sub-state frustrations also resulted in changes in the democratic electoral 
sphere: On 28 October 1968, Rene Levesques’ Mouvement- Souverainete-
Association and the Ralliement National merged to create the Parti 
Québécois. The PQ would lead the democratic independence movement and 
gain political momentum in Quebec. The PQ would create a polarization 
with the FLQ during the October Crisis as they made an effort to distance 
themselves from the felquiste violence.  
 
Lundi de la Matraque, a demonstration held earlier on 24 June 1968, 
resulted in a heavy handed response from the authorities, and shows an 
attempt by the authorities to curb the increasing radicalism in Quebec with 
repressive tactics. With no known links to the Geoffroy cell, a group of 
several hundred Quebecois held a demonstration at the St-Jean Baptiste 
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Parade in Montreal on the eve of the federal election. Two hundred and 
ninety people were arrested, including Jacques Lanctot and Paul Rose of the 
Chenier and Liberation cells of the FLQ in 1969-1970. The police force 
responded forcefully to the demonstration and 125 demonstrators were 
injured30. It is suggested in the book ‘Le lundi de la matraque’ that Lanctot 
and Rose met during this event in the back of a police car when both were 
arrested (Collectif 1968). The Anti-Terrorist Squad, composed of the 
Montreal Police Force, the RCMP, and the Sureté du Québec (Whitaker 2011), 
took a very ‘hands-on’ approach with public demonstrators. They targeted 
the immediate problems as they developed rather than attempting to pursue 
the social issues and frustrations of the actors. Although policing officials 
were heavy-handed in Quebec, radicalism continued- through 
demonstrations, strikes and FLQ activity- due to the continuation of leftist 
thought and social issues that were not being addressed politically.  
 
The next day after the demonstration, on the 25 June 1968, Montreal-
born Pierre Eliot Trudeau was named Prime Minister of Canada. Originally 
viewed as a success for Quebec, Trudeau would certainly burn bridges with 
his federalist policies and his response to the FLQ during the October Crisis.  
 
While Quebecois society was radicalizing, so was the FLQ. Tactics 
became more innovative and spectacular. The Geoffroy cell built the largest 
bomb that Quebec had seen, and two members even escaped Canada by a 
plane hijacking. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly suggest that social 
appropriation, a cultural process in which groups or networks are redefined 
as appropriate sites for collective action (Aminzade 2001, 37), ‘paves the way 
for innovative action’ (316). Innovative action often occurs in order to certify 
the legitimacy of the actor and his or her claims. The ‘typical result’ of 
innovative action is the formation of a new actor category and an identity 
shift by the group as a whole (316). Strategy is also embedded within a 
structure of symbolic meaning (Bourdieu 2000; Geertz 1973). This section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Translated	  as	  ‘Monday	  of	  the	  truncheon’	  by	  author.	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looks at the innovative action and the actor constitution of the Geoffroy cell 
in 1969.  
 
On the 19 February 1969, the Geoffroy cell set a bomb in the Montreal 
Stock Exchange that blew out the northeast wall and injured 27 people. This 
bombing would be the most spectacular ever placed by the FLQ, and caused 
the highest count of injuries. For the Geoffroy cell, the Montreal Exchange 
represented ‘Anglo-colonialism’, and the attack served as a message to 
English-speaking investors in Quebec (La Victoire 1969). The increase in 
violence proves a deeper frustration, and could certainly have been 
influenced by the other complications of strike action and unemployment of 
the 7-up workers. The increased insurgency of the Geoffroy cell attracted 
actors that were willing to adopt a more radical approach. Charrette and 
Alard’s attempts to escape arrest by plane hijacking acts as evidence to this 
argument. The radicalization of tactics by the Geoffroy cell, and of the social 
spaces in Quebec, foreshadows the violence of the October Crisis of 1970.  
 
Shortly after, on the 4 March 1969, Geoffroy was found, arrested and 
confessed guilty to all charges because he did not want to betray his 
accomplices. Geoffroy was a left-wing 26 years old student at Collège Saint-
Marie at the time of his arrest (Behiels 2011), and former RIN member.  His 
involvement with the FLQ in a leadership role influenced the largest 
sentence ever given in a Commonwealth Judicial Court: 24 lifetime sentences 
in jail. He was eventually freed after 12 years on the 15 February 1981.  
Although he served only a fraction of his extensive sentence, the fact that he 
was sentenced so harshly proves the fear of extremism, and of the FLQ, in 
Quebec in 1968- and specifically by the largely English judicial system. The 
symbolic violence of the Geoffroy cell, and the obvious increase in violence, 
responded to the frustrations in Quebec that were shaping the radical space.  
  
The other members of the cell were recruited through the RIN and 
had been present at the strike.  Two such members, Pierre Charrette and 
Alain Alard, escaped Quebec after the arrest of cell leader Geoffroy through 
unconventional means. Charrette, a 24 years old employee at Radio Canada, 
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and Alard, a 23 year old electronic technician at Canadian Marconi, hijacked 
a Boeng 727 plane of National Airlines flying from New York to Miami with 
a .38 calibre revolver, and forced it to land in Havana, Cuba (RCMP report 
1969). This felquiste activity was not considered unusual within political 
activism of the time; it was one of 82 plane hijackings during 1969, the 
biggest year ever for hijackings in the United States (Holden 1986). This 
hijacking was one of the most extreme acts by the FLQ to this point in time, 
and allowed the FLQ to become a ‘player’ in the international liberation 
movement during the sixties. Yet, as Holden suggests, the hijacking itself 
was routine; airliners carried approach plans for the Havana airport and 
crews were instructed not to resist hijackers” (Holden 1986: 881).  The 
hijacking by Charette and Alard, though effective for their escape to Cuba, 
lacked the surprise and creativity of a ground-breaking violent act; therefore, 
although the FLQ members began to settle themselves amongst the 
international movement of decolonization extremism, they were in no way 
leading it. The members, themselves, continued to avoid a level of 
insurgency to be considered ‘terrorists’.  
 
Although past felquistes generally did not take up arms again after 
serving jail time- Jacques Lanctot, however, was arrested, released on bail 
and continued with FLQ activity- some continued to remain political and 
many occupied the radical space and participated in the zeitgeist of the late 
1960s.  
	  
Language and cultural tensions as mobilizing mechanisms for other 
Quebecois activists 
	  
After the dissolution of the Geoffroy cell, the radical space continued to be 
occupied by language and culture activists in Quebec.  Language and 
cultural tensions continued to be cited as a frustration and acted as 
mobilizing mechanisms for marches and demonstrations.  
 
 On the 28 of March 1969, Bachand organized the Opération McGill 
francais, where approximately 10 000 trade unionists, leftist activists, CEGEP 
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students and a few McGill students demonstrated on the university campus 
for a francophone university that was pro-nationalist and pro-worker 
(Chester 1999). This strike action brought together the student movement, 
the socialist movement and the nationalist movement (Warren 2008, online). 
The link between the student and workers movements was the ‘internal link 
between the liberation of the education system and of Quebec’ (Béland 1969, 
18). The demonstration did not attempt to storm the campus and occupy 
buildings as students had at Columbia, Harvard and Berkeley (Mills 2010), 
and little violence occurred due to a massive police presence. The pressure to 
francicize McGill University lessened in the fall of 1969 with the opening of 
l’Université du Quebec a Montreal (UQAM) (Levine 1991, 77).  
 
In addition to the Operation McGill francais, Montreal experienced 
other linguistic crises in 1969 as a part of a revolt against the “dualism” 
hierarchy; the school conflict in Saint-Leonard occurred in the aftermath of 
the demise of Bill 85, a proposal that school boards would teach in both 
languages if requested by parents, although French language proficiency was 
mandatory for all students. Bill 85 was proposed after a group of Italian 
immigrants in Saint-Leonard demanded bilingual education in English and 
French. The Ligue pour l’integration scolaire (LIS) continuously organized 
agitation in Saint-Leonard in support of unilingual policies, which often 
ended in scuffles between Francophone and Allophone 
counterdemonstrators. Robert Lemieux, leader of LIS, declared that the 
“provincial government should close the door to immigration until the 
language problem in Quebec is regulated” (Levine 1991, 78), and in 
September 1969, mayor of Saint-Leonard Leo Ouellet warned of a “racial 
explosion” (“St. Leonard’s language issue remains in doubt” 1969). 
 
On 10 September, the LIS organized a march through the 
neighbourhood of Saint-Leonard, and Italians lined the streets and heckled 
the demonstrators.  A riot broke out between the two groups, with an 
estimation of 1000 citizens involved. One hundred were injured, 50 arrests 
were made, and the Riot Act was read in Montreal (Lemieux in Levine 1991, 
78). The first time that the Act had been read since 1957, it established 
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curfews to restore order. The demonstration in Saint-Leonard of September 
1969 was cited as a grievance by the Québécois, and represented the socio-
economic, cultural, and political pressures of linguistic separation and elite 
accommodation.   
 
Although the FLQ during the late 1960s to early 1970s articulated an 
importance of French language and culture, it was more of a side-note to 
their postcolonial and Marxist demands. The Felquistes wanted a socialist 
and independent Quebec, achieved through revolution, and the protection of 
the French language was simply a ‘means to an end’; the linguistic hierarchy 
of English and French in Montreal was a symbol of colonial oppression that 
needed to be challenged in order to achieve their end goal. Louise Lanctot 
(1981) of the Liberation cell wrote: “Dans l’absolu, le terrorisme felquiste 
n’était qu’un exutoire alors que le marxisme-léninisme a été une 
structuration et une implication personnelle dans la société”31 (120).  
 
The focus on protecting language and culture in Quebec resulted in 
ethnic tensions and shaped the radical space while the FLQ was inactive. 
These events demonstrate a need to protect language and culture from all 
influences, be it state-induced, American involvement in the market or 
immigration; they also prove that the radical space did not disintegrate with 
the FLQ. Frustrations of an elite English-speaking bourgeoisie did not only 
invoke a radicalization of felquistes, but of Quebec society in general 
throughout the late 1960s.  Although the felquistes of the Geoffroy cell were 
much more violent than that average Quebecois, they were responding to, 
and becoming radicalized by, the same issues in Quebec.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  In	  absolute	  terms,	  the	  Felquiste	  terrorism	  was	  simply	  an	  outlet,	  while	  
Marxist-­‐Leninism	  was	  a	  structure	  and	  a	  personal	  identification	  in	  society.	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The October Crisis: the formation and dissolution of the 
Liberation and Chenier cells 
	  
“Je	  ne	  veux	  pas	  eriger	  Octobre	  en	  programme,	  encore	  moins	  en	  modèle	  
d’organization.	  Je	  ne	  veux	  pas	  dire	  que	  je	  suis	  certain	  d’avoir	  eu	  raison,	  d’avoir	  
posé	  le	  geste	  qu’il	  fallait.	  Peut-­‐être	  que	  nous	  avons	  eu	  tort,	  que	  nous	  avons	  manqué	  
notre	  coup.	  Mais	  avec	  seulement	  des	  peut-­‐être	  ou	  des	  si,	  tu	  ne	  fais	  rien,	  tu	  ne	  
changes	  rien,	  tu	  ne	  prouves	  rien,	  tu	  ne	  montres	  rien.	  Pour	  moi,	  tu	  as	  toujours	  tort’	  
(Simard	  1982,	  195)	  
	  
After the election of the Robert Bourassa Liberal government on the 22 of 
May, the last two cells of the FLQ developed in September of 1970: the 
Chenier and Liberation cells. Similar to the Vallières-Gagnon and Geoffroy 
cells, the Chenier and Liberation cells returned to a socialist and 
‘indépendantiste’ perspective, citing Marxism as its political ideology with 
Latin-American guerilla influences. The felquistes of the Chenier cell were 
also interested in Marighella’s theory of urban guerilla warfare; the 
Liberation cell gave James Cross a copy to read while he was kept hostage 
(Cross documents given to Centre of Canadian Studies, University of 
Edinburgh). Marighella (1969) argued that guerilla warfare in urban areas 
would drive the government to respond with repressive means, and 
subsequently spark an uprising.  Charters (1997) argues that Marighella was 
solely influential on a tactical level by liberating prisoners and gaining 
publicity; this lack of revolutionary discipline only underlines the 
amateurism of the FLQ during the October Crisis. 
  
 While there is much contention around the relationship and the 
interactions of the Chenier and Liberation cells, Marc Laurendeau, 
influenced by a personal interview with Jacques and Louise Cossette-Trudel, 
suggested that the Chenier and Liberation cell loosely began as a single cell 
(Laurendeau 1990). At the very least, it is certain that there were relations 
between the two cells. Yves Langlois of the Liberation cell was a friend of 
Francis Simard in the Chenier cell; there are accounts of their travels in 
England together before 1970. Louise Cossette-Trudel (née Lanctot) lived in a 
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house rented by Paul Rose under the name of Paul Blais. Laurendeau also 
suggests that Paul Rose and Jacques Cossette-Trudel met to discuss strategy 
on Queen Mary Street on the 13 October, four days before the murder of 
Pierre Laporte (Laurendeau 1990); it is also certain that the Chenier and 
Liberation cells were two distinct groups during the October Crisis, and will 




Membership in this moment was very much shaped by personal connections 
and links between the actors. The members of the cells were often related, 
were involved romantically, or were friends, and were mostly in their early 
to mid 20s. This section explores the actors of the liberation cell, and how 
they formulated the cell structure.  
 
Jacques Lanctot, considered the ‘leader’ of the Liberation cell, was 24 
years old during the October Crisis. Lanctot became a member of the FLQ at 
the age of 17 and was involved in two of the three moments; this was highly 
unusual as most felquistes returned to society and participated in the 
electoral system after being arrested.  In 1963, he was sentenced to two years 
in prison for placing bombs as a part of the FLQ. After his release, Lanctot 
worked as a taxi driver; he was very involved in the Taxi Liberation 
Movement, organized in 1968 by taxi drivers and workers against the 
company Murray Hill with demands for better working conditions.  Lanctot 
was responsible for the Journal du Taxi, the organ of the movement. Lanctot 
stated in the Last Post: “What led me to join the front and to take action, the 
direct means to change government and its institutions, was let’s say a 
progressive discovery which came about especially during the years when I 
started driving a taxi.  (RG 146 file number 1025-9-9057 p. 88). Before the 
October Crisis in 1970, Lanctot had been living clandestinely since March 
and his brother was still in prison for FLQ participation (Fournier 1987, 257).  
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The Liberation Cell was also comprised of Lanctot’s sister, Louise 
Lanctot, and her partner Jacques Cossette-Trudel, both of whom were 
recruited by Jacques Lanctot and 23 years of age; Jean-Marc Carbonneau, a 
37 year old taxi driver, and driver of the vehicle during the Cross 
kidnapping; 23 year old Yves Langlois, and Nigel Barry Hamer. Hamer is the 
only Anglophone that was charged and tried for felquiste participation; he 
was a self-declared socialist, student at McGill University (Tetley 2006) and 
was introduced to Cosette-Trudel by a mutual friend named Pierre Louis 
Bourdet (Fournier 1982, 258). Similarly to many other felquistes, the Cosette-
Trudels were studying degrees of law and political science, and were 
similarly involved with political movements on campus.  Louise Cossette-
Trudel (née Lanctot), who distanced herself from her father’s right-wing 
allegiance, in Quebec (Lanctot 1981, 14), and Jacques Cossette-Trudel were 
expelled as leaders of the student movement the previous year during an 
occupation of the Cégep Maisonneuve after almost a dozen professors were 
fired (Fournier, 1982; Rapoport, 1986; interview with the Cossette-Trudels in 
1978 by Laurendeau), proving to be radical activists before their participation 
with the FLQ. Similarly to the Geoffroy cell, the Liberation cell was 
comprised of actors who were already subscribing to the radical space in 
Quebec.  
 
Outside of the cell, there were individuals who assisted the felquistes 
in hiding and delivering communiqués, although they were not involved in 
the activity and sometimes had no knowledge of the cell’s plans. On the 5 
September 1970, Louise Lanctot and Jacques Cossette-Trudel moved out of 
their home and in with Denise Quesnel, 38 years old, on 1485 rue Laurier 
(Fournier 1982, 57). She was also in contact with Louise Verreault, 28 years 
old, who was a friend of Paul Rose.  These connections allowed 
communication between the two cells, and both Quesnel and Verreault were 
charged with illegal affiliation with the FLQ (‘Trois témoins racontent la vie 
quotidienne des supposes ravisseurs’ 1970). Cosette-Trudel and Lanctot 
eventually moved, according to Fournier, to 10945 rue des Recollets in 
Montreal-North and rented the apartment under the name of Jacques 
Tremblay (Fournier 1982, 257).  
	   139	  
 
While a small cell is most secure, especially with tight, personal ties, 
yet without a network, it compromises the ability to gain support and 
funding from outside sources (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Similarly to the 
other felquiste cells, the Liberation cell was forced to finance and arm itself 
due to the cell structure; at no point did an FLQ cell receive funding by 
foreign investment, government or revolutionary tax. The FLQ were not 
violent enough, not were they structured in a way, to impose a tax or inspire 
outside funding, therefore the cells did not achieve a higher level of 
insurgent action. Although tactics did become more innovative, theft 
continued to be the sole source for financing the violent activity. One 
hundred and twenty five sticks of dynamite was stolen on the 26 September 
from the CIL gun powder supply McMastervill on the South Bank of 
Montreal, and 450 batons were stolen the next day from la carrière Demix 
near Saint-Hilaire; it is suggested in the Keable report that Nigel Hamer and 
UQAM colleagues Jean-Pierre Piquet, Gilles Cossette, Rhéal Michon, and 
Robert Comeau were responsible for these thefts in order to arm the 
Liberation cell (Commission Keable 1981, 219).  
 
Since the ties between nodes (the actors) were especially stronger in 
this cell, innovative action was possible; it becomes evident that the lack of 
funding and support made the kidnappings of the October Crisis more 
difficult32, yet both the Liberation and Chenier cells chose to join in the 
international trend of kidnapping political officials.  
 
On the 6 October, 1970 the Gazette published an article entitled ‘1970: 
the year of the terrorist kidnap’.  The article was written in response to the 
kidnapping of James Cross, trade attaché with the British High Commission 
in Montreal, on the 5th October; and declared Cross as the 13th victim of a 
larger global movement before summarizing the other twelve kidnappings, 
most in Latin America (United Press International 1970). By kidnapping a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Cross	  suggested	  that	  he	  was	  given	  minimal	  to	  eat	  and	  lost	  22	  Ibs	  (‘Taped	  
memoir	  of	  Cross’	  experiences’	  1971)	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politician, the Liberation Cell not only placed themselves alongside larger, 
more organized extremists, they also gained larger national attention.  
 
Kertzer (1988) suggests that action is “wrapped in a web of 
symbolism” (9), which ties into McAdam et al.’s action as repertoires with 
scripts; strategy and action were framed within these larger repertoires to 
send a message to government and populace and gain the demands of the 
movement. While the strategy of former FLQ cells of placing bombs in 
symbolic infrastructure allowed the press and the populace to interpret the 
actions and create a narrative for the FLQ (Crelinsten 1987); the FLQ had 
little debating power.  After the kidnapping of James Cross, however, the 
Liberation cell was able to use the media as a vehicle for communication with 
the government; it also forced negotiations to be made in public, which 
created a checks and balance of the government response by the populace, 
and maximized publicity for the political goals of the cell (Crelinsten 1987). 
Due to its very small size and radical tendencies, the political credo of the 
Liberation cell was not enough to draw the attention of larger national 
populace; the cell was only able to do so with dramatic action.  
 
Three days after the kidnapping of Cross, on the 8 October 1970, the 
FLQ manifesto released to the press was read over CBC/Radio-Canada. The 
demands included: the cessation of all police activity designed to find the 
kidnappers or their hostage; the publication of a political manifesto on the 
front pages of all major Quebec newspapers and its broadcast on Radio-
Canada during a prime-time broadcast in which released FLQ prisoners 
would be permitted to read and comment on the text; the release of 20 
‘political prisoners’ including Francois Lanctot, Lanctot’s brother from an 
earlier wave, and Pierre-Paul Geoffroy; the provision of a plane to fly them 
to Algeria or to Cuba, accompanied by their lawyers and at least two escorts; 
the rehiring of the LaPalme Boys, a union of postal drivers who had been 
replaced by the Federal Minister of the Post Office; a ‘voluntary tax’ of $500, 
000 in gold ingots to be placed on the plane with the political prisoners upon 
their release; the publication of the name and photo of the presumed 
informer who had led to the break-up of the Burgess plot (FLQ Liberation 
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cell communiqué; Laurendeau 1990; Fournier 1982).  The header on the 
communiqués was printed in the colours of the flag of the Patriotes, and the 
silhouette of les vieux Patriotes was watermarked behind the text (Liberation 
cell FLQ Manifesto 1970).  In doing so, the Liberation cell attempted to 
provide continuity and legitimacy to their cause by visually connecting their 
intentions and motives to the ‘invented tradition’ of the Patriotes during the 
1837 rebellion. The communiqué also made a verbal connection by stating: 
“thousands of Québécois have understood, like our ancestors of 1837-1838, 
that the only way to assert our survival is by total national and economic 
independence” (Communiqué 1 by Liberation cell)33. While the statement 
was certainly an exaggeration of Quebecois support for the movement, the 
FLQ drew upon the history of the Patriotes and used it to provide further 
support for their plight. 
 
The first communiqué by the Liberation cell stated that the 
kidnapping of James Cross was to attract international attention to the 
reputed colonial relationship between Quebec and Canada, and the 
monopoly of economic interests by the United States. The communiqué also 
attempted to place the FLQ within a global movement:  
 
The FLQ supports unconditionally the Black [power 
movement] in the US and in Africa; the liberation movements 
in Latin American, Palestine and Asia; the revolutionary 
Catholics in Northern Ireland… the FLQ wishes to especially 
salute the Cuban and Algerian people who fight against 
imperialism and colonialism in all of their forms. We believe 
that the only valuable support what we can give these people 
who march towards their liberation is to liberate ourselves 
(Communiqué 1 Liberation Cell 1970).  
 
This propaganda was to spur the ultimate goal of the Liberation Cell: to 
publicize the plight of Quebecois internationally, and to reconstruct the 
image of the FLQ as an organized force with a political program.  The 
kidnapping did not create a sense of extreme crisis within the government, 
and after a strong stance by Trudeau and Bourassa, the Liberation cell 
dropped five demands to push their top two: the release of political prisoners 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Translated	  by	  author.	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and the cessation of police activity. While the new strategy of kidnapping an 
English-speaking politician was not radical enough to achieve their demands 
from the government, the new strategy of having the manifesto read over 
television and radio did gain public sympathy for their political manifesto; 
Crelinsten suggests that the reading of the manifesto on the 8th of October 
created a ‘swell’ of public sympathy for the cause of the Liberation cell 
(Crelinsten 1987, 63). In an interview with CBC during the October Crisis 
(and before the death of Pierre Laporte), FLQ lawyer Robert Lemieux stated:  
““I would go so far as to say that the majority of French-speaking 
Quebeckers [support the FLQ]…support and sympathy run to different 
degrees and intensity, and I think that there is sympathy for this particular 
action” (“Peter Gzowski interviews FLQ lawyer”, CBC Digital Archives 
1970).  
 
While this section introduced the Liberation cell and the kidnapping 
and manifesto that began the October Crisis, the following section looks at 
the second cell: the Chenier cell. While there were connections between the 
cells, as discussed previously, both cells acted separately from each other and 
had little if no communications during the October Crisis. This was unclear 
to authorities and the populace, therefore, the different manifestos and 
communiqués complicated negotiations and created a mystery surrounding 
the network as a whole.  
Chenier Cell 
	  
“the kidnappers were.. ‘a group of bumbling punks with incredible luck who didn’t 
even have the money to buy their captives food’ (McKenna, 1971) 
 
On the 10 October 1970, Deputy Premier and Minister of Employment and 
Immigration in Quebec Pierre Laporte was kidnapped by four felquistes that 
called themselves the Chenier Financing cell.  Paul and Jacques Rose were 
travelling to the United States with their mother Lise Rose, her daughter 
Claire, and Francis Simard when they heard on the news that the Liberation 
cell had kidnapped James Cross (Simard 1982, 19); they hurried home to 
quickly organize their own kidnapping (“FLQ terrorist convicted of killing 
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cabinet minister Pierre Laporte has died” 2015). Transcripts of Paul and 
Jacques Rose’ mother, Lise Rose, and Bernard Lortie’s court testimonies in 
the Montreal Gazette articulates the rush to kidnap Pierre Laporte. In Texas, 
the Roses, accompanied by Simard, heard of the Cross kidnapping: “My son 
said: that’s incredible, that’s crazy. The government won’t give in for a guy 
like that” (Mrs. Rose testimony 1970). They drove straight back and arrived 
in Montreal on the 8 October 1970, where they met Lortie: “We had been 
thinking and talking about kidnapping somebody for quite a while at the 
house at 5630 Armstrong Street. We met at the house after the Cross 
kidnapping and prepared to kidnap Pierre Laporte” (Lortie in Bauch, 1970).  
This kidnapping would quickly undermine the newly acquired public 
sympathy, as well as the conciliatory approach taken by Justice Minister 
Jerome Choquette.  
 
The individual who would become most well known as a member of 
the Chenier Cell is undoubtedly Paul Rose. Rose was 26 years old at the time 
of the October Crisis. Although viewed as the leader of the Chenier cell, Rose 
articulated his dislike for such a title (Rose in Laurendeau 1990: 284). Rose 
was born in Saint-Henri and completed a degree in Political Science from the 
Collège Sainte-Marie; before the October Crisis he worked as an instructor of 
maladjusted children (Rose in Laurendeau 1990). Both of his parents were 
factory workers, so Rose very much had two perspectives of living in 
Montreal: living in the working-class district of Montreal as a child, and 
living in Montreal as a student in a middle class milieu.   
 
 Similar to the Liberation Cell, the Chenier Cell was comprised of tight 
bonds and relationships, such as family members and relationships. Other 
members of the cell involved in the kidnapping included Paul Rose’s 23 year 
old brother, Jacques Rose; 24 year old Francis Simard; and 19 year old 
Bernard Lortie. Francis Simard and Bernard Lortie had both met Paul Rose in 
1969 through other leftist spaces. Simard met Rose while campaigning for the 
French language at McGill, organized by Mario Bachand. Lortie met the Rose 
brothers in the summer of 1969 at the Maison du Pecheurs alongside other 
individuals who were charged and convicted with assisting the felquistes 
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(Simard in Bausch 1970). Again, similar to the Liberation cell, individuals 
were arrested and charged for assisting the FLQ: Richard Therrien, for 
example, was sentenced to a year imprisonment for building a hideaway 
cupboard in the apartment, in which the Rose brothers and Lortie once hid to 
escape the police. Collette Therrien, Richard Therrien’s sister and Jacques 
Rose’s girlfriend, and Francine Belisle were both sentenced to six months for 
serving as messengers of the Chenier communiqués (“Drama in Quebec; co-
stars in court” 1971). 
  
After the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte, the Chenier cell delivered four 
communiqués before the Liberation cell had the chance to respond. Initially, 
the Liberation cell believed that the kidnapping of James Cross would spur 
the meeting of their demands, however it became evident after the first of the 
Chenier Cell’s communiqués that the Chenier cell was moving beyond the 
Liberation cell’s focus on propaganda. ; the Chenier cell’s main concern was 
economically-focused; the reinstatement of the Lapalme union was critical, 
while the release of imprisoned felquistes was only a secondary demand 
(FLQ manifesto 1970). Although the Chenier Cell adapted to the tactics of the 
Liberation Cell by kidnapping Pierre Laporte, the way that they handled 
negotiations suggests that they were not willing to forego their demands for 
the potential propaganda gain of a flexible negotiating approach (Crelinsten 
1987: 77), unlike the Liberation cell whose central strategy was to change the 
image of the FLQ from a loosely-constructed group of criminals to a 
organized force with a political programme (Crelinsten 1987, 71). 
 
When the Liberation cell did finally respond publicly to the Chenier 
cell’s kidnapping of Laporte, they reiterated their original two demands- the 
release of the prisoners and the cessation of police activity- and promised 
that Cross and Laporte would be freed if the demands were met. The 
communiqué was published on the 11 October. Hours later, the Chenier cell 
communiqué was published, in which they also stood by their original six 
demands (Chenier cell communiqué 1970; Crelinsten 1987, 78). Not only did 
this cause confusion amongst the media and the politicians, it proved a 
schism between the two cells and the FLQ subsequently lost the advantage of 
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appearing as a strong and organized network.  The Chenier Cell released a 
fifth communiqué in which they disassociated themselves from the 
Liberation cell, making the rift between the two cells even more obvious.   
  
The tactics of the Chenier and Liberation cells reflected the way that 
the two cells differed fundamentally. The liberation cell was anxious to take 
action immediately and, therefore, prepared propaganda and publicity 
carefully and set a limited objective. The cell placed their motives within a 
larger international movement of ‘urban guerilla dogma’34 (Crelinsten 1987, 
75).  In contrast, the Chenier cell was attempting to organize a clandestine 
financial arrangement in order to conduct a larger attack at a later date; 
however, because they were panicked at the idea that Operation Liberation 
had occurred without them, they decided spontaneously to participate; their 
kidnapping of Laporte was ill-prepared (Charters 1990) and deemed ‘sloppy’ 
(Crelinsten 1987, 76).  The contradiction of the Chenier cell’s strategic 
philosophy, and their improvisation is important. Where they originally 
believed that bombings and kidnappings were inappropriate to achieve their 
long-term goal for a socialist and independent Quebec, they were now 
willing to adapt a limited tactic in order to stay involved with the FLQ 
movement, but continued to hold their original ideals for a long-term 
movement. While they had originally planned to achieve further financing in 
the US, and thereby expanding the movement across borders, the Chenier 
Cell was instead pressured to work only in Quebec, thus retaining the radical 
space within Quebec boundaries. 
 
On the 13 October, Paul Rose and Jacques Cosette-Trudel met for the 
first time since the beginning of the October Crisis at a friend’s apartment. 
The Canadian army had been dispatched to Ottawa the day before to protect 
important individuals and sites. There was much debate between Rose and 
Cosette-Trudel as to how they would proceed in the event of a government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  “L’image	  qu’on	  a	  du	  FLQ	  c’est	  celle	  des	  bombes…	  Je	  ne	  sais	  pas	  a	  quoi	  
ressemble	  un	  baton	  de	  dynamite.	  Je	  n’en	  ai	  jamais	  vu…	  Pour	  nous,	  le	  FLQ	  c’était	  
nous	  organizer.	  Créer	  une	  organization	  pour	  aider	  et	  soutenir	  les	  luttes	  
populaires	  déja	  existanted.	  Susciter	  d’autres	  volontés	  de	  lutte	  pour	  un	  
changement	  radical	  de	  la	  sociéte	  (Simard	  1982,	  140).	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refusal; they agreed that while Cross’ life would be spared, Laporte’s death 
threat would remain. They also agreed that all communication with 
authorities would be left to the Liberation Cell- who issued a joint 
communiqué the next day on the 14 October articulating that both hostages 
would be freed if demands were met (Crelinsten 1987).  
 
Crelinsten rightly suggests that the dissension between the two cells 
oddly mirrored the divergence between the Federal and Provincial 
governments: ‘the Liberation cell responded to dialogue and negotiation 
with the Quebec government, while the Chenier cell reacted to firmness from 
the Federal government with escalation and intransigence’ (Crelinsten 1987: 
40). These conflicting negotiating tactics occurred due to the differing images 
that the cells wanted to portray and embody. The factionalism informs the 
internal dynamics of the FLQ by highlighting that the organization was 
comprised of differing political ideologies, socio-economic backgrounds, and 
now new tactics, which at times created factions within the larger movement.   
 
At this point in time, before the murder of Pierre Laporte, the shift in 
strategy and tactics employed more symbolism and had certainly gained 
more interest in the FLQ. A higher level of interest in sympathy amongst 
young Quebecois in particular was evident during the press conference, held 
on the 13 October by FLQ intermediary Robert Lemieux at the Paul Sauvé 
Arena. Chartrand, Lemieux, Vallieres and Gagnon spoke to 3,000 FLQ 
sympathizers (Tetley 2007).  During his presentation, Vallieres stated that 
every person there was a felquiste: “The FLQ is each one of you”, and that 
they were to “organize the fight for liberation in each district, plant, in each 
office, everywhere” (Behiels et al 2011). Labor leader Michel Chartrand 
announced that his union executive was ‘unequivocal[ly[ support[ing] the 
FLQ manifesto (Duchaine and Keable Inquiries October Crisis; Charters 1997, 
154; Stewart 1970, 50). Gagnon and Lemieux encouraged students at UQAM, 
the following day, to leave their classes, which spurred the announcement by 
a group of students at UQAM and other Quebec institutions, on the 15 
October, that they would strike until the political prisoners demanded by the 
Liberation cell were released. That same day, Prime Minister Trudeau was 
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interviewed by CBC about the military presence through the War Measures 
Act in Quebec. When asked how far he would go to suppress the militants, 
Trudeau famously responded: ‘just watch me’ (CBC Digital Archives 13 
October 1970). 
 
The FLQ press conference informs this thesis in a series of ways: first, 
it was the climax of public debate. The goal of the Liberation Cell was to 
create propaganda for the FLQ, not to mobilize a popular movement as past 
cells had attempted; this event was the peak of public interest and support, 
especially after Trudeau’s decisive interview earlier that day. This 
demonstration proves that there was popular support for the FLQ, especially 
prior to the murder of Pierre Laporte:  
 
I was very surprised at first but also, like many Quebecois, 
sympathetic toward those who had taken part in the 
kidnappings. I suppose that there was a certain amount of 
romanticism in my reach, but it was more than that. When 
they [the government] were forced to read the FLQ manifesto 
over television, I thought that was quite an achievement,…The 
crisis forced a lot of people to think and this will lead us 
eventually to a transformation of Quebec institutions 
(Normand Caron in “Quebec: what now?” 1971).  
 
Second, this event was conducted by FLQ sympathizers, rather than 
the organization itself, who ‘hijacked’ the image of the FLQ to achieve their 
own means. Despite the attempts of the Liberation and Chenier cells to create 
their own image by communicating through the media, the image of the FLQ 
was still very malleable by second parties. Throughout the 1960s, the FLQ 
has become a ‘brand’ in which actors could form distinct and separate cells; 
in times of conflict, it was easy for outside actors, sympathizers, and even the 
larger populace to also shape the organization. Third, this event was the 
closest the FLQ ever came to spurring an uprising. Charters (1997) is correct 
in suggesting that Vallieres’ call for arms during the press conference was 
potentially revolutionary. Although his speech could have been a ‘potentially 
decisive opportunity for mass action’ (156), Vallieres did not urge the 
sympathizers into the streets and the crowd ‘dispersed quietly and slowly’ 
(Charters 1997, 56).  Although his writing called for radical measures, 
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Vallières was not a revolutionary leader in action. Excluding all other 
conditions that prevented a popular movement in Quebec, the absence of 
violent ambition amongst the members, and leaders, was influential in the 
failure of the FLQ to achieve independence through revolution, the 
dissolution of the larger movement after the October Crisis, and the shaping 
of the radical space in Quebec. 
 
The strong presences by both Trudeau and FLQ sympathizers in the 
press showed a bubbling conflict between state and the FLQ that was about 
to explode. Trudeau kept to his word, and the federal liberal government 
took a heavy-handed approach by implementing the War Measures Act 
(WMA). In 1971, more than 60 men and women awaited trial on a wide 
variety of charges (Lebel 1969), which does not count the hundreds that were 
arrested and released under the WMA. The WMA was contentiously used to 
repress the radical space in Quebec.  
 
 At 16.00 on the 15 October 1970, Premier Robert Bourassa announced 
that he had requested under the terms of the National Defense Act that the 
Federal government send the Canadian army into Quebec in order to assist 
the Sureté du Quebec, and ensure “the safety of the people and public 
buildings” (Premier Bourassa speech, CBC digital archives 15 October 1970). 
Approximately 1000 soldiers arrived in Montreal within the hour, and more 
troops were deployed throughout the week (Tetley 2007).  On the 15 October, 
all three leaders of the opposition parties- the Union Nationale, the Parti 
Quebecois, and the Credit Social- in the National Assembly declared their 
agreement with Bourassa’s decision. On the 16 October 1970, Trudeau 
announced the imposition of the War Measures Act (WMA) after Bourassa 
and Drapeau had made another, separate, request for the application of the 
WMA. Invoked during peace time for the first and only time in Canadian 
history, the WMA declared an ‘insurrection real or apprehended’, and 
allowed for the suspension of habeas corpus, a summons with the force of a 
court order. In the House of Commons, T.C. Douglas objected to the decision 
by stating: “We are not prepared to use the preservation of law and order as 
a smoke screen to destroy the liberties and the freedom of the people of 
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Canada…the government, I submit, is using a sledgehammer to crack a 
peanut” (Gray 2000; Margoshes and Barnhart 2004). René Levesque went as 
far to state ‘Quebec no longer has a government’ in response to the 
provincial government’s request for the WMA. Levesque and Douglas aptly 
articulated the contentiousness that would surround the October Crisis, and 
the governmental response to the kidnappings of Laporte and Cross. While 
the FLQ shifted to a radical strategy so did the government.  
 
 In order to have a better understanding of the October Crisis, I 
highlight the important events now, which have been cross-referenced and 
mapped with secondary sources and newspaper articles. Near midnight on 
the 17th/18th of October 1970, the body of Pierre Laporte was discovered 
strangled in the trunk of a green Chevrolet car at the Wondel Aviation near 
the St-Hubert airport.  Warrants for Marc Carbonneau and Paul Rose were 
issued later that day.  On the 6 November 1970, a police raid on the 
apartment at 3720 chemin de la Reine Marie, in which Bernard Lortie, both 
Rose brothers and Francis Simard were hiding, led to the arrest of Lortie. The 
Rose brothers and Simard escaped by hiding in a specially-designed 
cupboard with a hidden compartment; it was ingeniously built, with the help 
of Richard Therrien, so that it did not sound hollow when knocked upon. 
Lortie, himself, hid in the wrong cupboard out of panic and was 
subsequently found by the raiding authorities (Hazlett 1970) Lortie was 
sentenced to 20 years for the kidnapping and murder of Pierre Laporte. 
Because the police did not leave any surveillance in front of the apartment, 
the three felquistes were able to escape by taxi to Mme Denis Quesnel’s 
residence at 1485 rue Laurier. Claure Larivieres and Yves Roy both assisted 
the felquistes, and were convicted of aiding and abetting, in transferring to a 
barn in Saint-Bonaventure-de-Yamaska. Proving difficult to survive in a barn 
during a cold Quebec winter, Michel Viger, ex-president régional of the RIN, 
collected the Rose brothers from the barn on the 24 of November and took 
them to his house in Grand-Pres in Saint-Luc (Fournier 1984, 323-324).  
 
 On the 2nd of December, the Cossette-Trudels of the Liberation Cell 
were arrested after leaving the apartment at 12:36 at the metro station Henri-
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Bourassa. Knowing that the RCMP were surveying the apartment, a member 
of the Liberation cell threw a communiqué out of the window at 2 o’clock in 
the morning, threatening the death of Cross and requesting a journalist from 
La Devoir or Quebec-Presse, and lawyer Bernard Mergler. At 8 a.m. on the 3 
December, approximately a thousand soldiers and police officers were based 
outside of the apartment building, and Mergler arrived by midday for 
negotiations. In exchange for Cross’ liberty, the members were granted safe 
passage to Cuba (unknown title, Montreal Gazette 1970); by 14.00, Cross, 
Lanctot, and Carbonneau were joined by les Cossettes-Trudels and Suzanne 
Lanctot and her 20 month year old son, and with the approval of Fidel Castro 
were flown to Cuba in Canadian Forces Aircraft at 19.45 hours (Fournier 
1982: 325).  After being held for 59 days, Cross was released from his room 
on Rue des Récollets. Jacques Lanctot spent four years in Cuba, and four 
years in France with the other abductors of James Cross (Fournier 1982, 258). 
Lanctot returned to Quebec in January 1979, and was sentenced to three 
years in prison; he was released in 1981.  The Cossette-Trudels returned to 
Quebec on the 13 December 1978; they were sentenced to two years in prison 
and released after 8 months. The last to return to Quebec was Marc 
Carbonneau in 1981, and he was sentenced to 21 months in prison (Fournier 
1982, 259).  
 
The Liberation cell dissolved after their hideout was found on the 28 
December 1970 by police, and with no assistance from the emergency powers 
of the War Measures Act (Rapoport 1988, 62). The Rose brothers and Simard 
were arrested in a farmhouse near St. Luc, during the third raid of Viger’s 
residence: armed with a single-shot shotgun and a starter’s pistol with a clip 
of 0.22 calibre bullets, and hidden in a 25 foot-long, 4 foot-high dugout under 
the house, the three felquistes refused to negotiate with the Quebec 
government’s proposed mediator, publisher Jacques Hebert, president of the 
Montreal Human Rights League. Both sides agreed to Dr. Jacques Ferron as 
the chosen mediator; Ferron was president of the Canadian Peace Congress 
in 1954 (Faron in Cohen et al. 1996) and founder of the serio-satirical 
Rhinoceros Party in 1963, which suggested with tongue-in-cheek that 
national unity could be achieved by tearing down the Rocky Mountains 
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(Remple 1973). Ferron was an ironic character that seemed to fit the motives 
of both parties; his left-wing ideology- he was a self-proclaimed socialist- and 
literature that portrays the uneasy relationship between Quebec and English-
Canada35 would have been considered beneficial to the Chenier cell 
members. All three were patients of Ferron and had worked with him in the 
political sphere. Equally appealing for the government, Ferron’s literature 
consistently articulated a concern for Canada’s French-speaking population, 
which was very much aligned with Trudeau’s bilingual policies. In other 
words, the irony of Ferron’s experiences as president of the Peace Congress, 
military doctor and advocate of a peaceful state and sub-state relationship, 
yet founder of the satirical Rhinoceros party and left-wing activist made him 
trust-worthy to both the government and the felquistes as mediator.  
  
Paul Rose and Francis Simard were convicted of the murder of Pierre 
Laporte and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment each. Both were 
given conditional release and granted parole in 1982- Simard in September 
and Rose in December. Jacques Rose was convicted of being an accessory 
after four trials for complicity in the death of Laporte, and was freed 
conditionally in July 1978. Michel Viger also served eight years for 
complicity, and housing the felquistes; he was also freed conditionally in July 
1978. Other individuals were sentenced to six to nine months for aiding the 
Chenier Cell felquistes, by housing them or carrying out services for them. 
These FLQ supporters include: Francine Belisle and Collette Therrien, 
partners to the Rose brothers (“Un Communiqué a disparu à L’U. de M.” 
1970); Lisa Rose, mother to the Rose brothers; Normand Roy, who helped 
transfer the Rose brothers and Simard to the barn hideaway; Francois Belisle, 
who delivered communiqués for the Chenier Cell; and Robert Dupuis, who 
was sentenced to two years imprisonment but was freed conditionally after a 
year for putting Viger and Rose brothers in contact for housing. Therrien was 
sentenced to a year imprisonment for his assistance in building the cupboard 
with the hideaway compartment that the Rose brothers and Simard used to 
escape arrest. Therrien became a Quebec judge, but was dismissed in 2001 
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  Les	  Roses	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for having concealed his involvement with the FLQ (‘Supreme court rules 
against judge with FLQ past’ 2001). In 1982, Simard wrote of the murder: 
‘Pierre Laporte a été tué. Sa mort n’a pas été accidentelle. Dire cela, ca ne 
veut pas dire que sa mort a été voulue36 (193). After Rose was freed in 1987, 
many felquistes were pardoned of their violent activities.  
 
The focus of this section was to introduce the FLQ cells of the late 
1960s and into the 1970s. Tactics became more innovative and action became 
more violent with a higher level of insurgency. By studying the actor 
constitution, the cell structure, and the innovative action, I was able to 
distinguish the differences between the cells and how their interactions 
affected the radical space in Quebec. The cells radicalized and shifted to 
strategy that was more ‘timely’. The kidnapping and plane hijackings, two 
tactics that were being used within the global decolonization movement, 
brought local and international attention to the FLQ. When the FLQ 
attempted strategy that involved injury or death, however, the populace 
responded very negatively, thus, shaping the radical space. By pardoning all 
felquistes of their criminal records in the late 1980s allowed the individuals 
to return to society and participate in the peaceful electoral system as 




While the Quebec provincial government, Canadian federal government and 
the provincial judicial systems attempted to crack down on extremism with 
harsh sentences and the WMA, the French government, and specifically the 
minister of Interior Charles Pasqua, in the late 1980s also attempted to use 
repression to control the violence. When Francois Mitterand was re-elected in 
1988 and appointed Pierre Joxe as interior minister, the socialist government 
responded to the support of the FLNC and attempted a new approach of 
discussion.  The increased repression of 1986-1988, as discussed in this 
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  was	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  it	  doesn’t	  
mean	  that	  his	  death	  was	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  Translated	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section, is included in this chapter to show the shift in approaches by the two 
French ministers, and how the authoritative approaches influenced the 
scission of the FLNC into two factions, and thus affecting the radical space in 
Corsica.  
 
At the beginning of the third moment, Charles Pasqua, appointed as 
minster of the interior for Corsica in 1986, intensified his predecessor’s 
program of repression against the extremists. On 16 June 1986, Pasqua stated 
that to combat the FLNC, it was necessary to “terrorizer les terrorists37” 
(Rochiccioli 2010). Pasqua stated earlier in April that there was no need for 
extremism as there were mediums of expression through freedom of the 
press, freedom of reunion, and freedom of association (Charles Pasqua, 
ministre de l’interieur, France 24); soon thereafter, ironically, the editor of FR3, 
Sampiera Sanguinetti, was fired and two journalists were transferred to the 
continent (Crettiez 1999) after writing and publishing articles that were pro-
Corsican. This event suggests that the Corsicans did not have complete 
access to the freedoms that Pasqua discussed in April of that year; they were 
still managed by the state.  
 
 The state proceeded to further the program of repression through a 
series of arrests during the year of 1987: on the 4 March, 23 FLNC members 
were arrested in Porto-Vecchio and approximately 20 in Fiumorbu; On the 8 
May, 30 extremists were arrested in the region of Gruzzini; and on the 1st 
October, Yves Stella, Leo Battesti and Antoine Verdi, members of the 
direction, were arrested in the offices of U Ribombu in Bastia, and 10 more 
extremists were arrested in Corté in November (Crettiez 1999). The militants 
predicted that the repression was to occur as a response to to the upcoming 
presidential election of 1988; on February 1987, the FLNC wrote in the 
bulletin interne for members to note that for 6 or 7 months, the state and 
police forces would use much more repressive means until the election 
(“Réflexions de secteur P”, Bulletin Interne de FLNC). As the government 
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became more repressive of both the peaceful and violent nationalists, the 
FLNC radicalized.  
 
After Francois Mitterrand was re-elected and hired Pierre Joxe as the 
new interior minister, the FLNC announced a 120 day cease-fire on the 31 
May 1988. When announcing the decision of the organization, Pierre Pogioli 
stated:  ‘la balle est dans le camp des socialistes’, ‘the ball is now in the 
socialists’ camp’ (Poggioli 1996: 69). In response, Paul Joxe, new minister of 
the interior, met with the Cuncolta on the 21 July, and continued to visit 
Corsica during the late 1980s (Crettiez 1999; Quinio and Hassoux 2001).  For 
Pierre Joxe, Corsica was considered the ‘only insular region of France’; this 
notion that Corsica was distinct from the rest of the Republic would further 
shape discussion around the Corsican Question and lessen the state 
repression greatly. 
 
On the 22 August 1989, the final three imprisoned FLNC militants 
who were considered ‘political prisoners’ were liberated by the state. Since 
the ceasefire of 1987, 52 militants were released, thus supporting the new 
approach by Joxe and proving a willingness to treat Corsica as an entity with 
a different identity. This approach contrasts the usual tripartite model of 
French policy. While the UPC openly negotiated with the state, certain 
members of the FLNC continued to question the sub-state and state 
relationship despite the attempts of Joxe and the government. Others, such as 
Poggioli, felt that violence was no longer necessary to achieve political 
representation. On the 24 October 1989, Pierre Poggioli announced his 
departure from the FLNC to create the Accolta Naziunale Corsa (ANC), a 
political space without militarism and violence of the FLNC; he was voted 
into the territorial assembly that year. Subsequently, a year later, the 
Cuncolta dissolved after the departure of Alain Orsoni and the Mouvement 
pour l’autodetermination (MPA) was created as a political arm of the FLNC 
canal habituel. Interactions with the government and the loss of key militants 
created tension within the FLNC that would soon grow to outright conflict.  
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A deep division amongst the FLNC began to occur during the year 
1990. While the branch in Ajaccio chose to negotiate with the state and 
insisted on continuing a dialogue with Joxe, the sector ‘Gravona’ of Bastian 
extremists refused to negotiate and formulated a militaristic strategy for the 
front. In November 1990, the sector ‘V’ in Ajaccio, led by Alain Orsoni, quit 
the direction of the FLNC to form the FLNC canal habituel, taking the 
authentication code for the press with him. In opposition, the sectors G and 
certain groups in Bastia and Balagne formed the FLNC canal historique 
(Crettiez 1999). The rest of the canals became inactive.   
 
The result of this scission between FLNC factions was an arms race; it 
became important to reinforce a militaristic advantage on the island. As 
Poggioli rightly noted: ‘during this era, there was finally a peaceful option 
and therefore the FLNC networks became competitive to gain arms, 
supporters and territory” (Poggioli interview 2014).  The furthered violence 
and militarized tactics influenced previous members of the direction, such as 
Yves Stella and Leo Battesti, to leave the FLNC and the increased violence 
came close to mafia and banditry. Yves Stella subsequently joined the MPA 
and pursued nationalism through peacefully political measures; he also 
became editor of the MPA’s journal Paese until 1992 (Corsica infurmazione, 
2014).  
 
Recruitment after 1990 was hasty, and targeted disassociated youth 
who were hardly political in comparison to their contemporaries; this led to 
the organization of several small violent sub-sects to the different FLNC 
networks that were minimally controlled and very active. Crettiez noted 
between 148 and 216 violent attacks between 1989 and 1990, and most were 
still focused on symbols of colonialism; in 1992 alone, 333 attacks occurred 
with 260 gun attacks and 40 homicides (Crettiez 1999).  
 
While Crettiez (1999) states that the average age of presumed 
members of the FLNC between 1985-1989 was 32.3 years old, membership 
during the 1990s was younger, estimated between 15-25 (Tafani 1996). Pierre 
Poggioli described a surge of youth having joined the FLNC during the early 
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1990s who had little to no knowledge of the nationalist culture. Poggioli 
states: “What is even more worrying is how the young and depoliticized 
militants within the clandestine structures, galvanized during the Borgo 
press conference of 1990 and subject to the pressure of ‘crazy killers’ who are 
profiting from the antidrug campaign, are climbing the ranks of the 
organization” (Poggioli 1996, 175)38. The FLNC created a community of 
belonging for youth that offered an identity of militancy in an anti-colonialist 
army; this new, younger actor was of similar age to many of the FLQ 
members.   
 
The use of media encouraged recruitment to the FLNC canals. While 
the members of the 1990s were younger than the previous moments and 
between the ages of 15-25, the FLQ members were generally older than the 
previous moments; this was true of the Liberation Cell partially due to 
Jacques Lanctot having aged since his membership in the first moment and 
being particularly involved in recruiting his sister and her partner Louise 
Lanctot and Jacques Cossette-Trudel. The members of the Geoffroy cell were 
in their mid-20s, and the Chenier cell aged between the ages of 19 and 26.  
The cells of the third moment were comprised of members who had been 
active in the nationalist movement during the second and/or first moments, 
and had simply aged since their involvement in the university and working 
protest movements; while younger FLNC members were targeted for 
recruitment and responded to the higher insurgency of violence.   
 
With the factions, splits, and development of new cells and sub-
groups, it is difficult to decipher the amount of active members; however, it 
was clear that approximately 500 to 600 individuals were present at the press 
conference in 1996 (FR3 Corse 1996). Similarly to the other ‘moments’, and 
the third moment of the FLQ, new members were recruited by friends and 
family. Personal connections were always the most reliable links amongst the 
FLNC; however, the divisions of the 1990s influenced a scramble to recruit 
new members, encouraging the recruitment of younger, masculine 
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individuals. These new networks were loosely-organized and considered 
their existence legitimized by repression, but also offered a space of 
belonging; in the 1990s, the FLNC was as much an inclusive space for the 
disassociated and depoliticized youth as it was a space for the militarist 
nationalists of the past.  
 
While it could be convenient to suggest that there was a tripartite 
structure in Corsica in the 1990s, in which the canal historique encompassed 
the North, the Canal habituel the South and the Resistenza in Ajaccio and 
Corte, there were also smaller cell-like groups that separated further. Cells 
were as small as ten members and as large as networks of over one hundred 
militants. While Le Devoir merged all violence under the umbrella term of the 
FLNC, Crettiez maps 26 clandestine organizations between 1989 and 199639. 
 
With factions came alliances; the MPA was known to be closely in 
communication with the Canal habituel (Chemin 2012), which would make 
MPA members targets of the Canal historique, the Cuncolta and those loyal 
to Francois Santoni (Chemin 2012).  
 
The scission between the two factions and the competition that 
erupted as a result also changed the focus and orientation of the 
organizations; respect for the environment, defense of a rural Corsica and 
equality were no longer prominent issues and became less and less 
important as demands, nor did they influence the targets. For example, the 
development on the coasts for tourism, mainly French-owned and originally 
targeted as a symbol of French power, were less targeted as the factions 
received financial support from owners and promoters in return for the 
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  Groups	  included:	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(appeared	  shortly	  in	  1983),	  Brigades	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  Corses	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1982),	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  corses,	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  Organisation	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  forces	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  1976),	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  CPE,	  Fronte	  Ribellu	  (Crettiez	  1999,	  128).	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safety of themselves and their buildings (Crettiez 1999).  The MPA, 
especially, focused less on independence and more on economic 
development (Lefevre 1996). 
 
After the scission, the canal historique began to wear red and white 
clothing that resembled the ‘corps d’élite’ of the national police.  Just as the 
FLQ invoked symbolism during the October Crisis by comparing themselves 
to the Patriotes in the Rebellion of 1837, the Canal historique implied that by 
wearing the clothing of the French national police they were taking on a 
similar role for Corsica; the comparison suggested that they were serving the 
safety and the well-being of the Corsican populace.  Strategy also required 
modern arms; during the press conference of the 11 January 1996, the FLNC- 
canal historique displayed several new guns alongside modern 
communication technology and miniature scanners: Jericho Israeli pistols, 
Austrian Glock, two Galil guns, several Uzi, Heckler und kauch guns, famas, 
and the M16 (Crettiez 1999). This press conference had approximately 600 
members present, and was organized hours before the arrival of Jean-Louis 
Debré, new Minister of the Interior.  The press conference was to announce a 
three month cease-fire, to ‘be conciliatory with the government’ and to send 
a message to the FLNC-canal habituel of its strength after the violence of 
1995 (Benhamou 1996a).  The violence of the FLNC-canal historique and 
FLNC-canal habituel during the early 1990s was more to impress the other 
FLNC faction and to maintain an appearance of unifying members against 
the state.  
 
Further, the scission of 1990 decentralized the finances of the FLNC, 
allowing an autonomy of each group and cell. Similarly to the cells in the 
FLQ, the groups were in charge of their own finances; in Corsica, this quickly 
became an arms race between factions. The Canal-historique focused on the 
industrial and commercial sector by extortion of funds, and fictitious 
employment for militants. For example, certain members of the Cunculta 
bought Bastia Securita in the early 1990s and employed exclusively 
nationalist militants; as a monopolistic industry in Haute-Corse, Bastia 
Securita ensured a financial arrangement for the Canal-historique (Crettiez 
	   159	  
1999). The liberation newspaper wrote in 1996 that between 1990 and 1993, 
the Canal historique bought 3 millions francs in arms (Benhamou 1996b). The 
stewards of the Football Club in Bastia were also composed of nationalists 
that were close to the canal historique. In 1996, Robert Sozzi, militant of the 
FLNC historique, denounced the collusion between the clandestine group 
and the neo-clan and was subsequently murdered. The FLNC-Canal habituel 
attacked revenues of the tourism sector instead, such as bars, restaurants, 
clubs and casinos.  The protection of infrastructure and individuals in return 
for funding harks back to the clan system in which the ‘clients’ awarded their 
vote to a candidate in return for social protection. As an arms race 
developed, financing became particularly important and extortion was 
rampant. 
 
  In 1995, the competition developed into a fratricidal war, which 
resulted in several attacks on nationalists, and dozen of deaths. Six deaths 
were amongst the ‘Mouvement pour l’Autodetermination’40 (MPA) and the 
FLNC-Canal Habituel;  8 amongst its rival organizations the Cuncolta 
Naziunalista, the FLNC-Canal historique; and one member of the Accolta 
Nazionalista Corsa (ANC) was killed (Lefevre 1996). Pierre Albertini, an 
important member of the MPA, was assassinated in August 1995 (Benhamou 
1996c).  Leaders of nationalist organizations responded to the violence by 
denouncing the ‘vicious yob rule’, thus articulating a frustration with the 
violence when there were peaceful left-wing groups to support nationalism; 
Alain Orsoni, secretary general of the MPA called for dissolution of the 
Canal habituel, but the initiative was very much contested. One militant 
argued that it would be ridiculous to dissolve the Canal habituel when the 
Canal historique was still active. At the end of the two day MPA congress of 
150 members in Ajaccio in March 1996, 45 voted for the continuation of the 
Canal habituel and 90 voted for its dissolution. Alain Orsoni was not present 
due to the lack of security as there had been threats on his life since the 
fratricide war of 1995 (Benhamou 1996c).  
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  Translated	  by	  author	  as:	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  for	  self-­‐determination	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The intensity of the violence during the early to mid 1990s responded 
directly to the divisive changes of the organization of the networks; the 
factions, their finances, materialism, and competition became more 
important than the demands of the original FLNC and the ideal of 
independence. Nationalism was still cited as the inspiration, but almost in a 
mythical context.  The government attempted an approach of negotiation 
with the FLNC, which encouraged many to give up violence either 
temporarily during a cease-fire or permanently; however the approach also 
created conflict within the FLNC when certain canals continued to meet for 
discussion while others created new militaristic programs. While the 
violence responded directly to the divisive changes after the scission, it is 
interesting to note that the original conflicts were spurred by interactions 
with the government. Thus, while attempting to diminish the violence in 
Corsica, Joxe accidentally spurred an increase in insurgency and the 
development of a radical space.  
 
In December 1996, two leaders of the FLNC-Canal historique, Francois 
Santoni and Jean-Michel Rossi, were arrested. In June, a series of militants 
quit the official organization A Cuncolta in support of leader Jean Biancucci. 
Santoni’s place of leadership in the FLNC became a contest for succession 
between Bati Cononici and Marcel Lorenzoni. Lorenzoni, however, was a 
known critic of the Cuncolta and the institutional engagement of the 
network. By September 1996, the FLNC-Canal historique was in crisis 
(Benhamou 1998).  On the 6 February 1998, prefect Claude Erignac was 
assassinated at 21.00 on his way to the theatre Kallisté to meet his wife for a 
classical music concert. Erignac was shot in the back three times by a caliber 
9 mm Beretta pistol. The gun was stolen in 1997 from the gendarmerie in 
Pietrosella near Ajaccio (“Il ya 15 ans, le préfet Erignac ëtait assassiné à 
Ajaccio” 2013).  
 
On 9 February, an anonymous group took responsibility for the 
assassination. On 2 January, Marcel Lorenzoni officially separated from the 
Cuncolta to create le Collectif pour la nation; it was under the pressure of 
another faction within the FLNC-Canal historique that they held a press 
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conference on the 25 January to proclaim an end to the cease-fire (Benhamou 
1998). At no point did the FLNC claim responsibility for the shooting 
(Benhamou 1998). Yves Colonna, a former shepherd, was captured in a 
shepherd’s hut in Porto Pollo in 2003 and was tried as assassin and found 
guilty, but was retried after the original sentence was overturned on a minor 
procedural error in 2010 (“France Corsica: Eignac killer Colonna to stay in 
jail” 2011).   Although the murder was never proven in court to be an act by 
the FLNC, it became well considered amongst the media and on the island 
that the FLNC had played a part, which resulted in a negative public 
response.  
 
The 1990s in Corsica saw an extreme shaping of the radical space. 
While many key members of the FLNC left the space to pursue nationalism 
peacefully and canals became inactive, the factions that continued intensified 
and young members were recruited to occupy the radical space and take the 
place of the past members. Similarly to the FLQ, the assassination of Erignac 
created negative press and feelings towards the FLNC. Although 
assassinations and murders had occurred before; this was high-profile. The 
negative response resulted in a further shaping of the radical space as many 
sympathetic turned to the growing political parties and the electoral system. 
The FLNC that did continue was altogether different from the previous two 
moments and the movement of the past; worries about the environment, 
language and culture were replaced with worries about finance, arms and 




This chapter compared membership, the innovative action (strategy and 
tactics) and the ideologies of the FLQ cells and the FLNC networks. 
Polarization and RFE, in the form of interactions with the governments, was 
also discussed throughout the chapter and will be compared further in this 
section. For the ease of the reader, I have divided the conclusion into sub-
sections. While some information is certainly repeated from earlier in the 
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chapter, it allows for a concrete comparison of the networks of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s in Quebec and late 1980s and early 1990s in Corsica; this 
comparison will further inform the final concluding chapter. 
 
Membership in the FLQ in the 1970s was formed due to close ties; the 
Liberation and Chenier cells were comprised of family members and friends. 
All actors had participated in left-wing activism in Quebec prior to their 
participation in FLQ activity. In the Liberation Cell, Jacques Lanctot recruited 
his sister, Louise Lanctot, and her partner Jacques Cossette-Trudel. Even 
Nigel Barry Hamer, the only Anglophone of the FLQ cells (Tetley 2006), 
might seem like an oddity amongst the strong relationship ties of the other 
actors, but was in fact a friend of Cossette-Trudel (Fournier 1982, 258).  
Affiliates of the cells were often partners or family members, as well. In the 
Liberation cell, Denise Quesnel, a friend of Louise Lanctot, was charged with 
illegal affiliation with the FLQ for allowing Lanctot and Jacques Cossette-
Trudel to stay with her while participating in felquiste activity (Fournier 
1982, 57).  
 
The Chenier cell was similar in the sense that the cell was comprised 
of the Rose brothers and their friends; Francis Simard even travelled on a 
holiday with the brothers and their mother. Bernard Lortie met the brothers 
in the summer of 1969 at the Maison des Pecheurs. Again, friends and 
partners were also charged for illegal affiliation with the cell; they chose, or 
felt an obligation, to support or collaborate with FLQ members, but did not 
consider themselves a member, nor had they participated in the violent 
activity. Jacques Rose’s girlfriend, Collette Therrien, (Montreal Star 1970) 
ordered wood to build a cupboard for a secret hideaway, delivered 
communiqués, and opened a safety deposit box in a Côte des Neiges district 
bank for ‘important papers’. She was also present during the police raid on 
the 6 November, in which she assisted Jacques and Paul Rose and Francis 
Simard to hide in the cupboard. Therrien was not a member of the FLQ and 
had no knowledge of the cell’s plans, but assisted the Chenier cell with small 
tasks due to her relationship with Jacques Rose. In the courts, collaborators 
of FLQ activity were viewed as members of a centralized organization and 
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were often charged for their participation; Therrien was charged as an 
accessory to the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte.  
 
Stohl and Stohl (2007) hypothesize that ties of friendship and 
acquaintance can form the bedrock of a resilient network, and are often 
strong ties that appear to be weak (101-102). These collaborators might seem 
weak as they were not financially responsible to the cell, nor were there 
violent consequences or threats when detaching from the network; these ties 
of friendship and family were emotionally involved and, in reality, created 
the strongest ties within the network. Weak ties between the Chenier and 
Liberation cells were kept at a minimum as it reduced visibility of the 
network and a chance for information to leak out of the network (Krebs 1994, 
48), however, this created a much looser and less-established network that 
limited the activity of the cells, the communication between them, and the 
ability to gain funding (Arquila and Ronfledt 2001) thereby making the 
network less active and less radical.   
 
FLNC Membership is even less known during the early 1990s, as 
popular FLNC leaders quit in contestation of the increase in violence for a 
peacefully democratic movement that was gaining ground in Corsica. While 
the FLQ in this chapter formed small and tight cells with friends and family 
ties, the FLNC was forced to mobilize younger and more radical members. 
While the FLNC network of the 70s and 80s was strict about mobilizing new 
members that were considered neighbours and friends, or at least well 
known to both the canal and the direction, the FLNC canals after the split did 
not have the liberty to be so choosy. A race for membership and arms meant 
that both FLNC canals embraced many new radical members between the 
ages of 15-25 (Tafani 1996) who no longer had the nationalist perspective of 
their fore-fathers. While the FLQ held strong ties, but a less-established 
network, the FLNC during this chapter began to loosen their ties. Despite the 
scission de 1990, the network prior and the canals afterwards maintained an 
established network that was able to continue a higher level of insurgency, 
and continued to collect funding.  
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Innovative Action 
 
While both the FLQ and the FLNC were becoming more violent and 
employing tactics such as kidnapping, they also increased the theatricality as 
part of their strategy. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) suggest that 
contentious repertoires are claim-making routines available to actors and 
identities. The FLNC always staged their press conferences similarly, as a 
ritual. The leaders sat at a table, separating themselves from the media as 
politicians would during a political press conference; the other militants 
stood behind them clutching weapons as a show of force. All were solemnly 
masked. A Corsican flag was almost always shown to symbolize and 
represent nationalism. These press conferences allowed the members to 
participate and celebrate the unity of the group and the symbolic death of the 
state, comparable to religious rites. Although the staging of the press 
conference made it appear to be a symbolic ritual of violence in the form of a 
religiously prescribed ceremony, it in fact encompasses a legitimate and 
democratically political space. Instead of violent acts to get their messages 
across, the members exercised their freedoms by sharing their demands with 
the press, assuring the state that they represent the Corsican populace. 
 
While the press conferences of the FLNC over the decades displayed a 
modernization of arms, the staging continued to remain relatively the same; 
the choreography attempted to reinforce a ‘messianic’ symbol. The 
conference acted as publicity for recruitment, support, and a warning to the 
state; and attempted to create a sense of nationalism and unity (Poggioli 
interview). Finally, these conferences ultimately overlapped the radical space 
of the clandestine community and the peaceful political space.  
 
In contrast, the Chenier cell decorated the FLQ manifesto with the 
colours of the flag of the Patriotes, and a watermarked silhouette of la vieux 
Patriote; this imagery attempted to glorify the FLQ by comparing itself and 
its plight to the 1837 rebellion (Communiqués FLQ 1970).   Similarly, the 
communiqués connected the radical space in Quebec to the peaceful 
sociopolitical space by peacefully discussing the ideology and demands of 
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the network. While the FLNC chose to display its strength and numbers 
behind masks, lending a mystique to the balaclavas and the clandestinity of 
the movement, the FLQ was not large or strong enough to show off their 
small cells; instead, they used their absence to create a similar mysticism. 
While viewers in Corsica could be astounded by the participation of the 
FLNC, viewers in Quebec and Canada were terrified by the unlimited 
possibilities of cells, networks and members. 
 
While the FLNC used theatricality with the modern press through 
televised press conferences as a means to communicate with the populace, 
recruit and show power and strength, the Liberation and Chenier cells of the 
FLQ used written communiqués as a means to communicate their demands 
not only to the populace, but also to the state. While there was much more 
discourse between FLNC canals and the state due to their connections with 
the democratic nationalists, the FLQ only had the media in order to 
communicate their needs, demands, and philosophy. Negotiating publicly 
maximized publicity for its political goals, but also encouraged the state to 
crack down harder on the violence as a show of strength to the populace.  
 
The FLQ used the media to interact with the government, forcing 
them to make their interactions and discussion public. While the publication 
of the FLQ demands on both television and radio was considered a win for 
the FLNC, and Quebecois in general, the publicity of the FLQ and the FLNC 
demands highlighted the amateurism of the two cells and created confusion. 
While the Liberation Cell would send a communiqué with certain demands, 
the Chenier Cell would send another with contradictory demands. 
Ultimately, the public interactions with the government worked against the 
‘brand’ of the FLQ, their attempt for mysticism, and proved to the world that 
the FLQ was exactly what the government suspected: a ragtag ‘network’ of 
radical youths, rather than a strong and organized network.  
 
In Corsica, the arrival of Pierre Joxe, the new minister of Interior, 
brought with him a peaceful option of government interaction and 
discussion that the nationalists had never experienced before. While the 
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branch in Ajaccio insisted on negotiating with Joxe and the state, the 
‘Gravona’ sector of Bastia and surrounding areas preferred to militarize 
further, which added to the other tensions in the FLNC and led to the 
scission (Crettiez 1999). Similarly to the FLQ, interactions with the 
government became a mechanism for the downfall and disintegration of the 




While the FLQ cells of the late 1960s and early 1970s held a postcolonialist 
perspective and articulated Marxist demands, the Chenier cell articulated a 
frustration with ‘les big bosses’, an elite English-speaking bourgeoisie, and 
the French politicians that ‘conspired’ with them (Manifeste de FLQ 1970).  
 
The FLNC, on the other hand, lost their focus on nationalism and the 
demands surrounding the protection of culture and environment as they lost 
leaders such as Poggioli, who quit to form the ANC, and Orsoni, who left to 
join the MPA; both important figures felt that political representation was 
now possible to acquire peacefully. In the past, violence was very much 
intertwined with politics in Corsica, but the 1990s proved a frustration with 
the violence in all social spheres. Economic development became a focus by 
all over independence. In both Corsica and Quebec, economic frustrations 
influenced the need for further representation politically. The tactics of the 
FLNC in the 1990s no longer embodied the cultural frames that best 
highlighted the group’s motives for actions, as discussed by Taylor and Van 
Dyke (2004), as the canals morphed into an arms race and a different type of 
warfare.  
 
While society was initially radicalizing during the late 1960s in 
Quebec, the October Crisis brought any interest of revolution and violent 
extremism to a halt. Comparatively in Corsica during the 1990s, the populace 
became increasingly uninterested in the FLNC and the criminality that was 
rampant on the island. The further the FLQ and the FLNC radicalized, the 
further the canals and cells distanced themselves from the peaceful political 
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movements proving a negative RFE. Many members ‘jumped ship’ and 
crossed over into the peaceful political space to pursue nationalism through 
peacefully democratic means.  
 
This chapter explored a disintegration of the FLQ, and the traditional 
FLNC into two competing factions, as well as a shift in strategy by the 
governments and policing bodies. The conclusion chapter looks further at 
why the FLQ did not reform new cells after the October Crisis and why the 
FLNC morphed into a different type of militarism in Corsica. What is truly 
important to note here is the shifting of strategies by the governments and 
policing bodies, the popular frustrations in both Corsica and France towards 
the violent tactics, and the increased popularity and access to peaceful 
nationalist and left-wing groups. In both cases, the radical space changed 
extensively as workers movements and protests occupied the space in 
Quebec after the October Crisis, and younger radical members of the FLNC 
canal habituel and canal historique pursued an arms race and violent action 
without the cultural and national persepective. In both cases, the FLQ and 
the FLNC sought to, and failed to, extend the radical spaces in Quebec and 
Corsica.   
 
“Je ne regrette rien et ne renie rien. Comment regretter ou renier toute une partie de 
ma vie, tout ce qui fait qu’aujourd’hui je suis ce que je suis”(Lanctot 1981, 21) 
 
 
	    




This thesis has three important aims: first, the thesis has argued that 
the FLQ and the FLNC sub-state violent contention can be understood by 
their members’ aim to extend radical space. While the groups were able to 
maintain and/or extend radical space at certain points, public support was 
often undermined by radical activity. Ultimately, the FLQ and the FLNC 
failed in sustaining the extension of ideological radical space, but Radical 
Flank Effect (RFE) proves that the substate violent contention turned 
nationalist and radical support to the moderate political parties, who in turn 
extended radical space by holding referendums for independence.   
 
Second, this argument drew on contentious politics and social 
movement literature, which it combined with RFE to answer the central 
question:  what explains the contrasting patterns of sub-state violent 
contention in Quebec and Corsica. Finally, to provide and map an analytical 
account of the FLQ and the FLNC. Using newly released Canadian policing 
records and documentation, this thesis was able to clearly map the 
interactions between individual felquistes and cells. Transcripts of court 
cases were cross-referenced with RCMP documentation, primary accounts, 
and other archival data.  
 
The comparison of the FLQ and the FLNC necessitated a contrast of 
many elements: global vs local influences, sub-state vs state, crime and 
reform, cultural influences, history of violence, and different time periods. By 
examining the FLQ and the FLNC as networks of actors that sought to 
extend space, all of these elements were included in, or affected, the analysis. 
I have begun to unpack the effect of radical space on sub-state violent 
contention within democratic regimes as a way to understand the use of 
scripts, processes and repertoires by violent extremists. The continued 
mobilization and radicalization, after the dissolution of several cells, until a 
turning point suggests a larger sociopolitical challenge that is discussed 
further in this chapter.    




The main empirical findings are specific to the empirical chapters, 4-6. This 
section will synthesize the empirical findings to answer the two research 
questions of this thesis:  
What explains the often-contrasting patterns of sub-state violent contention in 
Quebec and Corsica? 
 
The empirical chapters offer answers to the thesis question, where one can 
most easily note the patterns that develop. The two groups shared an arc of 
mobilization: initial mobilization, radicalization and use of even more violent 
tactics, then a tipping point and the disintegration of violent activity. I will, 
however, condense the chapters into a single response here.  
 
This thesis used RFE as a tool to contrast sub-state violent contention 
in Quebec and Corsica. RFE requires that groups are separate and distinct, 
and were distinguishable in the eyes of the external actors, the populace, 
state and sub-state governments. As articulated throughout the empirical 
chapters, the FLQ was quite distinct from the constitutional Parti Québécois 
(PQ). The PQ condemned the violence of the FLQ, and the FLQ equally 
complained in the FLQ manifesto of 1970 of the ‘bourgeoisie’ presence in the 
PQ; they particularly singled out René Levesque. Although certain actors in 
the FLNC were active in both the violent and constitutional movements, the 
two movements were distinct from one another; the FLNC equally 
articulated a frustration with the ARC-turned-APC, who the FLNC accused 
of serving the interests of the bourgeoisie.  
 
Since RFE, however, did not explicitly consider the levels of strategic 
interaction within the movement (Alimi et al. 2012), then internal dynamics 
needed to be studied. The empirical chapters, therefore, focused on four key 
elements of contrast: membership, ideology, network structure and strategy. 
RFE, supplemented with strategic and internal factors, helped to understand 
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the contrast and patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and 
Corsica.  
 
The constitution of actors and/or members affected the course and the 
outcome of the mobilization process (McAdam et al. 2001). The membership 
of the FLQ changed as each new cell was formed; generally actors were left-
wing students or workers from East Montreal who were disaffected by 
capitalism and the electoral system. The exception was, of course, the ARQ 
that was led by three ex-military who were frustrated with the absence of 
French language within the military. FLNC membership, in contrast, 
generally stayed constant until the scission de 1990 as there were several key 
figures that were active throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Friends and trusted 
neighbours were recruited, and each canal had an element of autonomy, but 
were overseen by the direction, la Cunculta. Members were of different 
profiles, but always considered themselves ‘Corsican’. Actors, as in theatre, 
manipulate, modify and reinterpret their identity of contention (McAdam et 
al 2001: 24), and it was found in this study that the profiles of the FLQ and 
FLNC members developed a pattern of violent contention that they hoped 
affected the radical ideological space.  
 
 Both the FLQ and the FLNC subscribed to Marxism and post-
colonialism. While the FLQ cells differed in ideology depending on the 
membership, the members sought to extend radical space in order to combat 
what they termed ‘the Anglosaxon colonial power’. While the personal 
ideologies of the members spread across the left of the political spectrum, the 
manifestoes and political publications described the average felquiste as an 
‘urban revolutionary’, and subscribing to Vallières and Fanon’s manifestoes. 
The FLNC, in contrast, embraced Mao and agrarian reform. While the FLQ 
pursued economic and political reform, the FLNC placed a greater 
importance on land and culture. These differences in ideology were key 
contrasts between the violent contention in Quebec and Corsica.  
  
The network structures were influenced by the sociopolitical 
environments and radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica. While the FLQ had 
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hopes for revolution, the urban guerilla tactics were tailored to the 
sociopolitical environment in Quebec. They understood that if they had 
attempted different tactics (further bodily harm), the populace would not 
have supported the violence. The cell-like structure was influenced by the 
limited numbers of actors that did not have the man-power or resources to 
employ further tactics, as will be discussed next, but they also organized in 
small cells to avoid detention by the state. The FLNC had more members, 
and was able to develop a regional network structure that encompassed the 
island with more violent tactics. While the FLNC opposed the clan system in 
Corsica, the network took advantage of the system and organized around 
family and clan ties.  
 
Social, political and economic processes constrain the tactical options 
available to social movements. Tactics are adopted due to their efficiency as a 
way to resonate the beliefs, ideas and cultural frames (Darnovsky et al 1995). 
Taylor and Van Duke (2004) conclude that actors choose amongst tactical 
repertoires for those that best conform to their ideologies and collective 
identities, and embody the cultural frames that best highlight the group’s 
motives for action (277). The FLQ and the FLNC subscribed to popular 
violent performances amongst international decolonization and nationalist 
movements; bombings, hijackings and assassinations were part of the protest 
culture of the 1960s and 1970s.  As stated above, the FLQ did not initially 
employ the same strategy as other violent movements of its time period, but 
as time progressed they became open to new tactics like plane hijacking and 
kidnapping as a way to place themselves within the global movement and 
achieve international recognition. The FLNC already had a history of 
violence, therefore they were able to use tactics that were more violent and 
routinized without achieving the same shock factor as in Quebec; they were 
also much more focused on gaining momentum ‘at home’ rather than 
abroad. While the FLQ saw itself as part of a global New Left movement, the 
FLNC’s program of agrarian revolt was distinct to Corsica. Both groups 
sought to extend radical space in Corsica and Quebec in very different 
nations, which affected the strategy and choice of tactics. Tactical repertoires, 
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therefore, also helped to explain the patterns of sub-state violent contention 
in Quebec and Corsica.  
 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s mobilization model was also conducive 
to analyzing the patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and 
Corsica. The model expands on framing (Snow et al 1986) to involve the 
interaction between actors, their opponents and the media. While the use of 
RFE outlined the relationships between the extremists and their moderate 
factions- the FLQ and the PQ were separate and distinct, and did not 
respond to the moderate movement as the FLNC did, which chose strategy 
and tactics in response to political outcomes- the mobilization model looked 
at the interaction between the extremists themselves. In doing so, an arc of 
violent mobilization becomes apparent, and the mapping element of the cells 
within the movements becomes important to this thesis.  
 
After the FLQ and the FLNC had developed in 1963 and 1976, 
respectively, both movements responded to their sociopolitical environments 
and understanding the electoral and legal processes in colonial terms. The 
members of the FLQ and the FLNC felt disenfranchised with capitalism, so 
the exclusionary implications of majority rule and the lack of representation 
within constitutional groups influenced the members of the FLQ and the 
FLNC to propose alternative and open public spheres of political discussion.  
During the trajectories of the FLQ and the FLNC, the radical ideological 
space was maintained, extended or even minimized by a radicalization of 
tactics, shifting ideologies, the responses of the governing authorities, and 
the adaptability of the movements. Both networks shared an arc of violent 
mobilization: radicalization until a tipping point and then a decrease of 
nationalist-focused violence until dissolution. This overall pattern was 
mapped and explained in the empirical chapters through comparative 
historical analysis with social movement literature and RFE. 
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Why didn’t the FLQ re-form after the October Crisis as it had since the 
dissolution of the first cell in 1962? 
 
While the FLQ never had an intricate network to of cells, the fact that FLQ 
cells ceased to develop after the October Crisis of 1970 requires an 
explanation. Although it might be easy to suggest that the instigation of the 
WMA was enough to ‘break’ mobilization and violent activity under the 
umbrella term of the FLQ, I argue that the FLQ ceased to form further cells 
due to several reasons. 
 
First, the development of several separate cells during the 1960s to 
early 1970s implied that the FLQ were drawn by ideological commitments to 
Marxism, and attempted to radicalize and revolutionize Quebec against the 
colonial state. Felquistes were frustrated over social conditions, capitalism, 
the democratic electoral system and government. After the instigation of the 
WMA and the removal of Habeas Corpus during the October Crisis, other 
political options became apparent. The PQ became an effective political 
vehicle for political and economic change.  
 
Second, the New Left was losing momentum in North America in the 
1970s, and coupled with the debacle of the October Crisis, revolution was no 
longer likely.  FLQ cells were developed, between 1962 and 1970, by left-
wing extremists who subscribed to Marxism and post-colonialism. FLQ 
members held contrasting articulations as to their membership; there was a 
‘hodge podge’ of ideals, ideologies and levels of radicalization. While some 
of the students seemed to have articulated a nationalist struggle against the 
Anglophone bourgeoisie, others embraced Fanon’s (1961) theory that 
preached anti-colonial revolution through the strength of the working class, 
while others admitted to an involvement in the violence ‘for kicks’. Unlike 
Laurendeau (1990), who suggests that the FLQ had a strict ideological 
orientation from the beginning based on its first communiqué on the 8 march 
1963, I argue that although the FLQ articulated a need for revolution as a 
means to achieve an independent Quebec, it lacked focus and direction as a 
result of appeasing the different ideologies and levels of radicalism.  
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Third, the constitutional nationalist option had a political party for the 
first time with the appearance of the PQ. In 1968, the Mouvement 
Souveraineté-Association and the Ralliement National merged to form the 
Parti Quebecois, and was gaining political popularity due to the popular and 
dynamic René Levesque as its founder; Quebec finally had a political party 
that focused on independence gaining momentum. While the radical space 
was extended in this period, it was not due to the tactics of the FLQ but to 
the growing support for nationalism through the PQ.  
 
A lack of FLQ structure, a harsh response by the federal government 
and the populace to the murder or Pierre Laporte, and the decline in 
popularity of the New Left, together affected the dissolution and the absence 
of the FLQ after 1971.   
Why, in contrast to the FLQ, did the FLNC experience the scission de 1990 
and morph into a competitive arms race and fratricidal war? 
 
This question is ultimately easier to answer. The short answer suggests that 
there were a series of increasing tensions within the FLNC that mainly 
developed around the organization and decision-making of the direction, le 
Cunsigliu, while the constitutional politics became more effective towards 
pursuing independence. Chapter 5 described the tensions that were building 
within the FLNC during the late 1980s. Influenced by l’affair Schock, le 
Cunsigliu decided to decentralize the revolutionary tax that they collected 
from businesses to finance the network, which caused stir amongst the 
regional cells, or canals, and the central unit began to lose control of certain 
cells and individuals. The network became less unified and, therefore, less 
organized. The refusal to punish those who disobeyed le Cunsigliu also 
meant that they had less control as the members began to test the central 
power of the FLNC.  
 
Finally, during the late 1980s, as members radicalized and began to 
lose sight of Corsican independence, nationalism and cultural and 
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environmental demands, many of the older members that had been a part of 
the FLNC throughout most of its existence began to leave the network to 
participate in the moderate political movement. With Francois Mitterand and 
the socialists in power there was more opportunity for discussion, especially 
with Joxe as Corsica’s champion; there was, therefore, more opportunity by 
supporting the constitutional groups and parties. Just as McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly (2001) suggest, polarization involves the widening of political and 
social space between claimants in a contentious episode forcing the 
previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other or both 
extremes (21). By ‘hollowing out’ members stuck between the two extremes, 
polarization raises the stakes of winning or losing and promotes violence 
with the other members (22).  As the less violent members left the FLNC for 
the moderate movement, the FLNC radicalized tactics and strategy, and 
grew increasingly isolated in terms of support.  
 
Unfortunately, this political support by the state was in fact the 
‘tipping point’ that led to the scission and further violence. Without the 
leadership of Poggioli, Stella, Batesti and their contemporaries, the FLNC not 
only radicalized, but it also divided into two factions that began to compete 
in an arms race. The decentralization of finances furthered the competition, 
and soon the factions were employing illegal means in order to gain more 
financing, arms, and members. Particularly fascinating is that Joxe was the 
first interior minister to view Corsica as a separate entity from France, yet 
while attempting to end the violence in Corsica with an engagement rather 
than repression, he spurred an increase in insurgency and violent activity. 
 
The FLQ and the FLNC should not be considered unified movements 
against a unified opponent in a social vacuum. The introduction was 
necessary to frame the sociopolitical environment in Quebec in 1963-1971 
and Corsica in 1976-1990, respectively. The three empirical chapters analyzed 
comparative mechanisms to develop patterns of sub-state violent contention; 
both the FLQ and the FLNC adapted to changes in sociopolitical 
environments, influences and governments over the course of their 
trajectories. While the FLQ and the FLNC are no longer active in Quebec and 
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Corsica (the FLNC laid down arms in 2014 after my fieldwork), both sub-
states continue to fight for their identities, politically and culturally. Many 
jailed felquistes and FLNC members returned to society and embraced the 
peaceful and democratic electoral processes. In Quebec, many ex-felquistes 
survive a new generation that continues to shape radical space with student 
movements and action. In Corsica, violence continues without the nationalist 
demands of the FLNC.  
 
Quebecois culture, in the 45 years since the October Crisis, continues 
to embrace activism and protest. Movements- especially the recent student 
movement- mobilize and gain support in a way that is different than the rest 
of English Canada; therefore, I speculate that radical space continues to be 
shaped and maintained in Quebec. The shaping of radical space today, 
however, is now constitutional rather than violent. Parties on the nationalist 
left of the political spectrum, Québec Solidaire and Option Nationale, 
attempt to move the PQ to reinstate itself on the left. These groups are more 
social democratic and radical, and attempt to shape radical ideological space 
by influencing both the PQ and its constituents to radicalize.  
 
An arc of violent mobilization is conducive to the development of the 
two movements: an initial mobilization that developed from a frustration 
with moderate political groups; a radicalization until turning points that 
included the assassination of Pierre Laporte by the FLQ and the division of 
the FLNC into competitive factions; and then a decline of nationalist activity, 
mobilization and recruitment. Although the FLQ and the FLNC experienced 
certain periods when they maintained or extended radical space, they both 
undermined their own public support through radicalization and were 
unable to sustain the extension of radical space, as reflected by RFE. Many of 
the members and supporters, instead, turned their political action to the 
electoral system in support of the moderate nationalist movement. 
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“Mon histoire n’est pas un recit guerrier, mais bien une histoire d’amour 
avec ses joies et ses chagrins, celle qu’a vécue un Québécois, un militant du FLQ, un 
révolutionnaire… Salut Quebec, je t’aime” (Schirm 1982, 211). 
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